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The Mexican War served as a social battleground for issues such as
professionalism, racism, and anti-Catholicism for American regular and volunteer junior
officers. Their reaction to these issues influenced and changed the nature of debates to
destroy the regular army and close the military academy at West Point. Many in Congress
and the United States held a deep-seated fear of the regular army that dated back to the
colonial era. They feared that a standing army would become a tool of tyranny and
destroy a republican government. Instead, many Americans preferred a volunteer system.
They argued that volunteers were virtuous citizens who responded to danger and returned
to civilian life when the danger was over. The Mexican War demonstrated that these
ideals were not reality, though. Because of this, many in the United States realized that
the regular army could safely exist within a republican government, and that the
volunteers were not the virtuous patriots many thought.
Both regular and volunteer officers reacted with bigotry toward their Catholic
opponents in Mexico. Anti-Catholicism impacted the service experience of the junior
officers in Mexico. As members of a mostly protestant nation, they pillaged and stole

from the many Catholic churches that lay in their path. As members of what they viewed
as a superior religion, many officers felt that the Catholic church and faith was a fair
target during the Mexican War. Race impacted the service of the junior officers in
Mexico. American officers created a racial hierarchy in Mexico that ranked the Mexican
populace in various stages of whiteness. The highest social order consisted of those they
viewed as white. The lower classes they viewed as a mix of African and Native
American. Both regular and volunteers responded in the same manner to these issues.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

By 1848 the size of the United States had expanded rapidly since the nation’s
founding. What had began as a loose collection of states along the Atlantic coast, now
stretched to the Pacific Ocean. The recent war with Mexico had added vast expanses of
new terrain to the United States, and greatly expanded its frontier. The Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, which brought the Mexican War to a successful conclusion for the
United States, settled the boundary between Mexico and Texas at the Rio Grande, and
added the territories of Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, and California to the United States.
In return, the United States assumed Mexico’s debts in these regions and paid the
Mexican government $15 million for the new territory. The war, which had begun in
1846, witnessed a string of resounding victories for the United States, with the American
Army winning every major battle despite being outnumbered in the majority of its
battles.1
While the armies of Mexico and the United States met on the battlefield, another
war was taking place behind the scenes. In particular social issues such as racism, antiCatholicism, and professionalism influenced the experiences of American junior officers

1
John S. D. Eisenhower, So Far from God: The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848 (Norman: The
University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 363.
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throughout the conflict. For example, anti-Catholic attitudes and rhetoric pushed these
officers to plunder Mexican churches and assault Catholic clergy while in Mexico.
Racism also became a prevalent force among American junior officers during the
Mexican War as officers quickly created a racial hierarchy among the Mexican people.
Anti-Catholicism and racism were also closely linked to manifest destiny, which argued
that it was the ultimate destiny of the United States to expand westward. Throughout the
war, Regular and volunteer officers offered a scathing racial and religious critique of the
people of Mexico populace. By pointing out what they perceived as the racial and
religious inferiority of the Mexican people these officers excused manifest destiny. In
their view, it was acceptable to expand and take this land because the United States
represented the superior racial and religious force on the North American continent.
Professionalism also divided the ranks of the junior officers. The American army
in Mexico was comprised of a combination of regular and volunteer forces. These two
groups quickly began to ridicule and criticize the practices of the other. For all of this
criticism, though, these two groups both responded to anti-Catholicism and racism in a
similar manner. This demonstrated that professionalism had its limits as it did not create a
class of professional regular officers separate from society. The tension between the
regulars and volunteers reflected views within American society and Congress regarding
the future of the regular army and West Point. Prior to the war, many members of
Congress wanted to destroy the regular army and close West Point. By the end of the
Mexican War, though, these sentiments had given way to a general acceptance of both
West Point and the regular army.

2

Prior to the outbreak of the Mexican War many in Congress and across the nation
had called for the closure of West Point and the destruction of the regular army. To them,
these institutions represented a tool of tyranny and despotism. These fears dated back to
the colonial period, and reached their peak in the years prior to the Mexican War. During
the Mexican War, though, many people realized that the regulars and volunteers were not
as dissimilar as they feared. Instead, the two groups reacted to issues such as race in the
same manner, thus proving that both groups were made up of average Americans. The
regular army, they realized, could successfully operate in a republic without becoming
tyrannical, and the ranks of the volunteers were not comprised of the virtuous patriots
that many at first thought. The actions of the regular and volunteer junior officers during
the Mexican War changed this debate concerning the closure of West Point and the
destruction of the regular army by challenging previously held notions regarding these
two parts of the army.
By 1846 professionalism had become an issue that divided the ranks of the army,
and created tension between the volunteers and regulars. To better understand this issue,
it is necessary to define and explain the nature of military professionalism during the
1840s. The junior officer class of the regular army embodied military professionalism
during the Mexican War. Therefore, professionalism referred to the officers of the regular
army, most of whom had been educated at West Point by 1846, and who viewed the
regular army as their career. The institutionalized education they received at West Point
was instrumental to the process of professionalism. Among other things, all graduates of
the military academy received a heavy dose of engineering classes. As such, all graduates
were essentially trained as engineers. This was important given the role of the antebellum
3

regular army. While volunteer forces and militia could be useful for a defensive role,
many across the nation realized their limitations in offensive warfare. Therefore, the
regular army played a key role in offensive foreign wars such as that with Mexico.
Furthermore, by the 1840s the United States had already begun to amass an empire,
which Thomas Jefferson referred to as an “empire of liberty,” that would stretch to the
Pacific Ocean by the conclusion of the Mexican War. The engineering background of the
regular junior officers proved quite useful to this process. Basically, the regular army
maintained the American empire by building forts and roads, and garrisoning the ever
expanding frontier. Because of this, the educational process these officers received at
West Point is a key factor in the military professionalism of the antebellum army. Not
only did these officers view the regular army as their career, but they had received a
formal education in the duties and roles of a soldier from the military academy at West
Point.
In order to introduce this work, it is necessary to provide some brief overview of
the war. This will introduce the general course of the war’s campaigns and offer a point
of reference for the places and engagements referenced throughout this dissertation. The
Mexican War began as a result of the American annexation of Texas in 1845 and an
ensuing debate between the United States and Mexico concerning the boundary of that
territory. While Mexico insisted on the Nueces River as the boundary separating the two
nations, the United States demanded that the Rio Grande represented the true boundary.2

In order to justify his demands in the face of Whig opposition, the Democratic President James Polk
argued that the Louisiana Purchase had included Texas all the way to the Rio Grande, and that the land in
question was already part of the United States. No one at the time really believed these claims, but it did
provide Polk with a claim to being the aggrieved party in the dispute with Mexico.
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Unable to reach an agreement on the issue, President James K. Polk dispatched John
Slidell to negotiate a settlement that included an American offer to pay $25 million for a
settlement of the boundary dispute and acquisition of New Mexico, Arizona, and
California.3 During these negotiations, Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor, along with
most of the regular army, to the Nueces River in Texas in case hostilities broke out.
When Slidell’s mission ended in failure Polk ordered Taylor to move the army to the Rio
Grande. Upon learning of this move, which Mexico interpreted as an invasion by a
foreign force, the Mexican government dispatched an army under the direction of
General Pedro de Ampudia, who was soon replaced by General Mariano Arista.4 When
this force arrived, Taylor decided to leave a garrison behind on the Rio Grande at Fort
Texas, soon to be known as Fort Brown, and return with his primary force to Point Isabel
in order to retrieve supplies and hopefully draw the Mexican army into an engagement in
open terrain.5 Following this movement, Arista positioned his army to block Taylor’s
return to the garrison at Fort Brown. This movement led to the first two battles of the war
at Palo Alto on 8 May 1846 and Resaca de la Palma the following day. Taylor’s
outnumbered force won both battles, and successfully relieved the garrison at Fort
Brown. Both of these battles had been fought entirely by the regular army, as no
volunteers had yet arrived in the theater of operations. This last fact, proved especially
important for the regular, as many officers hoped to win several battles before the
Recently, Amy Greenberg has argued that Polk intentionally started a war between the United States and
Mexico to see his expansionist vision realized. In particular, in A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the
1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico, Greenberg noted that Polk never believed Slidell would succeed in his
mission to negotiate a settlement between the two nations. Instead, this simply offered him the opportunity
to argue that he had attempted peace, but Mexico had refused.
4
Eisenhower, So Far from God, 64
5
The post was named Ft. Brown to honor the fort’s first commander who fell during the Mexican siege of
the outpost.
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volunteers could arrive. They hoped this would demonstrate the importance and necessity
of the regular army, and would counteract any Congressional attempts to destroy the
regular army or close West Point. As such, when Resaca de la Palma and Palo Alto ended
in success many regular officers’ letters reflected a sense of pride that these victories
were achieved without the help of the volunteers.6
Following Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, Taylor moved his army to
Matamoras in order to await the arrival of reinforcements. Once his army had been
reinforced and resupplied, he put his army in motion once again with the goal of
capturing the city of Monterrey. From 21-24 September 1846 Taylor’s army fought for
possession of Monterrey. Assaulting the city proved a daunting challenge for the
American army. The left flank of the Mexican position rested on two high hills known as
Independencia, upon which the Mexican army had fortified a structure known as the
Bishop’s palace, and Federación. The Mexican center and right flank also rested on
several other fortified positions. Taylor developed a two-fold plan for taking the city. He
sent General William Worth with most of the army’s regulars on a flanking march in
order to assault Independencia and Federación. Simultaneously, in order to pin the
Mexican army in place and prevent them from reinforcing these positions, Taylor ordered

K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974), 52-59;
Eisenhower, So Far from God, 71-87; Amy S. Greenberg, A Wicked War: Polk Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846
U.S. Invasion of Mexico (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2012), 119; Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh, West Pointers
and the Civil War: The Old Army in War Peace (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
2009), 60-61; Matin Dugard, The Training Ground: Grant, Lee, Sherman, and Davis in the Mexican War,
1846-1848 (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2008), 83-102; Samuel J. Watson, Peacekeepers and
Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1821-1846 (Lawrence: The University
Press of Kansas, 2013), 404-406. Samuel J. Watson has an interesting take on the impact of Palo Alto and
Resaca de la Palma. In particular, he noted that the regular army did not support the the Mexican War
whole heartedly until after the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. The proximity of an enemy,
however, stirred their patriotic zeal.
6
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William Butler and John Garland to launch a feint against the Mexican right and center.
Worth’s assault met with success, but Butler and Garland’s feint ended up devolving into
a series of costly and mostly fruitless frontal assaults. Worth’s assault, however,
effectively outflanked the Mexican position and threatened to capture the entire Mexican
force. Fearing the destruction of his army, Ampudia requested a truce which ended the
battle and allowed the Mexican army to escape the area. The battle of Monterrey became
a major point of contention between the regulars and volunteers as both claimed credit for
the victory. Several officers reflected their disgust that other units had attempted to claim
credit for the victory when they felt it rightly belonged to their own regiment. Also, the
city was garrisoned by volunteers for several months following the battle. This created
problems when these volunteers took their frustration on being relegated to what they
considered a dull assignment out on the city’s populace and churches. These churches
became the scene of anti-Catholic actions when soldiers broke into and plundered these
churches.7
While Taylor had achieved great success in northern Mexico, both he and policy
makers in Washington realized victory could not be achieved on this front given its
remote nature and distance from Mexico City. Therefore, General Winfield Scott
received orders to land an army at Vera Cruz and proceed overland to capture Mexico
City. To help bolster this new invasion, President Polk ordered Taylor to dispatch the

Dugard, The Training Ground, 201-217; Eisenhower, So Far From God, 117-151; Bauer, The Mexican
War, 81-105; Greenberg, A Wicked War, 126-132. When President Polk learned of the truce he was
absolutely furious that Taylor allowed the Mexican army to escape. In his defense, Taylor argued that he
did not have sufficient numbers to capture and guard the Mexican army, and that his own army had
suffered costly casualty rates in its assaults. Furthermore, while the American Army had gained a favorable
position by 24 September the Mexican army still held enough defensible terrain inside the city to make a
final assault very costly on the American army.
7
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majority of his regulars to join Scott. Since this left Taylor with a reduced fighting force,
Polk ordered Taylor to remain on the defensive. Taylor ignored this directive, however,
and began an advance on the city of Saltillo. In response, General Lopez de Santa Anna,
who had once again gained political power in Mexico, gathered an army of 20,000 and
marched to intercept Taylor’s force of 5,000.8 From 22-23 February 1847 Taylor engaged
Santa Anna’s army near Buena Vista. Taylor won a victory, but the engagement was
close and costly. Following the battle, Taylor withdrew his army to Monterrey where it
remained for the remainder of the war.9
On 12 March 1847 Scott’s army landed outside Vera Cruz and quickly besieged
the city, which surrendered on 27 March 1847. Following the fall of Vera Cruz Scott
began a march on Mexico City over the National Road.10 Scott fought a series of battles
against Santa Anna’s army on his way to Mexico. The most important of these battles
occurred at Cerro Gordo in April 1847. Scott’s victory at Cerro Gordo proved significant
as it forced Santa Anna out of one of the last defensible positions before Mexico City. By
August 1847 Scott’s army had arrived outside the Mexican capital. Following several

Santa Anna’s return to power is one of the more interesting aspects of the Mexican War. Prior to the war
Santa Anna had been exiled to Cuba after being ousted from power. Once war broke out between Mexico
and the United States, Santa Anna contacted American agents and informed them that if they could get him
into Mexico he would seize power and negotiate an end to hostilities. The U.S thus landed Santa Anna at
Vera Cruz, and he quickly regained political power in Mexico. Instead of negotiating an end to the war,
however, Santa Anna deepened Mexico’s commitment to the war. In his defense, Santa Anna probably
could not have maintained power if he had negotiated a peace settlement with the U.S.
9
Eisenhower, So Far from God, 166-194; Dugard, The Training Ground, 277-285; Bauer, The Mexican
War, 210-221.
10
Scott was in a hurry to move his army away from the Mexican coast at Vera Cruz due to the impending
onset of the malaria season in these areas. Due to this he wanted to move his army into central Mexico’s
mountains to escape this sickness.
8
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battles around Mexico City, including the costly assault on the fortress of Chapultepec on
12 and 13 September 1847 Scott’s army entered the city.11
While Taylor and Scott fought almost all of the war’s major battles, their
campaigns did not represent the only theaters of the war. In particular, President Polk had
his eyes on the conquest of California.12 To achieve this, Polk dispatched a force under
Stephen Kearny to take possession of lightly defended New Mexico. His expedition
departed in July 1846 and captured the city of Santa Fe without much opposition.
Kearny’s force met its greatest opposition of the campaign in January 1847 when local
Mexicans and Pueblo Indians launched an unsuccessful rebellion in Taos against
American occupation.13
The Mexican War ended on 2 February 1848 with the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. The massive expense of new territory brought into the United States by the
treaty further impacted the debate regarding the future of the regular army, as many in
Congress realized that the regular army would be needed to garrison and patrol the new
frontier. Furthermore, West Point would be needed to produce officers for that army.
Also, no one could deny that the war had been brought to a swift and successful

For a more detailed understanding of Scott’s Mexico City Campaign refer to Timothy D. Johnson, A
Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2013). Also,
refer to K, Jack Baeur, The Mexican War, 1846-1848, and John S. D. Eisenhower, So Far from God: The
U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848. It is interesting that Eisenhower contends that Scott fought one of the
most brilliant campaigns in American history, and was also the greatest general in American history. This
is an interesting argument since his father was former president and general Dwight Eisenhower.
12
Polk’s vision for California was fulfilled in the years following the Mexican War when gold was
discovered at Sutter’s Mill. In many ways, it might be said that this confirmed Manifest destiny as the
proper course in the eyes of many Americans.
13
Refer to K. Jack Baeur, The Mexican War, pages 164-196 for more information on the campaigns in
California. The Bear Flag republic did not last long, but it had become clear by this point that Mexican
control of the region was clearly slipping.
11
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conclusion, and many Congressmen and newspapers grudgingly acknowledged that the
regular had been instrumental to that success14
The American army in Mexico comprised two separate and often rival forces of
regular and volunteer regiments. In Mexico, almost all of the junior officers in the regular
army had attended the United States Military Academy at West Point.15 Most volunteer
regiments, on the other hand, elected their own officers, few of whom had any formal
military training. One such officer, Stanislaus Lasalle of Indiana, had been a farmer prior
to the outbreak of hostilities. The volunteer system was rooted in the militia organization,
but as historian Paul Foos noted, by 1846 the militia system had become almost
completely useless as a legitimate military force. Due to this, Polk issued a call for state
sponsored volunteer regiments instead of utilizing existing militia organizations.16
Throughout the war, the regulars and volunteers viewed each other with contempt
and derision. This animosity had its roots in America’s colonial heritage, which feared a
standing army as a tool of despotism. Because of these fears, many favored the citizensoldier model of the militia. The problem, was that this system was a mostly defensive
force. The American Revolution enflamed this view, as American colonists demonstrated
against the presence of British regulars in the colonies. This continued throughout the

Perhaps the best political history of the Mexican War, and one which places the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo into its political perspective is Amy S. Greenberg’s A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the
1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico. For works that study the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in relation to military
events refer to K. Jack Baeur, The Mexican War, 1846-1848, John S. D. Eisenhower, So Far From God:
The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848. Also refer to Justin H. Smith’s two volume work The War with
Mexico. Smith’s work was published in 1919, much earlier than the previously mentioned works. Smith
looks at the war almost completely from the American perspective and presents a patriotic view of the
Mexican War as a just and successful war.
15
This was the first major war in American history in which West Point trained officers played a major
role.
16
Paul Foos, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict during the Mexican-American
War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 31-32.
14
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early republic while the United States struggled with the idea of a standing regular army.
Throughout this period, many called for the destruction of the regular army and the
closure of West Point, which provided the regular army’s officers. For these reasons, the
size of the regular army remained small prior to the outbreak of the Mexican War. In
1846, for example, the regular army only officially numbered some 8,509 officers and
men, though the actual total size of the regular army present for duty was probably closer
to 6,000.17
Founded in 1802, the goal of West Point throughout the antebellum period was to
create a professional class of officers for the regular army. To these ends, West Point
attempted to emulate European military academies as closely as possible in order to
generate officers capable of leading traditional engagements in set piece battles. Many of
the texts used by West Point were translated from European, especially French, works.
During its early days, the army sent several envoys to travel Europe in search of any texts
that might be useful to West Point. To supplement this, the curriculum at West Point
focused heavily on engineering and the sciences. However, this education often did not
match the realities of combat in America at this time. Between the end of the War of
1812 and the outbreak of the Mexican War, the only engagements the regular army
fought were small isolated actions on the frontier against Native American opponents
whose tactics more closely resembled guerrilla warfare than the linear European tactics
that these officers had been trained to deal with. Prior to 1846 then, except for the War of

Wayne Wei-Siang Hseih, West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and Peace (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 12.
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1812, the primary function of the regular army had been to garrison and defend the
frontier against Native Americans.
West Point did succeed in creating a professional class of officers, however. In
1812 only 89 officers had graduated from West Point, but 523 graduates served during
the Mexican War. As professionals, these officers made a career of the army, and had
received formal military training at West Point. Officers such as George B. McClellan,
George Meade, Robert E. Lee, and Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana, among many
others, all became career officers in the regular army. Furthermore, during the Mexican
War, these officers thought of themselves as professionals and thus separate from the
officer corps of the volunteers. As such, they felt that the army was their career. As
historian James L. Morrison, Jr. noted, “the military academy, on the other hand, existed
solely for the purpose of producing professional soldiers, or more accurately, engineers
capable of functioning as soldiers.”18 By creating a corps of officers who were also
engineers, West Point linked education with professionalism, which suggests that
professionalism meant more to these officers than just being fighting men.
Their status as professionals drove regular army officers to view the volunteers
with disgust. Louis Menand recently stressed that professions, such as the regular army,
assert the right to educate and judge their members by their own standards.19 Given that
regular officers certainly viewed themselves as professionals, this helps explain the
criticism that regular officers leveled at the volunteers. Furthermore, West Point helped
instill this professional attitude of judgement in the officer corps. As such, regular

James L. Morrison, Jr., “The Best School in the World:” West Point, the Pre-Civil War Years, 1833-1866
(Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1986), 97, 103, 111.
19
Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001), 59-60.
18
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officers criticized the volunteers based on the standards and ideals instilled in them at the
military academy. William B. Skelton noted the impact of professionalism on the regular
army officer corps. In particular, he defined professionalization as “the process by which
professional standards and procedures are applied in fields formerly handled by intuitive
or empirical means-rather than in themes of professionalism as an achieved state.”20 One
of the impacts this mentality had on the officer corps was that it generated a feeling of
corporateness or “a feeling among group members that they constitute a subculture
distinct from the rest of society.”21 While it might be true that professionalism instilled
feelings of separation from society, the reality looked much different, as military
professionalism could not train society out of individuals.
Throughout the early republic, the regular army and, by extension, West Point
faced numerous assaults from Congress and the American people. These assaults took
several different forms. Opponents of the military academy argued that West Point was
utilized to create an aristocratic officer class, and thus divide the United States along
class lines. For example, Davy Crockett, who was well known for his opposition to West
Point, noted of the military academy that “this college system went into practice to draw
a line of demarcation between the two classes of society-it separated the rich from the
children of the poor.”22 As Crockett argued, many viewed West Point as contrary to the
egalitarian ideals of the American Revolution. By extension, many viewed a standing
army as contrary to the ideals of a republican society, and linked the regular army with

William B. Skelton, “Professionalization in the U.S. Army Officer Corps during the Age of Jackson,”
Armed Forces and Society Vol. 1, No. 443, 444.
21
Skelton, “Professionalization in the U.S. Army Officer Corps,” 444.
22
Morrison, The Best School in the World, 112.
20
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tyranny. Lastly, others viewed the regular army and West Point as unnecessary. They felt
that the militia system would prove adequate to handle any situation that might arise.
Ideally, the militia could quickly expand in a time of crisis. Following a period of crisis,
the members of the militia could return to their civilian pursuits. The problem, which
many quickly realized during the Revolutionary War, was that militias rarely worked
according to this ideal.
Animosity between the regular army and volunteers dated back to America’s
earliest experiences in warfare. Indeed, historian Amy Greenberg noted that by the
outbreak of the Mexican War “like most Americans, the volunteers questioned whether a
democratic republic like the United States had any need for a standing army, and doubted
that men serving for wages could be relied upon in a fight.” She continued by pointing
out that “soon after the Revolution, Congress declared that peacetime standing armies
were ‘inconsistent with the principles of republican government,’ and ‘dangerous to the
liberties of a free people.’”23 Fred Anderson also noted that throughout the French and
Indian War colonial militias, or provincials, clashed with British regulars. The result, as
Anderson pointed out was that “New England provincials of the Seven Years’ War
subscribed to notions about military service and warfare that were wholly incompatible
with the professional ideals and assumptions of their British regular army allies.”24
Specifically, provincial militias expected to negotiate the terms of their service, and be
able to fight when, where, and under whomever they wished.

Amy S. Greenberg, A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 130.
24
Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years’ War (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984), viii.
23
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The American Militia experience during the Revolutionary War was a formative
period informing American fears of a regular army. For example, historian Steven
Rosswurm argued that the American militia experience in Philadelphia led to a shift in
class power and greater social equality within Philadelphia and Pennsylvania as a
whole.25 The militia experience therefore had a social leveling effect. Americans
championed the militiamen as the ideal citizen-soldiers, who joined the army during a
crisis, but then laid down their arms and returned to civilian life following the conclusion
of hostilities. Furthermore, these militias were designed to be a defensive force, and were
not expected to undertake major offensive operations. For this, the Continental Army
would be required. Wayne E. Lee, for example, studied colonial militias and Continental
regulars in North Carolina and argued that the necessity for violence legitimated the
means utilized to execute that violence, which helped lead to more defensive warfare
instead of the usually excepted offensive.26 Furthermore, Lee noted that differences in
discipline between continental regulars and colonial militias “arose in part from the
fundamentally ‘democratic’ nature of the militia organizations.”27 Militias, they argued,
built upon and helped foster the democratic ideals of the republic. Lastly, Lee pointed out
that violence itself could become a motivating factor driving soldiers during the
Revolutionary War. This suggested that revenge could be a motive for service in these
militias, which demonstrated a potential for violence among the volunteer and militia
forces. Therefore, while many viewed the militia as representing the democratic ideal,

Steven Rosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class: The Philadelphia Militia and the “Lower Sort” during the
American Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 11.
26
Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of Violence in Riot
and War (Gainesville: The University Press of Florida, 2001), 5-7.
27
Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina, 207.
25
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they could also become a violent vindictive force. As John Resch and Walter Sargent
noted, Lee “reminds us of yet another motivation: whatever may have motivated men to
enlist, violence itself could become a great motivator, prompting victims to strike back in
almost any way they could.”28 This theme of violence as motivation for enlisting
persisted widely within the ranks of the volunteers throughout the Mexican War, as many
volunteers viewed the Mexican populace and church as open targets for violence and
plunder.
John Shy noted that the revolutionary experience also left “certain military
attitudes…implanted” on American society.29 In particular, he argued that the Revolution
provided American society with “a deep seated respect for the kind of military prowess
that had become so closely bound up with the very definition of American nationhood, a
respect tinged with contempt for military professionalism which was viewed as
unnecessary, ineffectual, and thus somehow un-American.”30 Overall, this literature
paints a picture of a militia system that was in constant conflict with the regular army. It
also suggested that the army was somehow unAmerican while the militias represented
republican virtue. As Shy noted, the importance of this is that “war changes society, that
strategy and military policy are aspects of politics, that the incidence of military service
reflects and affects social structure, that the events and patterns of armed struggle help
shape the way people think about themselves and others.”31 The Revolutionary War was
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formative, and the lessons learned during the Revolution, influenced the future
development of the United States, and led to attempts to close West Point and destroy the
regular army. In particular, the Revolutionary Period provided a template for contempt
and mistrust of the regular army system and the institutions, such as West Point, which
supported it. Because of these debates, the regulars and volunteers viewed each other
with suspicion throughout the Mexican War. Despite these differences, though, when
confronted with social issues such as racism and anti-Catholicism these two forces
reacted with surprisingly similar responses of revulsion toward Mexico.
Though historians have not focused on the Mexican War as much as the
Revolution and the Civil War, the conduct and consequences of the Mexican War
decided this long-standing debate between the militia, or volunteers, and the regular
army. The historiography of the Mexican War has focused on two major areas. First, the
vast majority of the literature on the war focuses on the movements of the primary field
armies and revolves around traditional military histories of the war. For the most part
these histories fail to deal with social issues within the army during the war. Most of
these works argue that the regular army performed better than the volunteers both on and
off of the battlefield. For example, these works blame the majority of the war’s atrocities
on the volunteers, especially the Texas rangers. Along these lines, Amy Greenberg
recently reported that “volunteers, lacking both training and discipline, were not only less
reliable under fire than regulars, and disproportionately susceptible to communicable
disease, in part because of their poor sanitation practices, but also committed atrocities
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against Mexican civilians that would come to shock Americans back home.”32 While the
volunteers certainly participated in their fair share of these events, as this dissertation will
point out, the regulars reflected the same attitudes of anti-Catholicism and racism in the
same manner as the volunteers. This demonstrated that the regular and volunteer forces
were not as different and distinct from one another as many like to believe.
Other historians have approached the social and cultural history of the army
during the Mexican War. For example, James McCaffrey and Richard Bruce Winders
offer studies of the American army in Mexico, focusing on issues such as the daily life,
health, and equipment of American soldiers in Mexico. Both works demonstrate
differences in discipline between the regulars and volunteers. Winders, for example,
offers a chapter on the regulars, and a separate chapter on the volunteers that stressed the
differences such as fighting ability and general knowledge of warfare between the
regulars and volunteers. While there were some differences between the regulars and
volunteers, as chapter 1 will demonstrate, these differences should not be overstated. The
regulars, for example, proved just as susceptible to social and cultural issues as the
volunteers. Because of these similarities, many realized that the regular army was not an
unAmerican force of tyranny. Instead, they were simply Americans. Furthermore, when
the volunteers behaved so badly in Mexico, many in the United States began to question
the merits of a volunteer force.
Another prevalent trend in Mexican War historiography is the utilization of the
Mexican War as a springboard for discussion of the Civil War. The problem with this
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approach is that it overlooks the importance that the Mexican War had for both its own
sake and Jacksonian America. Martin Dugard typifies this approach to the study of the
Mexican War. In The Training Ground: Grant, Lee, Sherman, and Davis in the Mexican
War, 1846-1848, Dugard examines the battlefield exploits of several future Civil War
leaders and the impact that the Mexican War had on their career. He argues that the war
served as education for their future careers during the Civil War.
While there is little doubt that the Mexican War was a valuable experience for
many Civil War generals, it was also important as a stage on which Jacksonian social and
cultural issues played themselves out. This dissertation is concerned with the social and
cultural struggles with issues like anti-Catholicism and racism which defined the
experience of junior officers in Mexico. Many issues that plagued Jacksonian America
impacted the American military experience during the Mexican War. In turn the
experience of American junior officers in Mexico impacted these social issues. For
example debates concerning anti-Catholicism and racism raged prior to the outbreak of
war in 1846. These issues influenced the manner in which American junior officers
viewed their Mexican opponents. In turn, their reaction to these issues influenced these
domestic debates. Also, prior to the Mexican War, traditional American fears of the
regular army had led to an atmosphere in which the future existence of both the regular
army and West Point were threatened. The American military experience in Mexico,
however, convinced many to admit, if grudgingly, that the regular army served a
necessary purpose. Furthermore, many realized that West Point was instrumental in
providing trained officers for the regular army.
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Many have noted the differences which existed between the regular and volunteer
forces during the Mexican War. These histories often argue that the regular army asserted
its sovereignty and professional presence by defeating the Mexican field armies and
conquering Mexico, thus winning the war. The volunteers, these works often argue,
pillaged their way through Mexico and acted more lack a rabble, or mob, than an
organized military force. This dissertation blurs this line of separation. Instead both
groups exhibited racist attitudes towards their opponents and both both groups displayed
bigoted attitudes concerning the Catholic faith of the Mexican people. In this manner
professionalism was not the dividing force which many have previously noted.
Professionalism did create tensions between these two groups, however. For example,
regular officers clearly viewed themselves as members of a separate and distinct group
from the volunteers. As such, they ridiculed what they viewed as a lack of military
discipline among the volunteers. Among those who noted the differences between these
two groups, Paul Foos argued that “the most striking feature of military life in the
Mexican War was the sharp distinction between regular and volunteer organizations.”33
When combined with American views of manifest destiny, this racism generated an
atmosphere in which American officers felt they were entitled, as members of a superior
race, to treat the Mexican populace with utter contempt.34 Anti-Catholicism also
impacted the experience of American officers in Mexico. As citizens of a predominantly
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protestant nation fighting against a Catholic enemy, religion became a major issue for
these officers. In particular, any example of Catholicism came under fire from both
regulars and volunteers as these men abused the church’s property, its clergy, and
parishioners. The status of the regulars as professionals could not insulate them from
these issues. Instead, social issues influenced and impacted the wartime experiences of
both volunteer and regular officers. This dissertation confirms that warfare does not
happen in isolation from social and cultural issues, but is closely connected with them. As
the experience of both volunteer and regular American officers in Mexico demonstrates,
warfare and social/cultural issues were inseparable in the Mexican War.
The letters of the regular and volunteer junior officers who participated in the
Mexican War offer an interesting subject matter. This dissertation utilizes the letters of 54
officers who fought in Mexico. This includes 25 volunteer officers and 29 regular
officers. Of the volunteers, 12 were from the South while 7 were from northern states.
The rest were from border or midwest states. These numbers are proportional to the
number of troops from each region, as the south raised more regiments than northern
states. Both regular and volunteers officers often came from a higher socio-economic
standing than the average rank and file they led into battle. As such, these men were
educated, and kept in touch with the pulse of politics and social issues that raged across
the nation. Because of this, these men had a much broader understanding of the situation
than the common soldiers under their command. Also, since both regular and volunteer
officers interacted with each other throughout the war, a study of junior officers offers an
insight into the impacts of professionalism on the antebellum army. When they went to
war, these men became prolific letter writers, sending news from the front back to loved
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ones at home. These letters are the principle source for this work. They reflected the
issues these men felt were important. More than just military concerns found their way
into these letters, as these men quickly began to apply American social and cultural
norms to Mexican society. The officer corps of the United States quickly began to
racialize Mexico and its inhabitants, and utilized this to excuse their abuses of the local
populace. When they arrived in Mexico both the volunteer and regular junior officers
began to create a social hierarchy for Mexico’s people. The whiter they viewed someone
the higher they stood on that social scale. For example, those of European decent stood
on top of the racial order while those of African and Native American decent inhabited
the bottom of this racial order. In a similar manner, they utilized the anti-Catholic
sentiments popular across the United States at the time to excuse there excesses against
the Catholic Church in Mexico. Along these lines, these officers viewed the fabled wealth
of Mexico’s Catholic Churches as ripe for the taking. As a result, many quickly began to
plunder and steal from these churches.
The regular and volunteer officers who fought in Mexico represented a diverse
group of society, and each had a unique background. Stanislaus Lasselle, a volunteer
Captain in the 1st Indiana, was part owner of Lasselle and Polk Dry Goods in
Logansport, Indiana prior to the war. He was also the publisher of the local newspaper,
The Logansport Canal Telegraph. Since he was Catholic, Lasselle’s faith would be tested
in Mexico, as the church became the target of plunder and violence. Lasselle was typical
of the middle class officers who comprised the volunteer officer corps. Syndenham
Moore, a Captain in the 1st Alabama, offered another view of the volunteer officer corps.
Moore lived in Greensboro, Alabama with his wife and children, and held a minor
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judicial seat in Greene County. He also owned several slaves. One of those slaves, named
Peter, traveled with Moore to Mexico. Sadly, Peter died of a fever while in Mexico.
Moore went to Mexico hoping to make a name for himself on the field of battle. He
hoped this would translate into a higher judicial seat when he returned. In the end, his
hopes went unfulfilled, as his regiment spent their entire enlistment on garrison duty in
various Mexican towns. Moore would be elected to House of Representatives, but this
did not happen until 1857.
The vast majority of regular officers did not come from such diverse
backgrounds. By 1846 almost all of the regular junior officer corps had graduated from
West Point, and had begun careers in the regular army. Several, such as Lucien B.
Webster had served in Florida during the Seminole Wars, and other actions against
Native American opponents, but the vast majority witnessed their first taste of action
during the Mexican War. Lt. Rankin Dilworth, of the 1st U.S. Infantry, for example,
graduated from the military academy thirteenth in a class of twenty-five in 1844. He
spent the period between his graduation and the outbreak of war on garrison duty at
Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis, Missouri. On 21 September 1846 Dilworth was
mortally wounded after being hit with a cannonball during the Battle of Monterrey. Like
Dilworth, many regular junior officers would face combat for the first time in Mexico.35
While issues such as professionalism might have created differences between the
regulars and volunteers on issues such as battlefield and camp discipline, these officers
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fought in Mexico for similar reasons. Both regular and volunteer officers hoped to use
their service in Mexico to advance their station in society. Sydenham Moore hoped to use
any fame he won in Mexico to gain a higher judicial seat following his return from
Mexico. Alternatively, George B. McClellan, a young regular officer, hoped to gain
promotion while in Mexico, and thus advance his career in the army. In this manner, both
volunteers and regulars hoped that their service would provide advancement in their
chosen profession. Many in the United supported the volunteers because they thought
these soldiers fought out of a sense of patriotism and virtue, not for gain and plunder.
Alternatively, they loathed the regulars because they felt they were mercenaries fighting
for profit and gain. The Mexican War service of volunteer and regular officers turned
these thoughts on their head, though, as both regulars and volunteers enlisted in hopes of
gain and advancing their station in life. For many officers, patriotism took a back seat to
hopes of social advancement.
Chapter one focuses on the pre-war Congressional debate regarding West Point
and the regular army. This debate centered around attempts to close West Point and
eradicate the regular army. Following this, the chapter develops the differences, both real
and perceived, which existed between the regulars and the volunteers. The regulars
possessed prior training that enabled them to meet the demands of an active campaign
more successfully than many of the quickly trained volunteers. While professionalism did
have its limits, many regular officers nonetheless viewed themselves as separate and
superior to the volunteers. The volunteers, for their part, made no illusions to a desire to
seek a professional military career. Instead, many enlisted in the first place to advance
their social standing within their civilian life.
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Chapter 2 tracks and develops the theme of anti-Catholicism within the ranks
during the Mexican War. While the regulars might have viewed themselves as a separate
class from the volunteers, their expressions of racism and anti-Catholicism proved that
their training could not insulate them from such issues. For example, throughout the war,
both regulars and volunteers spoke of the fabled wealth of the Catholic Church in
Mexico. When mixed with views of manifest destiny, many soldiers argued that this
wealth was open to plunder. These men expressed these views by speaking of the many
golden Jesus' they thought the church in Mexico possessed. When they arrived in
Mexico, these men reacted to these views by plundering and stealing from Catholic
Churches. The pre-war atmosphere of the United States fueled and instigated these
thoughts. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities many Americans viewed the Catholic Church
with suspicion and fear. These fears sparked an outburst of anti-Catholic literature and
demonstrations in the 1830 and 1840s.
Race and racism within the officer corps is the theme of chapter 3. Racism
permeated class, rank, and sectional distinctions during the 1840s. Therefore, when
American junior officers traveled to Mexico they carried their views on race with them.
These views argued for the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, and the inferiority of all
other groups. Because of this, these officers intensely racialized the war, and their enemy.
Both regular and volunteer officers expressed this racism in similar manners, thus
demonstrating professionalism did not isolate the regular officer corps from such issues.
Furthermore, by expressing this racism these officers made Mexico a social battleground,
as they exported and applied American racial attitudes to Mexico. Upon arriving in
Mexico, for example, many officers quickly noted the dirt and squalor of Mexican cities.
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Instead of crediting this to the socio-economic situation of the city’s inhabitants,
American officers argued that the inferiority of the Mexican race explained the dirt and
squalor. Furthermore, these officers created racial divisions within Mexican society. The
premise for these divisions revolved around the perceived whiteness of the individual.
For example, these officers felt that those of European decent represented a higher racial
order than those of African and Native American decent.
Lastly, chapter 4 picks up with the intrigues and attempts to close West Point and
destroy the regular army following the war. By this point, many in Congress proved
willing to support these institutions, which helped secure them a more stable political
situation. One of the primary causes of this newfound support revolved around two
aspects. First, few could deny the successful performance of the regulars during the war.
Secondly, most realized that, even if they did not like the regular army, it would be more
necessary than ever to garrison the new territorial acquisitions gained by the United
States as a result of the war. Chapter four covers the newspaper coverage of the war. In
particular, this coverage mirrored the Congressional response to the war. When the war
began, these papers proved supportive of the volunteers, to the exclusion of coverage on
the regular army. By the conclusion of the war, however, this journalistic coverage
proved much more amenable to the regular army, which helped shape the public opinion
of these newspapers’ readers.
This dissertation impacts the field of Mexican War history and early American
history in several ways. Looking at professionalism refocuses and recasts views of the
Mexican War, Jacksonian American, and the antebellum army. Since both regular and
volunteer officers expressed the same racist and anti-Catholic attitudes, professionalism
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clearly had its bounds. While historians such as Paul Foos have argued that one of the
most important aspects of the American military experience in Mexico was the
differences between the regular (professional) army and the volunteers, professionalism
clearly had its limits. Professionalism trained regular officers on how to fight battles and
set a camp, it could not create a class of officers separate from society. Instead, the
regular and volunteers look much more similar than different. The traditional narrative of
the Mexican War argues that the regulars acted with restraint and virtue while the
volunteers ravaged and rampaged through Mexico. This does not appear to be the case,
however. Instead, both groups assaulted Catholic churches, and both groups viewed the
Mexican populace as members of a lesser race. Because of this, the volunteers’ record in
Mexico challenged the ideal notion of virtuous volunteers. Many considered the
volunteers to act with republican virtue, but thought the regular army represented a tool
of tyranny and despotism. Instead, the regulars performed well on the battlefield while
the volunteers performance in the army’s battles proved less than exemplary.
Furthermore, the volunteers did not act with the virtue expected of them. Instead, they
ravaged churches and demonized what they viewed as a lesser race. This further proved
to many in the United States that a regular standing army could work with a republican
government. Because of this, the regular army, which had been threatened with
destruction prior to the Mexican War, enjoyed a much more stable situation following the
war. Also, the intense anti-Catholicism and racism directed at Mexicans could not easily
be displaced following the war. Instead, the seeds of intolerance and racism toward
Mexico were laid for future generations.
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CHAPTER II
A DISTINCT CLASS OF SOLDIER

On 25 February 1830 the honorable David Crockett, U.S. representative from
Tennessee, rose to present a resolution that called for limitations on West Point, to the
other members of Congress. Crockett hoped to restrict the military academy at West
Point, if not close the institution altogether. This resolution inaugurated a debate
surrounding the military academy and the regular army that lasted through the end of the
Mexican War in 1848. Crockett disliked the military academy for several reasons. First,
he argued that the public should not have to shoulder the expense of operating West
Point. Furthermore, Crockett pointed out that the vast majority of those individuals who
received an education from West Point hailed from wealthy families who could afford to
pay for their own children’s education. He also argued that the academy propitiated class
distinctions within society by creating an elite officer class. Due to these objections,
Crockett’s resolution suggested that the “said institution should be abolished, and the
appropriations annually made for its support be discontinued.”36
Crockett echoed the fears and concerns of many people both in Congress and
across the nation regarding West Point. Most of these fears, Crockett argued, revolved
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around the class distinctions that they argued West Point supported. Along these lines,
Crockett commented that “this West Point Academy was maintained for the education of
the rich men’s sons for nothing.”37 Crockett continued his tirade by pointing out that a
formal military education at West Point was not required to make a good officer. He
reminded the audience that “Jackson never went to West Point school, not Brown, nor
Governor Carroll; nor did Colonel Cannon, under whom Mr. C [Crockett] said he served,
and a faithful good officer he was.”38 Crockett concluded that “the truth was, this
academy did not suit the people of our country, and they were against it; the men who are
raised there are too nice to work; they are first educated there for nothing, and then they
must have salaries to support them after they leave there.”39 Crockett lost his bid to see
Congress close the doors of West Point, but this did not end the Congressional debate
over the military academy. Instead, that debate raged well into the 1840s. William
Skelton pointed out that one of the primary causes of assaults on West Point and the
regular army during the 1830s and 1840s stemmed from the egalitarianism of the period,
which viewed these two institutions as a bulwark of aristocracy in an otherwise equal
society.40 Only the onset of the Mexican War interrupted this debate, but the nature of the
debate to close West Point changed during the course of the war. Overall, Congress
slowly become more amenable to West Point during the Mexican War due to the actions
of the regular and volunteer forces sent into the field. By the end of the war the
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Congressional debate to close West Point began to subside and the future of the regular
army in American society appeared secure.
The Mexican War served as a turning point for these debates, and served to divide
the regulars and volunteers. By the conclusion of the Mexican War, as will be
demonstrated in Chapter 4, this debate against the regular army and West Point had
reached its conclusion. During the course of the war, though, many people in the United
States, and Congress in particular, changed their minds and no longer wished to close
West Point. Instead, the military academy and the regular army emerged from the war
with a more stable situation than had been the case prior to the outbreak of war.
While Congress argued over the future of West Point and the regular army, the
officers engaged in fighting the Mexican War also became engaged in these debates from
within the ranks. In the wake of these assaults the regular army officers fell back on their
professionalism to distinguish and distance themselves from the volunteers while the
volunteers attempted to discredit the regulars by attacking the credibility and skill of the
regular army and West Point. This argument between the regulars and volunteers
reflected fears within the United States that extended back to the Revolution, as many
viewed the regular army as an affront to a republican society. Through arguing against,
and attempting to discredit each other, both the regular army and the volunteers junior
engaged in these debates along with Congress and the rest of the nation. Each vehemently
sought to legitimize their own branch of the service. Chapter four will cover the
conclusion of these debates and how Congress addressed them during the Mexican War
and in the years immediately following the war’s conclusion. As noted in the
introduction, American fears of a standing army had a long history by the outbreak of the
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Mexican War. Amy S. Greenberg, for example, pointed out that many volunteers viewed
the regular army as contrary to the beliefs of a free people.41
When the Mexican War erupted in 1846 Congress had debated over whether or
not to close the military academy at West Point or keep it open for over a decade.
Through these assaults, many came to view West Point, and by extension the regular
army, as an affront and danger to a republican nation. These assaults represented a
general feeling of distrust for a regular army which dated back to the founding of the
nation. Due to these fears, the regular army of 1846 only numbered 8,509 troops.42 To
offset this lack of numbers, Congress issued calls for the state governments to raise
volunteer regiments to send to Mexico. These volunteers joined the regiments of the
regular army already in Mexico. The officers, both regular and volunteer, who
accompanied these regiments became embroiled in the prewar debates to close West
Point and cripple the regular army. By joining these debates, they influenced and affected
their outcome. In this regard, American social politics surrounding the issue of West
Point and the necessity of a regular army influenced the experiences of these officers in
Mexico. In order to defend their position the regulars relied on their own notions of
professionalism and discipline to distinguish themselves from the volunteers. To these
officers, military professionalism meant that they exhibited better discipline and could
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fight better than the volunteers, and that they had formal military training.43 Furthermore,
the regular junior officer corps felt that their professionalism distinguished them from the
volunteers. As historian Louis Menand noted, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. pointed out
one of the distinguishing factors of military professionalism. In particular, Menand
argued that Holmes “ remained proud of the professionalism of his regiment. He reports
with satisfaction the remark of a senior officer that the Twentieth [regiment] ‘have no
poetry in a fight’— that is, they don’t romanticize the business of war.” He continued by
pointing out that “‘One’s time is better spent with regulations & the like.”44 The
volunteers, on the other hand, sought to undermine this position by challenging the
supposed superiority of the regulars while at the same time arguing in support of their
own. To the volunteers, the regular army system, and the military academy which
supported it, were an affront to a republican society. Therefore, in the face of the intense
Congressional debates surrounding the future of the regular army both volunteers and
regulars reacted by attempting to distance themselves from each other and distinguish
their branch of the service as much as possible. To the regulars, the volunteers
represented an unorganized rabble. Because of this, they portrayed themselves as
possessing superior discipline in order to dissociate themselves from the volunteers. In a

For the purposes of this chapter, I have chosen this definition of professionalism. Several historians have
written on the subject of military professionalism, but the definition I utilize here better explains how the
regular officers themselves viewed and defined their own professionalism. The most recent to write on the
subject of military professionalism is Samuel J. Watson’s two volume work on the American officer corps
on the frontier between 1810 and 1846. These two books are Jackson’s Sword: The Army Officer Corps on
the American Frontier, 1810-1821 and Peacekeepers and Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps on the
American Frontier, 1821-1846. Others who have written on the subject of military professionalism include
Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh, West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and Peace, William B.
Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The American Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861, Samuel P.
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, G. Teitler, The
Genesis of the Professional Officers’ Corp.
44
Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001) 46.
43

32

similar manner, the volunteers viewed the regulars as tyrannical. As Paul Foos noted,
volunteers viewed “the freedom to negotiate the terms of their service” as a
“fundamental value.”45
The volunteer regiments that traveled to Mexico carried with them a deep-seated
resentment of the regular army. As such, they attempted to discredit the regular army
whenever possible. For example, when confronted with the unending boredom of
garrison duty many of these regiments blamed the Regular Army for their plight, arguing
that it represented an undeserved favoritism for the regular army over themselves. The
volunteers argued that they had enlisted to fight, and felt the army had done them an
injustice by not allowing them to participate in battle. They also attempted to discredit
both West Point and the regular army by arguing that, despite all of their training, the
regulars proved inferior to the volunteer regiments. These attacks sought to legitimize the
volunteer service and destroy the credibility of the regular army at the same time. The
volunteers felt that they represented the republican citizen-soldier ideal, and that a regular
army threatened this ideal.46
In a similar manner, the regular army realized that the debates swirling around
congress might mean the closing of West Point and the destruction of the regular army.
To counter this threat, these officers hoped their performance in Mexico would prove the
usefulness of the regular army and the military academy. To achieve this, they relied on
the professionalism which had been instilled in them at West Point, but also denounced
the volunteers in their letters at the same time. Through these methods, they hoped to
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distinguish and distance themselves from the volunteers. In order to achieve these goals,
many officers hoped to win several battlefield victories prior to the arrival of the
volunteers in Mexico.47 At the same time, many regular officers denounced the lack of
discipline they felt the volunteers exhibited while trumpeting what they viewed as their
own superior brand of discipline. Through these means, they hoped to demonstrate the
superiority of the regular service as opposed to the volunteers and positively influence the
debates swirling around Congress and the nation regarding these issues.
Throughout the 1830s and 1840s the debate that Crockett rose to weigh in on
continued unabated. By extension, this campaign to close the military academy extended
to the regular army as well since the regular army and West Point had become indelibly
linked in the eyes of many. By 1834 many states began to pass resolutions calling for the
closure of West Point. Ohio came forward as one of the first states to denounce West
Point. On 7 April 1834 Ohio passed an application calling for Congress to close West
Point. This application echoed the arguments first proffered by Crockett four years prior.
In particular, it argued that “the Military Academy heretofore established at West Point,
in the state of New York, and supported exclusively by the funds of the general
government, is partial in its operations and wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius
of our liberal institutions.”48
In direct response to these calls to close West Point Richard M. Johnson, a
member of the committee on military affairs, presented a resolution reaffirming the
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importance of West Point. In this defense Johnson presented the history of West Point in
an attempt to call attention to the heroic deeds performed by its graduates, and the good
that the military academy had done for the nation. He argued that “our whole army
possesses now far more of the public respect and confidence than it did not many years
since. It is the great distinction of the academy at West Point that it has contributed so
effectually to this elevation of the character of the military establishment.”49 Heading into
the 1840s this debate only intensified as more states joined Ohio in its attempt to close
West Point.
This debate experienced its greatest intensity and support in the states of New
England and the old Northwest Territory. Many in these states argued that West Point
accepted cadets from the ranks of the wealthy, but that it refused to accept applicants
from the lower classes. In this manner, West Point created a class of elite junior officers.
For example, in July 1842 Connecticut passed a resolution to the House of
Representatives on 25 July 1842 that argued that West Point catered to the sons of the
wealthy “to the almost total exclusion of the sons of poor and less influential men,
regardless alike of qualifications and of merit.”50 The following year, Maine and New
Hampshire joined Connecticut in pleading for Congress to close West Point. The New
Hampshire petition agreed with the above arguments for closing West Point but added
that “although a standing army, and its consequent evil, a military aristocracy, may be
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congenial with the genius of monarchical Governments, and necessary for the safety of
the same, yet, with a government like ours, it is not only unnecessary, but incompatible
and absolutely dangerous to the safety of our free institutions.”51 The primary focus of
these resolutions reflected a common fear that West Point had become a breeding ground
for a military aristocracy and that the academy would eventually destroy the freedom of
the United States. The New Hampshire resolution also demonstrated the connection
between the regular army and West Point. Furthermore, these resolutions all argued that
the primary reason for West Point, to train a professional military officer corps,
threatened the freedom and democracy espoused by the United States. The resolution
passed by the state of Maine, for instance, argued that West Point should be abolished
“and a plan of military instruction adopted that will be impartial in its operations, and
consistent with the spirit and genius of our liberal institution.”52
The fear of the regular army had a long history in the United States by the
outbreak of the Mexican War, much of which dated back to England. In particular, many
of the revolutionary generation felt that a standing professional army was a tool of
tyranny, and that any professional army should be feared.53 George Ballentine, a soldier
in the regular army, summarized the animosity that many Americans held for the regular
army. Upon traveling to meet other recruits in New York Ballentine wrote that “we could
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scarcely help remarking that the majority of the them [onlookers] seemed to look upon us
in the light of a degraded caste, and seemed to think that there was contamination in the
touch of a soldier.” He continued by noting that he heard an “old fellow of most vinegarlooking aspect drily remark, ‘Ay, ay! They are a fine set of candidates for the State’s
prison.”54 Ballentine’s comment perfectly reflected the negative view held by many
Americans for the regular army. Many, such as the fellow Ballentine quoted, argued that
the lowest order of society comprised the ranks of the regular army. For that reason, they
felt the regular army could never uphold and embody the republican ideals on which the
United States relied. The republican view argued that the ideal army was comprised of
citizen-soldiers, not trained professionals. Paul Foos has pointed out that many during the
nineteenth century viewed regular soldiers as serving out of a desire to gain wealth, and
not out of patriotism as volunteers.55 Recently, historian Samuel J. Watson commented
on this thought, pointing out that “much of the republican critique of standing armies was
based on assumptions about the character of enlisted men, who were thought to be
mercenary, dependent hirelings not much above slaves.” He continued by arguing that
“American social and political leaders, and indeed officers themselves, shared this
assumption, which was reasonable in terms of republican ideology.”56 One reason for
this, Paul Foos argued, was that many people within the United States resented the
regular army out of nativist fears. While they argued that the officer corps represented a

54 George Winston Smith and Charles Judah, Chronicles of the Gringos: The U.S. Army in the Mexican
War, 1846-1848, Accounts of Eyewitnesses and Combatants (Albuquerque: the University of New Mexico
Press, 1968), 2.
55
Paul Foos, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair, 15-16, 93-94.
56
Samuel J. Watson, Jackson’s Sword: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1810-1821
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 6.

37

respectable class, the common soldiery comprised a mass of immigrants from places such
as Ireland and Germany.57 Furthermore, Foos argued that many in the United States
viewed the regular army with disgust because its soldiers represented a form of waged
labor as opposed to free labor.58
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the regular army grew slowly.
The regular army received a huge boost in 1802, however, when West Point opened.
While the military academy did not have a huge impact on the War of 1812, it provided
most of the regular army officers, and quite a few volunteer officers, for the Mexican
War. After 1815 the military academy continued to grow with each passing year even the
size of the regular army never rose above 9,000 men before 1846.59
The animosity displayed by the volunteers toward the regular army and West
Point influenced the ranks of both the volunteers and regulars during the Mexican War
and helped generate a feeling of animosity between the two. Throughout the war, the
majority of the regulars criticized and ridiculed the volunteers for their lack of discipline
and general rowdy behavior while the volunteers displayed a general distrust of the
regulars, and the military academy that had trained them. Instead of a regular army, most
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citizens championed the citizen soldier and recounted the perceived triumphs of virtuous
volunteers, such as those led by Andrew Jackson at New Orleans. At this time, the
citizen-soldier ideal referred to volunteer soldiers who volunteered at a time of crisis, but
who returned to civilian life once the crisis had ended. Many volunteer officers became
disgruntled when they found themselves garrisoning rear areas while the regulars
received front line postings. This did not sit well with many of the volunteer troops, and
they took their anger out on the regulars in their letters home. Col. William Campbell of
the 1st Tennessee described this perceived favoritism for the regular army when he wrote
“nor would I ever again take a command in the army unless it was in the regular service,
as there is so strong a feeling of jealousy and opposition to the volunteers, that while the
command and control of the army and all its departments is in the hands of regular
officers, justice will never be done to the volunteers.” He continued by remarking that
“the whole of the officers of the regular army seem to regret that the battle of Buena
Vista was fought by volunteers.”60 Campbell complained about what he viewed as
favoritism for the regular army throughout the war. He wrote many letters on this subject
to his uncle, David Campbell, who also happened to be the governor of Virginia.61 It
might seem odd for American soldiers to be disappointed after a resounding victory, but
the regulars despaired over the fact that by achieving a few such victories, the volunteers
received credit for winning the war in the eyes of many Americans.
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Political divisions further divided the ranks of the volunteers and the regulars.
Volunteer officers, most of whom usually tended to be Democrats, linked the regular
army to the Whig Party since so many of its officers openly supported the Whigs.62
Trustin B. Kinder, a Captain in the 2nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry, noted that “every time
our arms are defeated, every time a movement proves unsuccessful, they [regulars] cry
out Oh! the administration. The officers of the ‘regular line’ echo it forth, ‘go home
volunteers and vote down the administration.”63 Kinder continued by noting that “the
present congress must be active in forwarding every plan of attack, make every
appropriation again and wind the matter up at the end of twelve months, and all hell can’t
beat the [Democratic] party.”64 Partisan Party politics lie at the root of Kinder’s
complaints. Many regulars, as Kinder noted, disapproved of the manner in which the
Democratic James K. Polk administration ran the war. Furthermore, Kinder’s comments
demonstrated the view that a longer war only served to empower the Whigs, who gained
strength throughout the war despite its successful outcome. Similarly, Stanislaus Lasalle,
a captain in the 1st Indiana remarked that “we poor volunteers expect nothing and have
become reconciled to their fate, determined to do their fighting at the ballot box when
they get home.”65 Like many of the volunteers, both Lasalle and Kinder, supported the
Democratic Party, while they tied the regular army to the Whig Party. This proved to be
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yet another division between the regulars and the volunteers, and further exacerbated the
Congressional divisions over the future of the regular army.66
Other volunteers viewed the military academy at West Point as a bastion of
strength that supported the dreaded regular army. Due to the prominence of West Point
and the fact that it trained an elite officer class, it received much ire from the volunteers.
Furthermore, this illuminated the fear that many volunteer officers held for a standing
army as many volunteers vented their anger and animosity on the military academy. As
Lasalle and Kinder’s comments above demonstrated, the volunteers fear of West Point
could also be connected to partisan politics. They, along with others, summarized these
fears in their letters home. Lasalle demonstrated a desire to see West Point destroyed
following the war, commenting that “if this war don’t strangle the West Point Academy
in less than five years you can say I am no prophet.”67 In a similar vein, Kinder argued
that “every effort that the officers of the Regular Army can make to procrastinate an issue
is done-cause- more promotions- they are desirous that the Regular Army shall have all
the honor- cause voluptuous poor house of the nation, West Point will be upheld.”68 As
these letters note, many volunteers viewed the military academy, and the regular army as
a whole, in a conspiratorial manner. Overall, Kinder and Lasalle, as many of their
comrades would have agreed, viewed West Point with a great deal of scorn, which
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directly reflected pre-war assaults on the regular army and West Point, and further
divided the ranks of the American Army during the Mexican War.
Some volunteers hoped to degrade the regular army by attacking its fighting
ability. The generals leading the war widely believed in the superiority of the regulars
since most spent their careers in the regular army.69 The volunteers vehemently disagreed
with this view, and offered several counter arguments. Some noted that contrary to
popular belief, the regulars did not fight well, and that their reputation with the general
officers held little merit. In a letter to his wife, for example, Captain William P. Rogers of
the Mississippi Rifles heatedly argued that “the regular army is no account. They are
cowardly dogs and will not fight, the volunteers are the men upon whom the country has
[to] rely. In the battle of Monterey the regulars were skulking behind the Chaparrals all
day.”70 Others, such as Samuel Ryan Curtis of the 3rd Ohio, held that their regiments
could match the quality of the regulars. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities Curtis had
graduated from West Point and had served in the regular army before returning to civilian
life. Unlike most other West Point graduates, though, Curtis did not remain in the regular
army, but instead chose to leave the army. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, his prior
experience led to his appointment as Colonel of the 3rd Ohio Infantry. In his diary, Curtis
argued that “to pass us by and select regulars from Saltillo and even from General Wool’s
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column is saying plainly you are inferior.” 71 He continued by arguing that “my regiment
I know cannot be excelled by any regulars in this army.” 72 General John E. Wool
commanded one of the columns in Taylor’s army prior to and during the Buena Vista
Campaign. Wool’s troops had a reputation of being more rowdy than normal although
historian K. Jack Bauer noted that in reality Wool’s troops proved no more ill behaved
than any other troops in the American army.73 As Curtis pointed out, though, this did not
matter to many within the army who viewed Wool’s command with disdain.
Officers within the ranks of the volunteers criticized the mental capacity of the
regulars. To the volunteers, the common regular soldier represented the uneducated
masses. They noted that many of the soldiers within the ranks of the regular army proved
to be physically tough, but appeared to lack any intelligence. Furthermore, they viewed
soldiers in the regular army as simple automatons. Richard Smith Elliot expressed this
sentiment well. Elliot, a Lieutenant in the Missouri Volunteers, served as a correspondent
for the St. Louis Reveille, and regularly sent letters from the front to be published in the
paper. In a series of sketches written immediately following the war, Elliot described the
quality of soldiers in the regular army. In these sketches he noted that the regular army,
and especially the U.S. dragoons, seemed to attract soldiers of poor quality. He related an
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illustrative example of a fictional soldier named Andrew Jackson, whom he utilized as
the stereotypical regular army soldier, who joined the ranks of the dragoons. Elliot
summed up his qualities by noting that “Jackson is very stupid.”74 After describing
soldiers who enlisted out of a sense of adventure only to be disappointed by not finding
it, Elliot wrote that “there is still another and distinct class of soldiers, men with thews
and sinews, but with so small a portion of intellectual faculties that they seem to be in
reality but machines.”75 To many, then, the regulars appeared to be nothing more than the
reviled wage laborers who worked in factories.76 This last quote really summarized
Elliot’s complaints regarding the regular army in that he feared regular soldiers had no
ability to think. Instead, they simply followed orders as automatons without questioning
what happened around them. In the end, Elliot pointed out that Jackson’s superiors
assigned him as a hunter to gather buffalo for the army. After viewing him in action,
Jackson’s captain mocked him stating that “you’re good for nothing else, but you’re good
for buffalo.”77 As this passage noted, the volunteers disapproved of the lack of autonomy
that they witnessed within the ranks of the regulars.
Other officers assaulted the regular army by pointing out the poor quality of
soldiers who made up the ranks of the regular army. John W. Dodd, a Captain with the
4th Indiana, demonstrated this by describing the different techniques which regular
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officers utilized to keep their men in line as opposed to the methods utilized by the
volunteer officers. In particular, he wrote to his wife from Puebla that:
the grand difference however between regulars and volunteers is their
officers. The regular officers do not expect any moral influences of their men,
they obey them from fear, while our volunteers follow the lead of their officers
from pride and respect. Besides, the regulars are the lowest part of our population
a great proportion of them Irish and Dutch without character or friends. They fight
because they are trained to do it, and because it is death to run. The volunteers are
those who came because their country demanded their services, and they fight
from pride and real courage and are orderly because they mostly posses
character.78
Dodd’s comments to his wife perfectly illustrated the mentality of many within
the ranks of the volunteers, and within the United States as whole. Dodd noted that the
regulars represented everything reprehensible about the regular army system, and the
debates in Congress which had raged since the 1830s. As Dodd pointed out, many of the
soldiers in the regular army came from foreign nations, particularly Ireland, which
exasperated the many nativist fears of the period.79 Furthermore, this quote pointed out
one of the objections which many Americans had concerning the regular army. In
particular, they argued that the regulars enlisted in order to gain a profit, instead of
enlisting out of patriotism. Due to this, they lacked the virtue which Dodd argued made
volunteers better soldiers. This caused many to fear the regular army, and to suspect that
they did not display the character, or virtue, that motivated the mostly natural born
citizens who made up the ranks of the volunteers.
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During the Mexican War the rivalry between the regulars and volunteers became
deeply embedded within the ranks. Even when offered the opportunity, many volunteers
refused to submit to joining the ranks of the regulars, even if it meant being offered a
promotion and honors. Chauncey Brown, an officer in the 3rd Pennsylvania, received an
offer to command a battery of regular artillery. In a letter home, he noted that a position
in command of a regular unit had never before been offered to a volunteer soldier, and
that the offer was considered a great honor. Brown took the position, but soon became
dissatisfied with the command and decided to rejoin his volunteer regiment. He noted that
this surprised the members of the regular battery he had been placed in command of, and
pointed out that “the officers of the regular forces thought it strange that I had any wish to
leave my present position-remarking that the command of a company of regularsparticularly of the artillery-was a compliment that had never been paid to a volunteer
officer before.”80 Brown is typical of the volunteers who tried to distance themselves
from the regular army.
Given the nature of the rivalry between the regulars and volunteers, many
volunteers complained about the inequality that existed between themselves and the
regulars. They argued that the regulars received preferential treatment from the
government, which did not sit well with the volunteers. Samuel Ryan Curtis served as a
prime example for this line of thought. Curtis, complained that volunteer officers suffered
from a lack of adequate quarters, while regular army officers had no difficulty in
receiving first rate quarters. In a letter home he argued that he felt it “strange that all the
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Lieutenants of the regular army who are stationed here find no difficulty in procuring
spacious and commodious quarters.”81 He noted further inequalities by remarking that
“the volunteers get one dollar per month more for clothing than the regulars, but this will
not place them on anything like a footing with the regulars.”82 James Francis Preston,
Captain of the grenadier company in the 1st Virginia, commented that the preferential
treatment displayed for the regular army had even kept people from volunteering. He
complained to his brother that “well may the secretary of war say the recruiting for the
volunteer service was not reached. Whose fault is it? All advantages are in favor of the
regulars in all respects.”83 To the volunteers, what they viewed as preferential treatment
further exacerbated the pre-war tension between the regulars and volunteers.
While in Mexico many volunteers argued that the commanding generals assigned
regular regiments to front line duty while many volunteer regiments found themselves on
garrison duty in the rear echelon. This further added to the already considerable
animosity and resentment that many volunteers harbored for the regulars. Many
volunteers joined the war in the first place to gain renown on the battlefield, and use that
fame to win a higher station in society once the war concluded. Captain Syndenham
Moore, a company commander in the 1st Alabama Infantry, perfectly demonstrated this
view. Moore held a minor judicial seat in his hometown of Greensboro, Alabama. He
joined the 1st Alabama hoping to achieve distinction on the battlefield and return home a
hero. He hoped this would allow him to gain a more influential judicial seat after the war.
Shortly after leaving for the front he wrote to his wife Amanda that “if ambition prompts
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me to aspire after fame and distinction it is for them [his children].”84 He expressed this
view constantly throughout the war. Instead, the 1st Alabama never participated in an
active battle during the Mexican War, and instead received orders for one rear area
posting after another. Once the tedium set in, Moore reported to his wife his hopes of
“being carried forward and allowed to participate in the battles that were to be fought on
the road from this to the city of Mexico, but in this it seems now that we are to be
disappointed.”85 On top of this, Moore’s twelve months of service with the regiment kept
him out of his home state long enough to miss his reelection. In the end, not only did he
miss out on winning the fame and glory he sought, but he failed to even retain the
position he already held.86
James F. Preston adeptly summarized the problems involved in leaving volunteer
regiments behind on garrison duty for too long. While stationed at Saltillo he reported to
his brother that “the more I see of the service the more convinced I am that all troops who
are sent here (if any are sent) should be regulars. As I have said to you before volunteers
are good troops for active service and fight as gallantly as any on Earth but they cannot
and will not stand an inactive camp or garrison life.”87 Furthermore, while in camp at
Buena Vista earlier in the war he noted that “raw troops are sent to Scott. Why not order
us there and let the new troops take our place and prepare as we have done.” He
continued by arguing that “we have been here so long without an object (except to guard
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what our enemy could not take if we were away) that all are becoming weary of the
service or rather of the want of service.”88
Like Moore and Preston, many officers left their homes and joined volunteer
regiments hoping the gain distinction and fame that they could translate into a higher
social standing at home after the war. If the volunteer officers did not express these
desires for fighting in Mexico prior to the war, they began to once they found themselves
stuck guarding rear areas. Many of these officers left with the hope of fighting in battle
and winning fame. Instead, many of the volunteers found themselves acting as garrisons
for rear areas, far from any of the fighting. Once this occurred, there proved to be no end
to the complaints of these volunteer officers, as they felt they had been betrayed by the
government. Stanislaus Lasalle summarized the feeling of many when he wrote that,
“unless we have active service I would rather be discharged.”89 Tennant Lomax, a
member of the 1st Alabama, wrote, “I have everything to make me happy…but no
prospect of glory. There is no sign of war here. Peace is here whether it is in the United
States or not.”90 When action proved illusive Preston took matters into his own hands in
an attempt to see the regiment transferred to a more active front. Along these lines, he
reported to his brother that he had written to William H. Richardson, the Adjutant
General for Virginia “in a friendly way and asked him [to support] a project which I
started and which several officers have enacted, that of having our regiment ordered to
the other line in the event that there is to be no advance within a short time from this
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point.” He concluded by pointing out that “we have been nearly 12 months in the service.
Most of us have never seen an armed enemy.”91 Like many officers, Preston’s primary
concern revolved around getting the regiment into active combat. Without this, none of
the goals of the regiment, or its officers, could be realized.
While many volunteers might have complained about the lack of action, these
complaints went deeper as many of the volunteer officers blamed their lack of action on
the regular army. These officers felt betrayed by the fact that the regular army fought in
battles while they guarded the rear. Both Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott chose to
leave the majority of their volunteer regiments in the rear to garrison captured territory,
while utilizing regular regiments to do most of the fighting. While some volunteer
regiments did see action, the vast majority saw little or no action at all.92 There are
several reasons why Taylor and Scott chose to put the regulars ahead of the volunteers.
First, they found the regulars to be more reliable in combat. They also worried about the
relatively short term of enlistments of many volunteer regiments. For example, Scott
chose to leave many of his volunteer regiments on garrison duty when he began his
march to Mexico City from Vera Cruz. While volunteer regiments took part in many
battles, as historian Richard Bruce Winders noted, the regulars did most of the hard
fighting.93 Scott feared that when the term of enlistment for these regiments ran out, they
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would simply leave and head for home, making them a somewhat unreliable choice for a
front line assignment. If this occurred during an active campaign, Scott might find
himself facing battle without half his army. Colonel William Campbell of the 1st
Tennessee summed up the consequences of this nicely writing “Mr. Polk will be deceived
in his calculations that the volunteers now in service will re-enlist for the war. Not one
out of 100 will re-enlist.”94
For the volunteers, sitting in a rear area inactive proved unbearable, and many
began to complain bitterly when the months rolled by with no action. Not only did
garrison duty prove boring, but being stationed so far in the rear meant they would enjoy
little opportunity to earn the battlefield glory that so many of them desired. It proved even
more bitter that they read and heard about the exploits of the regulars on the battlefield.
After being stationed in the rear for some time with his regiment, Samuel Ryan Curtis
complained that the regular army would not share the battlefield with the volunteers. He
argued that “it will be fatal to the regular army,” but continued by insisting that “the least
effort [to share the battlefield] on the part of the regulars would satisfy the volunteers
who came here only to do good service and then leave the matter again to the regulars.”95
On another occasion, Curtis felt “more mortified than indignant at the unnecessary desire
manifested by the regular officers to put regulars forward and make them certain to be the
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authors of every acceptable movement.”96 This may or may not have been the reality, but
as Curtis’ quote demonstrated, the volunteers certainly viewed the regulars in this
manner, which illustrated the division and split between the ranks of the regulars and
volunteers.
The lack of opportunity to demonstrate their courage on the battlefield inhibited
their ability to translate military glory into success in civilian life following the war. After
volunteering to leave his company in the hope of getting closer to the fighting, William
Richard Caswell, a Captain in the 1st Tennessee, noted that “my great inducement on
leaving my company was to get into this very fight which I expected to take place at
Monterey before our cavalry would reach there, but I am deprived of all participation by
being expelled to remain here with this brigade.”97 On another occasion Caswell
expressed his desire to return home rather than spend more time behind the lines. In a
letter he complained that “my participation will not be published, for although I have
struggled hard to lead I have thus far only moved along with the army without doing
anything great, gallant or brilliant and thus disappointed I have no further hopes of honor
or fame I desire to return home.”98 Caswell’s comments demonstrated his desire to utilize
the army for advancement, but he found little chance to gain renown or fame through the
type of service he found himself in. Caswell closed his letter by arguing that if the army
did not intend to utilize the volunteers they should be sent home.99 In particular he
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complained that “I have hoped we should be discharged immediately after the surrender
of this place, as our assistance will not be needed.”100 Similarly, Syndenham Moore had
hopes of “being carried forward and allowed to participate in the battles that were to be
fought on the road from this to the city of Mexico, but in this it seems now that we are to
be disappointed.”101
Like many volunteer officers, Moore closely followed any rumor circulating
among the troops that might offer insight to a future movement to the battlefield. When
things did not go as planned, he and his men began to look inward for the problem. In
this, they blamed their inaction not only on the military leadership, but also on their own
officers. In one example of this, Moore argued that “there is a report here that we will be
stationed at Camargo or some other point on the river. If true it will cause great
dissatisfaction. I am more inclined to believe it, from the known fact that our regiment is
looked down upon with little favor by gen’l Taylor, owing to the incompetency and
insufficiency of our col. and lt. col.”102 From reading Moore’s letters and diary, it is
evident that a great deal of strife existed within the officer corps of the 1st Alabama with
factions forming around various officers within the regiment. Overall, many of the
officers of the 1st Alabama blamed each other for the regiment’s lack of action. Due to
this, factions began to develop around various officers within the regiment.103 At the
same time Moore boasted in his diary that many of the officers and soldiers of the
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regiment said that if he had been elected Colonel they would certainly have been in the
thick of the fighting. After all, the chance at gaining glory in a battle is what brought
many of these men to Mexico in the first place, as Moore summarized by saying “it was
for a chance like this that I made the great sacrifice I did in leaving home.”104 These
officers had voted on men they felt would carry them into combat, and thought they had
been betrayed when this did not happen.
Democracy, one of the divisive concepts of Jacksonian America, created
distinctions and divisions between the regulars and volunteers. The Presidency of
Andrew Jackson ushered in mass public participation in government on a scale
previously unseen in the United States. Democracy, as historians such as Sean Wilentz
and Gordon Wood have noted, proved to be one of the dominant themes during the
Jacksonian period.105 As Wilentz and Wood demonstrated, to Americans of the period
democracy meant the ability to vote and actively participate in the government and its
functions. The volunteer soldiers who traveled to Mexico carried this democratic heritage
with them when they left the United States in the form of election of officers.106 Perhaps
one of the most revealing areas in which democracy manifested itself was the long
standing tradition of volunteer regiments to elect their own officers. Volunteers had a
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long history of voting for their officers and having a say in the daily operations of their
regiments.107
Many of the elections held by volunteers to appoint their officers carried with
them all of the political intrigues of a normal political election in the United States. Many
of the officers and men in the volunteer regiments expected to be able to voice their
opinion in the operations of their regiments, and complained bitterly when the system
broke down. Stanislaus Lasalle commented on this phenomenon within his regiment,
remarking that “by political intrigues and dishonorable conduct of persons who were not
volunteers we were entirely cut off from electing any regimental officers, although we
had the only men in camp who knew anything of military tactics.”108 After elections did
take place, he further boasted that “I have been elected captain and have received my
commission. There were many intrigues to defeat me but I met and repulsed them at the
threshold.”109 Syndenham Moore also described one of these elections within the ranks of
the 1st Alabama. When it came time to choose who would be the major of the battalion,
he voted for a man from Tallapoosa over H.P. Watson, who was a personal friend. In his
diary, he noted that “Bryan [the officer he elected] is a graduate of West Point and I think
will make a good officer.”110 As this letter points out, Moore put aside any grudge against
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West Point professionalism in order to select who he thought the most qualified for the
job.
Many of the men who volunteered for service in Mexico brought the political
divisions that had split people at home with them to these regimental elections. For
example, rivalries that existed at home often found their way into the ranks. Historian
Paul Foos pointed out that the political rivalries and animosity ruined the performance of
the Massachusetts regiment.111 After his election as colonel of the 1st Tennessee, William
Campbell noted that “it so happened that 3-4 of those in my regiment are democratic
officers, but there is a majority of 200 democrats of the rank and file, yet I beat a Major
General and a Democrat 169 votes.” Campbell continued by pointing out that “so you see
I outran the Whig strength.”112 This quote demonstrates the sharp political divisions that
existed within the ranks, and the fact that these elections rarely involved electing the
individual most suited for the job. Instead, soldiers usually voted for officers of the same
party as themselves. Occurrences such as these divided many of the volunteer regiments
in Mexico along political lines. Some, especially in the North, argued that the war
represented an attempt by southerners to expand the institution of slavery.113 Others
opposed the war because they feared victory might bring thousands of people from an
unwanted Mexican race into the United States. Service in Mexico exposed and
exacerbated political divisions such as this within the ranks. As Paul Foos demonstrated,
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many veterans whose service did not live up to their expectations ended up joining the
Free Soil Party in the aftermath of the war.114
Syndenham Moore pointed out the democratic leanings of the volunteer
regiments. In his diary, he noted that the men who volunteered for service in Mexico felt
they had the right to negotiate their terms of service. They felt this reflected their rights as
a citizen-soldier as opposed to members of the regular army. Soldiers in the regular army
had to follow orders despite their personal thoughts or feelings. As civilians voluntarily
giving their time to the armed forces, tough, volunteers felt their position as temporary
soldiers gave them the right to negotiate their terms of service. Once Congress decided to
require all volunteers for Mexico to sign on for twelve months instead of six, many
became disgruntled. Moore noted that “many who were willing to go for six months
would not consent to go for twelve.”115 In a letter to his wife, Moore also commented
that, as with politics at home, when things did not go according to plan, the volunteers
blamed their lack of success on their elected officials, in this case, the officers they had
chosen. When Moore’s regiment found themselves in the rear during the Battle of
Monterrey, he commented that “many have said to me if you had been elected we would
have been at Monterey and had some chance to distinguish ourselves.”116
Discipline also divided the ranks of the regulars and the volunteers. In many
regards, the volunteers lacked the rigid system of discipline the regulars possessed. In a
Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 238, 241. Paul Foos, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair:
Soldiers and Social Conflict during the Mexican-American War (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2002), 156-160.
115 The Diary of Syndenham Moore, 15 June 1846, Syndenham Moore Diary, Alabama Department of
Archives and History.
116 Syndenham Moore to Amanda Moore, 13 April 1846, Syndenham Moore Letters, Alabama
Department of Archives and History.
114

57

letter to Secretary of War William L. Marcy Colonel Jefferson Davis pointed out an
interesting impact this lack of discipline had on the volunteers. He argued that the
volunteer regiments required more officers than regular regiments and wrote that
“volunteers require a full compliment of officers, indeed, more in proportion to their
number than regular troops and it would I think be an advantage to the service certainly a
favor to us if you would authorize the additional lieutenants.”117 Paul Foos noted that the
volunteers scorned the rigid discipline and professionalism of the regular army.118 The
volunteers felt that they should not have to comply with the structure and severe
punishments meted out within the ranks of the regulars, and argued that these tenants
proved contrary to a democratic people.119 These volunteers’ own officers complained
bitterly about the lack of discipline exhibited by the troops under their command. Since
the volunteers disdained the discipline and professionalism of the regular army, it is not
surprising that their officers had trouble controlling them. To these volunteers, the
discipline of the regular army reflected its despotic nature. Samuel Ryan Curtis, who kept
track of many of the differences between the regulars and volunteers, pointed out that
perhaps the lack of discipline is what kept the volunteers stuck in the rear of the army.
Along these lines, he pointed out that “I admit that Gen. Taylor has had reason to rely on
regulars and has had some reason to doubt the conduct of volunteers after the street
brawls that have gone off in the city of Matamoras, but I fear there is that prejudice
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enacted at the head of the army.”120 Curtis went on to point out that if the volunteers were
used more at the front, their discipline would improve. On another occasion, Curtis
pointed out that the volunteers felt as though they did all of the hard work, while others,
particularly the regulars, received all of the benefit. Along these lines, he remarked that
“it makes our volunteers feel that they undergo heavy privations and many of them begin
to wish they had never volunteered.”121
Other officers among the volunteers noted the lack of discipline exhibited by their
own troops. In a letter to his sister, Stanislaus Lasalle related an event that occurred on
board a transport ship. In this letter he wrote that:
charges were made by persons on board, who had goods in boxes, and etc,
that the volunteers, and more particularly the Marion Guards, had broken open
trunks, boxes, and plundered them of their contents. After hearing all the
testimony we could procure I am convinced that the pillaging was not confined to
any particular body of person, but was general among the volunteers.122
Lasalle noted that the volunteers engaged in this type of conduct before ever
leaving the country. While still in camp in the United States, Lasalle wrote that
“Whitcomb is and has been a place of riot and disorderly conduct. Almost every night
someone is hurt.”123 William P. Rogers, a Captain of the 1st Mississippi, noted similar
occurrences in his diary, reporting that “every day or two a straggling soldier from our
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camp is killed and then the Texians kill two or three Mexicans to pay for it.”124 Rogers
summarized the conduct of the army pointing out that volunteers “I am satisfied will
never do for an invading army, besides to keep them under proper discipline should they
be under excitement.”125
While the volunteers struggled to solidify their position in the wake of the
congressional debates concerning the army, the regulars also used Mexico to strengthen
their position within the American military framework as they hoped to distance
themselves from the volunteers be displaying their superior fighting skills and discipline.
Also, they hoped to discredit the volunteers by pointing out their lack of these skills. The
letters of regular junior officers in Mexico reflected these governmental debates, and
illustrated that they were both aware of the precarious situation of the regular army, and
concerned over its future. By attempting to distance themselves from the volunteers in
this manner, the regular junior officers corps utilized a professional military ethos and
regular army identity, provided by their education at West Point, based on the superior
traits, such as training and discipline, they felt they possessed in greater abundance than
the volunteers.126 One expression of this regular identity was a general critique of what
many regular officers viewed as the unprofessional bearing of the volunteers. Lieutenant
Richard W. Johnston, a Lieutenant in the 3rd U.S. Artillery, summarized many of these
critiques. While stationed at Tampico he reported to his wife that “there will perhaps be
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brought in by some of his company, a drunken exiled patriot, of the species known as ‘the
volunteer,’ cursing and swearing at everybody and everything, and especially at his own
officers who sent him to the guard house.”127
Once the war broke out and President Polk issued his call for volunteers, the
regulars realized that it would only be a matter of time before volunteers began to arrive
in Mexico in large numbers. To the regular officers, the presence of the volunteers in
Mexico further highlighted the general assault on West Point Congress had recently
initiated. Therefore, many of the officers who joined Taylor in Texas during the early
days of the war hoped to gain a few victories before these volunteers arrived. William
Seaton Henry, a Captain in the 3rd U.S. Infantry, pointed out the precarious position in
which the war placed West Point. In a remark that directly reflected the pre-war debate
regarding the possibility of closing the military academy, he reported that “in the hour of
our country’s danger she [West Point] will always prove her usefulness, and her
graduates will show to their country and the world that the money expended in the
education of so talented a corps of officers has not been thrown away.”128 Apart from the
fear of the destruction of West Point, Johnston’s quote also reflected the fear that the
volunteers represented the death of the regular army to many officers.129
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Many of the early letters of the regular officers reflected a sense of urgency, and
the necessity for quick victories. They hoped that if the regular army could win several
such battles before the arrival of the volunteers, it might legitimate the need for a regular
army. After Taylor won the twin victories of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma with an
all regular force, many officers rejoiced. Lucien Bonaparte Webster, an officer in the 1st
Artillery, for example, exalted over “what a glorious thing it is that these two glorious
battles were fought entirely by the regular army. I hope the war will be over before the
volunteers join the General and none of them have reached him yet, but they are daily
arriving here, and we shall soon be overrun with them”130 Philip N. Barbour, a Captain in
the 3rd U.S. Infantry, concurred with this opinion by complaining in his journal on 26
April 1846 that “General Taylor has made a requisition for 50,000 volunteers, but it will
disgrace the army if he does not beat back the enemy across the Rio Grande before their
arrival.”131 On the same day, Barbour reported that Taylor took part of the army back to
Point Isabel for supplies, but that he expected to meet the enemy on his way back.
Barbour noted that “this must be done before the arrival of the volunteers, or the army is
disgraced.”132
Many other officers agreed that the regular army needed to win several battles
prior to the arrival of any volunteer units in order to secure the regular army’s place in the
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war, and in the debates that had raged through Congress prior to the war. George Gordon
Meade, for example, pointed out that
with this force we shall drive all the Mexicans to the mountains, but in the
meantime we are all anxious to give them a sound thrashing before the volunteers
arrive, for the reputation of the army; for should we be unable to meet them
before they come and then gain a victory, it would be said the volunteers had done
it, and without them we are useless. For our own existence, therefore, we desire to
encounter them.133
On another occasion Meade elaborated on this thought, pointing out that “General
Taylor, as well as the whole army, was anxious to try our strength before the volunteers
should come, knowing how much our reputation depended on so doing.”134 Lt. Napoleon
Jackson Tecumseh Dana of the 7th U.S. Infantry reflected a similar opinion, arguing to
his wife that “you don’t know my darling Sue, how much we rejoice that all this [Resaca
de la Palma and Palo Alto] happened before the volunteers arrived. The country will see
it is the regulars which can do their business, and had the volunteers been here they
would have gotten all the credit for our hard fighting.”135 In a similar vein, Lt. Ephraim
Kirby Smith, also in Dana’s 7th U.S. Infantry, wrote to his wife after the battles at Resaca
de la Palma and Palo Alto that “it is a glorious fact for the army that there were no
volunteers with us.”136 The victories at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma carried a great
importance for many regular officers beyond the simple fact that the United States had
won its first victories against Mexico. Many of these officers, as noted above, felt that
these two battles might just have saved the reputation of the entire regular army.
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One of the many impacts that West Point had on the regular junior officer corps
was discipline. The identity of the regular army revolved around a strict sense of
discipline and professionalism. Overall, West Point during this period focused its
attention on attempting to create an army which mirrored Europe’s militaries.137 The
military academy instilled this sense of discipline in all of its recruits, and they carried
this discipline with them to Mexico. One graduate, Cadmus M. Wilcox of the 7th Infantry
described the impact of West Point on the officer corps when he wrote that
“subordination, deference, and respect for superior officers have been thoroughly
inculcated during his four years’ instruction and training at West Point, and to the usages
of the service he readily adapts himself.”138 With this professionalism and discipline
instilled in them, the regulars resented the lack of self-control and discipline they felt the
volunteers displayed. When the volunteers arrived, the regulars quickly began to
disparage them due to their disorderly behavior, such as abuses against the Mexican
populace and Catholic Church. Through these attacks, the regulars further built a regular
army identity predicated on military discipline and professionalism, and distanced
themselves from the volunteers. The lack of discipline the regulars viewed among the
volunteers proved to be the biggest complaint issued from the regular army during the
Mexican War. Lieutenant Dana, for example, noted “I am glad indeed to see the superior

Morrison, The Best School in the World, 102-104; Hsieh, West Pointers and the Civil War, 125-126;
Brent Nosworthy, The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil
War (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003), 77-108.
138 Smith, Chronicles of the Gringos, 24.
137

64

and more dignified bearing of our troops [regulars]. They appear to have a supreme
contempt and disgust for the militia organization and discipline.”139
Many of the regular officers did not discount that the volunteers rushed to the
standard out of a sense of patriotism, but they quickly pointed out that the superior
discipline of the regular army would decide the war, not the patriotism of the volunteers.
Along these lines William S. Henry note that
Before this war is terminated, the people will feel, by way of applying their hands
to a very sensitive part of the person, the pocket, the difference between carrying on the
war by volunteers and regulars. The president was correct in discharging the six months
volunteers. At the time, I thought the patriotism of the Americans was so strong that in
the face of the enemy they, to a man, would have enlisted for twelve months; experience
has proven their patriotism not equal to their self interest.140
As Henry noted when war broke out, many people swarmed into volunteer
regiments being raised by the various state governments, but instead of the usual twelve
month terms of enlistment, many states signed volunteers on for six months. President
Polk disbanded many of these regiments because he feared six months was simply not
enough time to train and deploy troops to Mexico. Henry adeptly noted, though, that the
lack of people willing to sign on for twelve months called into question the vaunted
patriotism of these volunteers.
On another occasion, Henry called into question the practice of raising volunteer
regiments for the Mexican War instead of increasing the size of the regular army. In
particular, he argued that “the bad policy of having so great a disproportion of volunteers
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cannot be felt in a war of invasion. If the war is to be prosecuted with vigor, a much
larger regular force must be raised. No column should advance into the interior composed
of less than one half regulars.” He continued by noting that “this is not said in
disparagement of the volunteers. Their individual gallantry and courage, and sacrifice of
home and all its comforts are appreciated. The only difference between them and the
regulars is discipline.”141 Like so many other officers, to Henry discipline proved to be
the deciding factor which separated the regulars from the volunteers.
Regular army officers offered a wide ranging critique of the lack of discipline
they viewed among the volunteers. Most of these complaints revolved around the rowdy
behavior of these regiments, and the fact that they simply didn’t know how to conduct
themselves as soldiers. For one, the regulars appear to not have grasped the fact that the
volunteers did not have the prior experience and West Point education they did to fall
back on. Instead, most had virtually no training prior to being deployed in Mexico. For
example, Richard S. Ewell, a Lieutenant in the 1st Regiment of Dragoons, reported an
incident, that went beyond a simple lack of discipline to criminal activity, in which
several volunteers murdered the regiment’s chief clerk. In particular, he noted that:
two nights ago a Mexican house was broken open and the Chief Clerk murdered
in attempting to defend the premises. The thieves alarmed, attempted to escape before
accomplishing their object, but left one of their number behind, who turned state’s
evidence, and gave up his accomplices, 12 in all, 4 of whom are officers in the
Pennsylvania Volunteers and are now in confinement. It is very much hoped that the
whole batch will be hung.”142
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Ewell’s remark demonstrated the contempt which many regular officers felt and
displayed for the volunteers. The men Ewell wrote about might have indeed committed
the crime he accused them of, but this passage is also illustrative of the manner in which
regulars viewed these types of events in general as Ewell proved quick to point out that
the men who committed the crime came from volunteer regiments.
Shortly following the arrival of the first volunteer regiments George Gordon
Meade reported on what he viewed as the lack of discipline exhibited by the volunteers.
In particular, he argued that “the volunteers continue to poor in, and I regret to say I do
not see it with much satisfaction. They are perfectly ignorant of discipline, and most
restive under restraint. They are in consequence a most disorderly mass.”143 While in
Matamoras, Captain Philip N. Barbour of the 3rd U.S. Infantry recorded in his journal
that the “volunteers are playing the devil and disgracing the country.”144 Similarly, E.
Kirby Smith reported to his wife that “my opinion of the volunteers and the whole
volunteers system is not changed in the least. They are expensive, unruly, and not to be
relied upon in action.”145 By critiquing the lack of discipline exhibited by the volunteers
in Mexico, the regulars solidified the regular army identity, created by West Point, which
relied on discipline and order.146 By proffering this argument, these regular officers
hoped to convince the nation that their superior discipline proved that the regular was
necessary and vital to the nation’s safety and defense. This identity remained in place
long after the conclusion of the Mexican-American War.
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Other regular officers demonstrated their opinion that the lack of discipline
exhibited by the volunteers often got them into trouble. On the other hand, they noted that
their own superior discipline made them better soldiers. For example, Lt. John Sedgwick,
a member of the 2nd U.S. Artillery, argued that “the volunteers have suffered a great
deal, and all for the want of knowing how to take care of themselves.” He continued by
noting that “on the contrary, the regulars are as healthy as if they were at their posts, and
it is believed by all that the country is healthier than any of the southern states. The
reason of the difference is that the latter [volunteers] know nothing about taking care of
themselves.” In conclusion, Sedgwick surmised that “one regiment of the regulars is
worth three of volunteers, and this will be acknowledged except by those politically
infatuated.”147 By remarking upon the political nature of the quality of the regulars vs.
volunteers, Sedgwick acknowledged that political nature of the rivalry between the
regular army and the volunteers. In so doing, he demonstrated that the social-political
debate in the United States regarding the future of West Point had an impact on the
manner in which these officers viewed and reacted toward the war with Mexico.
While regular officers proved willing enough to complain about the lack of
discipline among the volunteers under normal circumstances, these complaints multiplied
when they witnessed indiscipline on the battlefield. After fighting in the Battle of Buena
Vista, William Harrison Shover, an officer in the 3rd U.S. Artillery, wrote home about
the poor conduct exhibited by the volunteers during the battle. In particular, a volunteer
regiment fled the field, leaving a battery of artillery without protection at a crucial
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moment in the battle. He reported this action by noting that “I speak these things with
indignation for it was by gross cowardice that the artillerymen were left to be killed and
their guns taken! And this too by a set of fellows who have boasted that their lowest
private in the ranks were equal to any of the officers of the regular army.”148 One month
later Shover had still not let the subject drop and reported that “[Braxton] Bragg has the
greatest share of praise and he no doubt deserves it well, and yet would you believe it,
that the volunteers have taken all the credit of the victory to themselves! No one has ever
dreamed of the volunteers claiming to have driven off Gen. Minon’s Cavalry, yet tis said
in the states.”149
Another area of concern for the regulars revolved around the volunteers’
treatment of the Mexican populace. The regulars looked on with horror as many of the
volunteer regiments sacked and looted the many towns along their path. Many of these
officers noted that while the Mexican people respected the professional bearing of the
regulars, they exhibited a great deal of dread and trepidation upon learning volunteers
were in the area. During this period, the regular army believed that citizens and non
military targets should be considered off limits for armies. E. Kirby Smith, for example,
wrote to his wife that “the inhabitants [of Saltillo] had rapidly gained confidence in the
regulars and were much alarmed when they found we were about leaving them to the
mercy of the volunteers, of whom they have the utmost dread, and by whom they are
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generally treated with the utmost barbarity.”150 Ulysses S. Grant displayed a similar view
of the volunteers, noting that “some of the volunteers and about all of the Texans seem to
think it perfectly right to impose upon the people of a conquered city to any extent, and
even to murder them where the act can be covered by the dark.”151 Furthermore, George
Meade pointed out that “you will hear any Mexicans on the street descanting on the good
conduct of the ‘tropes de ligna’ as they call us, and the dread of the ‘voluntarios.’ And
with reason, they have killed five or six innocent people walking in the streets.”152 Lastly,
William S. Henry shamefully argued that “of late there have been several disgraceful
riots in the city, in which some of the volunteers were conspicuous, arising from the lax
state of discipline in some of the regiments.”153
According to the regulars, the lax discipline among the volunteers proved so
complete that not even Christmas dinner escaped the rampage. Shortly following
Christmas 1846, Lt. Dana reported a disturbing occurrence to his wife. A group of
volunteers tore through the local town on Christmas Eve and wreaked havoc on the local
population. When reporting the incident to his wife, Dana wrote that “I suppose that the
volunteers did not let the poor peoples’ turkeys get off altogether free. I suppose they
were determined to have a Christmas Eve supper even if they were on a march.”154 Ralph
W. Kirkham reported a similar situation in Mexico City on Christmas day 1847. He
reported to his wife that “Christmas has been kept here pretty much as we keep it at
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home, plenty of eggnog and apple toddy, and any quantity of drunken Volunteers in the
streets.”155
Lt. George B. McClellan of the engineers, who never backed away from
expressing his opinion in any situation, reported home to his family about a volunteer
unit he witnessed on the march. In particular, he noted that the condition in which the unit
arrived demonstrated its lack of discipline. On 4 January 1847 McClellan observed this
regiment just completing a march to the city of Victoria. The unit, he noticed, halted just
short of their objective to realign their ranks and have the troops put their coats back on,
and also brought out their flags at this point. This completed, the column resumed its
march into the city to give the impression that they had completed their march in the best
order. The regular army officers who observed the scene, McClellan noted, laughed
“enough to kill themselves.”156 By relating this scene, McClellan drew attention to the
complete lack of professionalism that reigned among these volunteers, who wanted to
make it appear that they had completed the march in good order.
The regular junior officers attempted to further distance themselves from the
volunteers by commenting upon what they perceived as their own superior fighting skills
compared to that of the volunteers. By pointing out the lack of fighting prowess among
the ranks of the volunteers, the regulars added a keen fighting ability to the identity they
created for the regular army. While the volunteers claimed they could fight as well as the
regulars and expressed an intense desire to be sent to the front in order to fight and win
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glory on the battlefield, the regulars recorded an almost complete contempt for the
fighting prowess of these volunteer regiments. Many of the letters sent home by the
regulars reported that the volunteers proved to be almost useless as a fighting force. After
Congress reassigned most of the regular units in Taylor’s army to General Scott,
Lieutenant Theodore Laidley expressed concern that “everyone has confidence in
General Taylor if he only had troops that he could rely on, but that he has lost all but few
of any kind.”157 Along similar lines, George Meade reported that “if we only had 15,000
regular troops, I believe sincerely we could march to the city of Mexico, but I doubt the
practicability of so doing with a force of volunteers; for this reason, the regular troops,
being disciplined and under command of their officers, can be restrained, kept in
subjection, and the war made a war against the Army of and Government of Mexico, and
not against the people.”
Regular officers such as Meade disdained the atrocities they witnessed volunteers
committing. Along these lines Meade argued that while the regular troops displayed
enough discipline and self restraint to avoid these kinds of acts, the volunteers did not. It
is interesting to note that while Meade might have thought that only the volunteers
committed atrocities against civilians, the regulars troops did commit such acts as well.
The fact that many regular officers ignored the atrocities committed within their own
ranks further demonstrates that fact that the regulars were attempting to create an identity
for themselves. Any acknowledgement of weakness or indiscipline within their ranks
would have ruined the professional ideal fostered by these officers. Meade continued by
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noting that “already have the volunteers commenced to excite feelings of indignation and
hatred in the bosom of the people.”158
Lieutenant Daniel Harvey Hill, a member of the 4th U.S. Artillery constantly
complained about the poor state of the volunteers he met while in Mexico. On 13 March
1848 he left a detailed remark in his diary which outlined his opinion of the volunteers. In
this passage, he disparaged the volunteers, not only for their lack of fighting ability, but
also for their general lack of discipline. In particular he wrote that
We have with us now a fine specimen of the volunteer system. The
regiment with the Train (1st Pennsylvania) ran during the battles whenever an
enemy presented himself in force. Now they march boldly along during the day in
parties of two and three robbing and marauding wherever plunder is to be had. At
night when they reach camp they amuse themselves by firing off their muskets at
random.159
Overall, Hill’s remark perfectly summarizes the view which many regulars held
of the entire volunteer system. As Hill pointed, he did not just blame this one specific
regiment for its actions, but the entire volunteer system which had sent them into the field
in the first place.
While Meade vehemently championed the superior discipline of the regulars over
the volunteers, the regular troops were not as blameless as Meade would have his readers
believe. John W. Dodd, a Captain with the 4th Indiana, noted one such instance that
occurred while stationed on garrison duty in Puebla. In particular, he wrote to his wife
that:
You never saw such joy manifested as when they were relieved, and
before our troops
were fairly in quarters we were called out to suppress

158 Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, 108.
159
Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr. and Timothy D. Johnson (eds), A Fighter from Way Back: The Mexican
War Diary of Lt. Daniel Harvey Hill, 4th Artillery, USA (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2002), 175.

73

pillage and robbery and murder. The troops that had been so long cooped up and
nearly starved got into the streets and aided by many of the regulars with us
commenced breaking open stores and houses, watching at the corners for
Mexicans whom they would shoot down armed or not. To the credit of the
volunteers, they had nothing to do with it.160
Dodd’s comment demonstrates that, contrary to what many regulars led their
loved ones to believe, the volunteers were not the only ones who committed acts of
atrocities against the Mexican populace. Dodd’s comment also illustrates the impact of
troops being left on garrison duty for too long. The troops whom Dodd described had
been stationed in Puebla for some time. When Dodd’s regiment finally arrived to relieve
them garrison went into an orgy of violence against the Mexican population of Puebla.
Other officers agreed with the opinion expressed by Meade. Lieutenant Napoleon
Jackson Tecumseh Dana also reported on the lack of fighting skills exhibited by the
volunteers when he reported to his father on the situation at Tampico. In particular, he
wrote “it [Tampico]is pretty strongly fortified by our forces and is now garrisoned by
about a thousand men, mostly volunteers, and if any kind of force should come against it,
with the present discipline, it would stand but a short time.”161 These feelings were
typical of those exhibited by the regular army’s junior officer corps. They felt that the
war could easily be won with a limited force of regulars, but that a large force of
volunteers could not hope to bring the war to a successful conclusion.
In a similar manner, Lieutenant Richard W. Johnston reported on the lack of
fighting skills exhibited by the volunteers in a letter to his wife. He noted that another
officer had recently received a letter from an officer named Bragg. In this letter Bragg
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provided a report of the Battle of Buena Vista to Johnston, and the deplorable
performance of the volunteers.162 Johnston reported that “a letter received from Bragg by
some officer of the Army a few days ago; in this he says that nine tenths of the Mexicans
killed were killed by our [regular] light batteries.” He continued by pointing out that most
of the volunteers acted most shamefully, leaving the batteries entirely unprotected, and
some of their regiments running from the field of battle and not returning during the
entire battle.”163 Johnston ended his letter by pointing out that despite all of these troubles
from the volunteers, they will claim credit for the entire victory. In particular, he
complained that “this battle will be claimed throughout the country as a battle gained by
the volunteers, I expect.”164
Politics, and especially the political appointment of volunteer officers, also served
as a forum that further divided the regulars and the volunteers. The regulars berated the
Polk administration and its handling of the war effort. President Polk expressed concern
due to the high number of Whig officers within the ranks of the regular army, and began
to make as many political appointments as possible into the ranks of the officer corps to
resolve this problem. One of the primary qualities of these newly appointed officers was
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the simple fact that they were loyal Democrats.165 The regulars held a deep sense of
contempt for the political upstarts, and connected this to the governmental conspiracy
against West Point and the regular army. Richard Johnston, for example, wrote home to
his wife that “the president seems as though he were determined to do away with West
Point and ruin the spirit and character of the army. Every new appointment except where
expressly prohibited by Congress, he gives civilians, dismissed cadets, etc.” He
concluded by hoping that “peace could be concluded before the new regiment of
dragoons and the nine new regiments of infantry have a chance to come into the field, the
President will hardly dare to keep them in the service when the army is reduced to its old
standard.”166
The American Army expanded considerably during the Mexican War. Not only
did the government raise many volunteer regiments, but Congress also commissioned the
raising of new regular regiments as well. While West Point provided many officers to the
ranks of the army, there simply were not enough trained officers to go around. Due to this
shortage of officers the government had to appoint many amateur officers to lead these
new regiments. Not surprisingly, many of these appointments ended up being viewed as
purely political in nature. The Polk administration felt increasingly boxed in during the
early days of the Mexican War due to the fact that both Zachary Taylor and Winfield
Scott, along with many in the regular army, closely identified with the Whig Party. In the
case of Taylor and Scott, both officers sought a potential Presidential nomination in the
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upcoming election. As a result of the regular army’s loyalty to the Whigs, President Polk
never fully trusted the regular army. To these ends Robert E. Lee offered his critique of
the situation by pointing out that “we however cannot much hope that merit will be
sought after, after the manner in which appointment to the mounted rifles have been
filled.” In particular, Lee blamed the Polk administration, and wrote that “no army ever
deserved more from an administration than that of the Rio Grande from this, and no
administration ever had a better opportunity to reward them. Yet every man was passed
over, many of whom, Graham, May, Duncan, had made direct application for this very
corps, without the least hesitation.”167
The junior officers of the regular army viewed these political appointments with
disgust, and felt that these positions should go to the most qualified individual instead of
the person who demonstrated the most loyalty to the Democratic Party. These men
argued that more regular officers should be promoted into the ranks of the general officer
corps instead of civilians with little or no military experience. Due to these appointments,
they felt that the Polk administration had betrayed them, and they took this as a personal
affront to the regular army. Ulysses S. Grant, a Lieutenant in the 4th U.S. Infantry wrote
to John W. Lowe, a Captain in the 2nd Ohio Infantry “don’t you think Mr. Polk has done
the officers of the army injustice by filling up the new regiments of riflemen from
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citizens? It is plain to be seen that we have but little to expect from him.”168 On another
occasion, Grant wrote to his wife that “he [Grant’s father] insists that every officer of the
regular army ought to resign after the appointments that have been made. I believe he is
right.”169 George Gordon Meade expressed a similar opinion, writing that “I trust,
however, the government, after leaving him [General Worth] in his present position for a
reasonable time, will give him his special assignment of Brigadier General, as a large
militia force is coming into the field, as we shall require all of the rank in the regular
service we can raise in order to keep these gentlemen-volunteers from taking
command.”170 Similarly, Robert Anderson, a Captain in the 3rd U.S. Artillery, railed
against the Polk administration and complained that “I would resign tomorrow rather than
hold a commission under an administration which has, from the first day of its existence,
shown that it used all means to destroy the pride and trample on the rights of the army
particularly when that army has by its gallant deeds plucked its drowning honors from the
deep.”171
One of the most scathing remarks concerning the nature of Polk’s political
appointments during the war came from Daniel Harvey Hill. By 1848 he expressed his
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disgust with the entire system and complained that after four years at West Point and six
years in the service he still only held the rank of Lieutenant. He reported disgustedly in
his diary that “I have met as Colonels men who had been dismissed from the Military
Academy for incapacity or bad conduct long after I had graduated, men whose sole
recommendation in the eyes of the President seemed to have been their dismissal from
West Point.” He continued by arguing that “now the precious rascals come forward after
the fighting is over and lord it over the survivor of so many bloody fields. Our most
glorious president has don all that man could do to outrage the feelings and destroy the
morale of the Old Army.”172
By defending themselves in this manner, the regulars created a view, realistic or
not, predicated on the superiority of their own discipline and professionalism. For their
part, the volunteers sought to discredit the supposed superiority of the regulars by arguing
that they were more well suited to the life of a soldier in a republic. As the next two
chapters will demonstrate, in reality the differences which regulars and volunteers viewed
between themselves broke down when these officers were confronted by social issues
such as religion and race. Their reactions to these issues proved more similar than
otherwise, and further demonstrates the fact that American social and political issues
greatly impacted the ranks during the Mexican war and the fact that the Mexican War
represented a social, as well as military, battleground.
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CHAPTER III
CAN IT BE POSSIBLE THIS IS RELIGION AT ALL?

When the war with Mexico erupted in 1846, William Harrison Shover had served
in the military since graduating from the military academy in 1838. His graduating class
at West Point had included a distinguished list of future generals including P.G.T.
Beauregard, Irvin McDowell, and William J. Hardee. The same year, he journeyed into
the Creek nation where he helped transfer Native Americans westward from the
southeast.173 He later served in the Second Seminole War until being transferred to
garrison duty in New Orleans. In 1842 Shover received a posting in St. Augustine,
Florida before being ordered to join the 3rd U.S. artillery regiment with General Zachary
Taylor’s army of occupation in Texas. Several future Civil War generals, such as Braxton
Bragg, Robert Anderson, William T. Sherman, George H. Thomas, and John F. Reynolds
joined Shover in the 3rd Artillery. During the Mexican War his unit participated in the
Battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, Monterrey, and Buena Vista, where Shover
received a citation and brevet for gallant and meritorious conduct. By 1847 Shover had
achieved the rank of Captain in the 3rd artillery. In 1848 he returned to West Point where
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he served as an instructor of Artillery and Cavalry until his untimely death on 7
September 1850.174
Much like many Americans at the time, Shover paid attention to the fact that
during the Mexican War the United States, a primarily protestant nation, would be
engaged against the primarily Roman Catholic enemy of Mexico. During the war, Shover
wrote numerous letters home to his sister. These letters reflected Shover’s disdain for,
and even hatred of Mexico’s Catholic population. On one instance, Shover noted the
manner that Mexico celebrated the Sabbath, pointing out to his sister that “you know dear
sister that Sunday is a great holiday in Catholic countries. Here the Mexicans turn it into
a regular day of gaiety and frolic, and the evening into balls, ‘fandangoes,’ parties,
etc.”175 Instead, of this festive atmosphere, Shover preferred a more solemn mode of
worship. Upon visiting a Catholic church in Monterey, Shover described his experiences
to his sister. In particular, he noted that the priest was well spoken, “but he has no general
information. Why! I heard an inquisitive officer ask him, a few weeks since, who the
present Pope was before he was raised to the papal chair.” He continued by pointing out
that “he did not know nor did he know what place or country he was a cardinal of! This is
the man sent here to conduct the heathen!”176 Shover summarized his opinion of both
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Mexican Catholicism and the Mexican people as a whole by arguing that “such things as
religion, morality, honesty, etc. as we understand them is entirely unknown here!”177
After being exposed to Mexico and its religion for the duration of the war’s two years,
Shover’s opinion had changed little. By 1848 he disgustedly reported to his sister that
“pure religion has no place in any heart in this land from the Arch Bishop to the lowest
beggar, all alike are vagabonds.” He continued by noting how this lack of religion
pervaded the different social classes of Mexican society by arguing that “amongst the
better classes, religion is only used as mere show, and amongst all tis only a mocking
mummery!”178 Shover summarized these remarks by comparing Mexico’s version of
Catholicism to that in the United States by pointing out that “when I compare our holy
religion at home; our plain neat churches, and well dressed, and well behaved
congregations, with what I see here, I ask myself, can it be possible this is religion at
all?”179 Finally, he closed by noting that “I might not go to these churches it gives me
such a fit of disgust.”180 Shover’s disappointment at witnessing Mexican Catholicism is
revealing enough of American attitudes toward Catholicism, but these quotes are even
more revealing considering Shover himself practiced Catholicism. In particular, many
Americans of the age linked Catholicism to despotism, immorality, and what they
perceived as Papal attempts at world domination.181
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While Congressional debates regarding the future of West Point and the regular
army generated sharp distinctions between the regulars and volunteers, these differences
were not the only issues dividing society, but the antebellum army also. AntiCatholicism, for example, divided American society between Protestant and Catholic for
several decades prior to the outbreak of the Mexican War. The American officers who
traveled to Mexico to fight in the war carried these religious animosities with them.
While the regulars might have prided themselves in their perceived superior discipline,
their professional bearing began to break down when confronted with a Catholic enemy.
With issues such as battlefield discipline, professionalism generated sharp distinctions
between the ranks of the regulars and the volunteers, as the regulars performed much
better on the battlefield than the volunteers. Anti-Catholicism proved too much for the
professionalism and discipline of the regulars to overcome, however. While some of the
regular officers carried themselves with all of the discipline they could muster, others
participated in anti-Catholic violence while they were in Mexico. This demonstrated the
fact that professionalism had its limits, and in regards to many social issues the regulars
behaved in a similar way to the volunteers. In this manner, the actions of the regulars
more closely resembled the actions of the volunteers.
Anti-Catholicism had a well established history in America since the Colonial
period. It had taken on several forms, ranging from assaults on the clergy to attacking
Catholic doctrine. By 1850 the American Catholic Church, which had been almost nonexistence in 1800, had grown to become the third largest church in the United States
largely due to the immigration of European Catholics to the United States. This rapid
growth and expansion gained the attention of America’s largely protestant population,
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which responded through a series of systematic assaults on Catholicism in the United
States. The Catholic Church received many of its new members from the ranks of the
thousands of immigrants, many of whom hailed from Ireland, who found their way into
the United States from Europe’s Catholic nations during the first decades of the
nineteenth century.182 American protestants responded with outrage and violence to this
immigration, which they perceived as a Catholic invasion. This outrage quickly took on
the form of a nativist movement. These nativists leveled their ire against the ranks of the
immigrants flooding into the United States, and particularly against the many Catholic
immigrants who found their way into the United States.183
In response to these developments, a large volume of anti-Catholic literature
appeared in conjunction with the rise of nativism in the United States. Much of this
literature targeted America’s cities, since most Catholic immigrants settled in these areas.
Several anti-Catholic periodicals appeared beginning with the Boston Recorder in 1816,
and continuing with the Christian Watchman, New York Observer, and Protestant
Vindicator. Aside from journalistic sources, popular literature also took on an antiCatholic slant by the 1830s. This literature detailed sensationalized accounts of the lurid
and immoral sexual perversion of the Catholic clergy, and outlined a papal conspiracy
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against republican government in the United States. The novel Lorette, published in
1833, for example, described Canadian nunneries as houses of prostitution, and related
tales of child murder and sexual assault. Others, such as Rosamond, which appeared in
1833, and Rebecca Reid’s Six Months in a Convent told similar tales of Catholic
promiscuity. One of the more interesting examples of anti-Catholic literature was
authored by Lymann Beecher, a Boston area Presbyterian minister. In 1835 he released
Plea for the West, that warned of a planned Catholic seizure and invasion of the
Mississippi Valley. Historian Charles Sellers summarized the general atmosphere of
these works well, noting that “popery was assailed-by sermons, a swarm of anti-Catholic
periodicals, the Benevolent Empire’s Protestant Reformation Society, and lewd exposes
fabricated in collusion with pious clergymen-as unscriptural, despotic, and cloaking
priestly prurience in pretense of celibacy.”184 Overall, these works warned readers about
the depravity of the Catholic Church in an attempt to turn the American public against the
Catholic faith. Particularly, much of this literature painted images of rampant sexual
misconduct among Catholic clergy. Furthermore, others argued that the true purpose of
the Catholic Church in America was to supplant republican government with a
totalitarian papal rule.
This literature, along with the general fears created by the nativist movement,
sparked an intense period of anti-Catholic violence that lasted throughout much of the
1830s and into the first half of the 1840s. Much of this violence occurred within
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America’s eastern cities with the highest concentration of Catholics and immigrants. In
1834, for example, anti-Catholic rioters attacked an Ursuline convent in Charlestown,
Massachusetts after a rumor spread that the convent was targeting Protestant girls and
forcing them to convert to Catholicism. Martin Van Buren even found himself embroiled
in the anti-Catholic debate when he was accused of attempting to foment a “popish plot”
after writing a letter to the Vatican in which he claimed that Catholics enjoyed freedom
of worship in the United States. Mobs also rioted against Irish Catholics twice within a
four year period in Boston, but one of the most violent of these actions occurred in May
1844 in Philadelphia.185
The case in Philadelphia reflected another aspect of anti-Catholicism, responding
to the growing number of Catholic schools in American urban areas. In Philadelphia,
Bishop Patrick Kenrick complained to the Philadelphia School Board about the use of the
King James version of the Bible preferred by Protestants. He argued that Catholic
students should be allowed to use the Douay-Rheims version of the Bible.186 Once word
of Kenrick’s argument reached the public an intense wave of anti-Catholicism swept
Kensington, a suburb of north Philadelphia, in May and south Philadelphia by July 1844.
Both areas had recently seen a rise in the number of Catholic immigrants, particularly
from Ireland. These anti-Catholic agitators argued that the Catholic Church had attempted
to remove the Bible from schools, and thus began to organize “save the Bible” rallies. As
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a result of all of this, rioting broke out in Philadelphia that resulted in nineteen deaths and
more than forty injuries. Furthermore, the rioters burned two Catholic schools and a
convent to the ground during these riots.187 In the end, as Michael Feldberg pointed out,
these riots proved to be about much more than just an argument over which Bible to use
in schools. Instead, these riots represented a nativist response against immigrants,
particularly Catholic immigrants.188 Furthermore, Feldberg noted that this struggle
between nativists and Catholics should be viewed “as an ethnic, rather than simply a
religious, conflict.”189
All of this anti-Catholic rhetoric had a profound impact on both the regular and
volunteer officers who fought in the Mexican War, as the war began during this period of
intense anti-Catholic agitation. The war brought out an overwhelming display of antiCatholicism within these officers. The fact that the United States, a largely Protestant
nation, fought against the overwhelmingly Catholic Mexico only exacerbated the antiCatholic tensions that had been engrained in many of these men due to their cultural and
social connections to Jacksonian America. It might be expected that professionalism
isolated the regulars from these social debates. Historians have long argued that the
regulars displayed greater discipline than the volunteers on such matters as fighting
abilities and restraint from violence against Mexicans. Upon examining the thoughts
reflected by the junior officer corps in their letters, this was not always the case, however.
While the regulars might have proved more adept on the battlefield, they often proved
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just as susceptible to prejudicial social and cultural tensions as the volunteers. Where
does this leave professionalism? While military academies such as West Point strove to
create a professional class of soldiers who would be immune to such debates as well as
skilled soldiers, this was largely not possible.190 While the academy excelled at
generating officers well suited to lead on the battlefield, it could not, nor did it attempt to,
train culture and society out of these men. Therefore, as evidenced by the anti-Catholic
debate within the ranks, professionalism had its boundaries. Instead of acting as a class of
soldiers separate from the volunteers, the letters written by the regulars demonstrated that
the regulars harbored many of the same anti-Catholic prejudices of the volunteers. While
this did not prove true for all regulars, it did for many. Therefore, upon being confronted
with a Catholic enemy, the first cracks in the professionalism of the regulars became
evident.
These anti-Catholic sentiments impacted and defined the way many officers
viewed Mexico’s Catholic population. In this regard, these officers viewed the war as a
religious crusade against the Catholic Church. Through these thoughts, the officers of the
American army exported anti-Catholicism with them to Mexico, as many constantly
complained about and sometimes physically violated the many Catholic churches in
Mexico. Many of these officers, both regulars and volunteers, felt it not only their
Christian duty to carry the war to the Catholic church, but they also felt it their right to
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sack and raid the churches they passed on the way. In this manner, the Mexican War took
on the tone of a holy war. This sentiment can be viewed as a direct extension of the
manifest destiny that motivated many Americans in their drive for expansion. If Mexico’s
territory was up for grabs they felt, why not the property of its churches? Given the
nature of the anti-Catholic movement in the United States, it seemed natural that the
Catholic Church became a target, if an unofficial one, of the American Army in
Mexico.191 Overall, as Paul Foos noted, “given the strongly anti-Catholic rhetoric
embedded in manifest destiny, and in American political debates of the 1840s, it is not
surprising that churches were particular targets of both calculated and spontaneous raids
by Americans.”192
Manifest destiny and anti-Catholicism impacted both the Mexican War and
Jacksonian society writ large. Manifest destiny, a term first coined by journalist John L.
O’Sullivan in the Democratic Review, argued that the United States was destined by
providence to spread from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific.193 Many people in the
United States utilized these thoughts to excuse imperialist or expansionist policies. Many
opponents of the Mexican War argued that southern congressmen had instigated the war
in an attempt to gain more land on which to expand the institution of slavery. The
growing abolitionist movement, in particular, opposed the Mexican War for this
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reason.194 To the abolitionists the war simply represented an attempted land grab by what
they viewed as a slavocracy. Others argued against the morality and efficacy of the war.
These people, located mostly in the northeast, argued that the war was simply immoral
and motivated by improper causes, namely conquest and expansion. Protestant supporters
of the war, however, argued that the United States had religious right, or providence, on
their side since they would be fighting a Catholic opponent, thus making it a kind of holy
war. In particular, most Democratic voters, especially in the south, supported the
Mexican War.
Most historians of the Mexican War, and the antebellum Army, note sharp
differences and distinctions between the discipline and actions of the regular and
volunteer regiments in Mexico.195 They argue that the regulars not only performed better
on the battlefield, but usually possessed self restraint in the face of wanton plunder on the
part of the volunteers, and that the regulars did not behave with the same unruly nature of
the volunteers. Overall, they described a situation where the professionalism of the
regulars insulated them from such actions. Historian Richard Bruce Winders summarizes
this view nicely, writing that “volunteers were made differently from the regulars of the
Old Establishment. Reared in Jacksonian America, the former clung tightly to the
privileges they had known in civilian life.”196 Along similar lines, historian Paul Foos
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recently noted that “the regulars were far better suited for taking the lead in pitched
battles and assaulting fortified positions, and their discipline made them, far more than
volunteers, suitable for garrisoning cities.” Specifically, Foos argued that the regulars
performed better on the battlefield than the volunteers, but also noted that the regulars
behaved better and were more easily controlled while on garrison duty. He continues by
pointing out that “the usefulness of the volunteers, in a military sense, came in their value
in intimidating and policing the civilian population in occupied areas.”197 While it might
be true that the regular army behaved better and possessed a better record on the
battlefield, this does not mean that the regular army did not harbor the same social and
cultural attitudes and prejudices as the volunteers. William Skelton argued that the
professionalism of the regulars created a separate and distinct class centered on regular
junior officers.198 If this were truly the case, the social and cultural outlook of the regulars
would have appeared vastly different from the volunteers. Instead, upon examining the
actions of the volunteers and regulars toward the Mexican Church, it becomes obvious
that no discernible difference between the two existed.199 By comparing the reaction of
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both the regular and volunteer junior officer corps it is possible to not only judge how
these two groups viewed anti-Catholicism, but also to judge the impact that
professionalization had on the military. Did professionalization, as William Skelton and
others contend, create a class of officers separate from the rest of society? The simple
answer here is no, it did not. Instead, both volunteers and regulars reacted to antiCatholicism along similar lines, and in ways influenced by Protestantism and nativism.
When the war broke out most Americans realized that religion would play a role
in the war for the simple reason that a Protestant nation fought against a Catholic nation.
Both the United States and American sympathizers in Mexico argued that American
forces should be instructed to deal lightly with, and not target the Catholic Church. For
this reason, both Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott issued such orders. Taylor issued
orders protecting Mexican churches prior to beginning the campaign against Monterrey,
while Winfield Scott gave similar orders prior to the landing at Vera Cruz.200 They feared
that a heavy handed approach by Protestant American soldiers would inspire the Mexican
populace to stronger resistance and would thus lengthen the war. Richard Smith Elliot,
correspondent and officer in the 1st Missouri, pointed this out by noting that the Mexican
people had been taught that the American Army would try to destroy the Catholic faith in
Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1821-1846 also talk about the antebellum
army and some of the differences between the volunteers and regulars. Tyler V. Johnson’s recent work
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Mexico.201 Along these lines he wrote that “strange, indeed, must have been the feelings
of the citizens, when an invading army was thus entering their home.” He continued by
noting that the Mexicans had been taught to believe that “their new rulers [the American
Army, were] strangers to their manners, language, and habits, and as they had been taught
to believe, enemies to the only religion they had ever known.”202 Others in Mexico who
supported the American cause hoped that the American leadership would issue orders
forbidding their troops from targeting the church. Richard Johnston, a Lieutenant in the
3rd Artillery, noted this sentiment in a letter home pointing out that “these gentlemen
said, so I understand, that it would advance our interests very much if General Scott
would give some promise to the clergy that the churches shall not be disturbed.” He
continued by arguing that “they said that the Mexican authorities caused all the lower
classes to believe that we were northern barbarians.”203 Captain Robert Anderson, also in
Johnston’s 3rd Artillery regiment, joined in this debate by writing “we ought to be very
particular here, as we have been represented as opposed to the religion of the country,
and being determined to put the priesthood down.”204 Anderson represented the minority,
though, as few other officers expressed any concern in this matter. This sentiment,
however, did not prevail in the American Army writ large, or even the junior officer
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corps. Instead, many of the officers joined in on the physical assault of Catholic
Churches, and the verbal tirade against the church and its supporters. To answer both the
complaints of the Mexican populace, and as an attempt to curb reprisals against the
Catholic Church General Winfield Scott issued General Order Number 20 on 19 February
1847, prior to the beginning of his landing at Vera Cruz. This order forbade any assaults
or reprisals on the church. While this order might have outlawed assaults on the church, it
did not stop such actions from occurring.205
One of the most common aspects of the anti-Catholicism displayed by the officer
corps revolved around how these men viewed the Catholic priests in Mexico. They felt
that these priests represented an undemocratic class that ruled the people of Mexico with
an iron fist. Furthermore, they argued that the priests lived a very impious life, often
partaking in the many vices enjoyed by secular Mexican society such as gambling and
sexual deviance. Due to these views, the officers complained bitterly about the priests in
Mexico. Their complaints paralleled the anti-Catholic literature of the prewar years. In
particular, much of this literature, such as Rosamond, argued that priests represented an
evil class that despotically ruled those under them. This argument perpetuated all of the
plots that this literature argued stemmed from the Vatican. Rosamond summarized this
argument, pointing out that “of all the scourges with which a country can be afflicted,
Popery, confessedly, is the worst.”206
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In order to improve the Mexican public’s view of the American Army, President
Polk ultimately decided to send two Catholic priests to travel with the American Army in
Mexico. In particular, he sent the Irish John McElroy and French Anthony Rey, two
Jesuits, to fill this role, and act as ambassadors and representatives of the Catholic
faith.207 These two men met with stiff opposition from many of the protestant soldiers in
the American Army at first, but as Tyler V. Johnson pointed out, by the end of the war
many of the officers and men in the ranks viewed these two in a much more favorable
light, accepting and approving of their ministry.208 Both the volunteers and the regulars
partook in this assault on these two American priests priests. Col. Samuel Ryan Curtis of
the 3rd Ohio summed up these views nicely. In a letter home, he complained bitterly
about the Polk administration’s policy of sending Catholic priests to Mexico to minister
to the army.209 He argued that “there is a kind of tempering whining policy in the position
of our government in the matter of sending a Catholic priest into this barbarous Catholic
country.” He continued by asking “does our government wish to Catholicize these
Catholics, or is the government afraid of Catholicism?” He concluded by remarking that
“the idea of associating our government with any seat of the church especially one of the
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most despotic and monarchistic; I regard as encroaching on our constitutional liberty.”210
While this comment railed against the government, it also illustrated the scorn with which
many officers held Catholic clergy in general. It is also interesting to note that this scorn
went beyond just Mexican priests, and extended to the Catholic faith in general. Indeed,
the men that Curtis commented on were Americans. Ralph W. Kirkham of the 6th U.S.
Infantry, also offered an opinion on the general relationship between the Mexican public
and the priests noting “the millions are steeped in ignorance, vice, and poverty, abject to
the priests and trampled to the dust by the wealthy.”211 As noted earlier, however, not
everyone shared these negative views, and the American reception of Rey and McElroy
warmed over time. Lt. Theodore Laidley, a regular officer with the ordinance department,
for example, wrote to his wife pointing out “yesterday was Sunday and you will hardly
believe me when I tell you I went to church and heard the service of my own [Catholic]
church. It was an agreeable surprise to me to learn that there was a chaplain with the
army, one from New York under the late act of Congress.”212 Lt. Garrett Barry of the 1st
U.S. Infantry also noted the presence of these two priests among the army by stating in a
letter that “there have been several communions among the wounded, two officers of my
company among the number who were baptized. One of them has since died. Father Rey
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has commenced some lecture on the real presence [of Christ] for the benefit of the
Protestant portion of the army.”213
Many officers, both regular and volunteer, joined assaults on Mexico’s priests.
One of the reasons why the priests drew such quick and sharp criticism was due to the
fact that they were the most visible physical embodiment of the Catholic Church as
members of the clergy resided in even the smallest Mexican villages. Also, these officers
expected the priests to rise above the problems that plagued the average person and live
more piously by not participating in vices such as gambling. Instead, they found out that
the priests often behaved in a similar manner to the secular population. For this reason,
many officers complained about the priests, and connected their behavior with what they
viewed as the moral corruption of the Catholic faith in general. In this regard, American
attacks on the clergy were a direct reflection of the anti-Catholic literature and sentiments
of the prewar period. Much of this literature railed against the priesthood arguing that the
priests represented a morally degenerate class of individuals who spread the false
teachings of Catholicism. Rosamond, for example, argued that “we have no need of the
tinsel trappings of popery. We prefer to follow the meek and humble example of Christ
and his Apostles, to the pomp, splendor, and pageantry of the church of Rome.”214 This
quotes demonstrated the view which many Americans held that the Catholic church was
too concerned with pomp and circumstance, and that the clergy dressed too
ostentatiously.
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A Captain accompanying General Kearny’s expedition in New Mexico concurred
with this view by writing a description of the priest of a small village in the Rio Grande
valley. In particular, he wrote that “there is at this town quite an extensive church, to
which is attached the priest’s house, where he keeps his wives or concubines. The priest
at this place has four. Two of them are quite good looking.”215 Another officer under
Kearny, Richard Smith Elliot, also complained about the priests he encountered along the
way. Elliot, a correspondent with a St. Louis newspaper as well as a volunteer officer,
wrote of a recent conversation he had with a man who turned out to be a priest. Along
these lines he complained that “as we left the mill, one of the Mexicans with whom I had
gone up, informed me that the gentleman with whom I had spoken was ‘un padre’ (a
priest) and the lady ‘su muger’ (his lady; literally woman). But one sees many curious
things here.” Elliot continued by noting that “this priest could appear in open day, visiting
on Sunday, with a woman, who, contrary to the canons of his religion, was all that a wife
could be to him! To make matters still more complicated, the person who gave me this
information remarked with no little pride that the priest’s woman was a cousin!”216 These
quotes also played on earlier anti-Catholic themes which viewed priests as sexually
deviant.
Officers in Taylor’s and Scott’s expeditions also lashed out against the priests
along their path. Ulysses S. Grant, for example, wrote home in 1846 complaining about
the clergy participating in vices such as gambling. In particular he wrote that “all
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[Mexicans] gamble, priests and civilians, male and female and particularly so on
Sundays.”217 In a similar manner, Ephraim Kirby Smith, a Captain in the 3rd U.S.
Infantry, complained about the fact that the priests seemed to condone immoral and
questionable acts. Specifically, he disgustedly remarked that:
cock fighting is quite the rage among these semi-barbarians. Yesterday I rode into
a cock pit, and you may imagine my astonishment when I beheld the old priest
presiding, receiving the bets, and heeling the chickens, as putting on the iron spurs
or slashes is technically called. I am told that this is nothing uncommon, that on
any Sunday afternoon I may find them thus engaged.218
Smith, like Grant, expected members of the clergy to act in what they viewed as a more
pious manner, which meant not participating in acts such as gambling. Daniel Harvey
Hill, an officer in the 4th U.S. Artillery from South Carolina , commented that he felt the
people of Mexico would eventually view the priests as morally corrupt. He expressed this
view in a letter home, noting that “we trust that the day is not far distant when the priests
will be regarded in their true light as the most corrupt and depraved wretches in the
country.” He continued arguing that “a few nights ago one of these holy men ran off with
the daughter of one of the most respectable ladies in the city.”219 Hill further reported that
this priest had done the same thing in Puebla but still retained his clerical position. This
quote, further highlighted the view of Mexican priests as sexually deviant and morally
corrupt.
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While the misdeeds of the priests caught the attention of many officers, others
also attacked the priests because they seemingly held the Mexican people captive and
thus dominated Mexico. Pre war anti-Catholic literature often emphasized the despotism
of the Catholic Church. Syndenham Moore of the 1st Alabama, for example, wrote to his
wife that “Catholic ceremonies are very absurd and ridiculous. They are no doubt for the
most part sincere but they have been misled by devious designs and wicked priests who
have almost absolute control over them.”220 Ralph W. Kirkham, also reported that “the
people are very superstitious, and the priests exercise the most unlimited control over
them and make them do as they please.”221 D.H. Hill, who seemed to always have a vocal
opinion, concurred commenting that “they [Mexicans] spoke with bitterness of the
insolence of the rich, the tyranny of the military, and the extortion of the priests.”222 The
priests did indeed hold a high position in both Mexican society and the church. Lt.
Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana, a Lieutenant in the 7th U.S. Infantry argued that the
clergy could also usurp a higher authority and take on a god-like status. Along these lines
he reported that “I expect the priest and their images are all the God they know.”223
Lastly, William Seaton Henry pointed out that “the poor are kept in utter ignorance, and
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under a blind obedience to their priests.” He continued by writing that “the priests are our
bitterest enemies and opposers, and are the main-spring of the war.”224
Major William Booth Taliaferro of the 9th Infantry also chimed in on these
negative views of the priesthood in Mexico. After visiting one of Mexico’s churches he
recorded in his journal that “it is there that one finds Mary, the mother of Jesus, the
simple Virgin, the pure and holy parent of God, decked out in gold and purple and tinsel
and brass with checks of wax bedaubed with rouge and eyes of glass as unmeaning in
their expression as mumbled prayers of the depraved priesthood of this deluded
people.”225 Taliaferro thus viewed both the priests and their parishioners as depraved.
This largely stemmed from the fact that Taliaferro viewed these services as bizarre and
alien. Many officers agreed with Taliaferro’s view of the “depraved” nature of Mexican
priests. Along similar lines, William Harrison Shover wrote home to his sister that “all
the padres throughout this miserable country are as corrupt as human nature can well be.
They are at the head of all rascality that is going on.” He further added that “they think
nothing of forgiving a man’s sins as that he may go out and murder and rob, and bring the
padre the largest share.”226
Apart from arguing against the power held by the priests and their lack of moral
character, the officer corps also resorted to a more base assault on the priests by attacking
and ridiculing their appearance. While it might seem trivial and petty to study this
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regard which many American officers held for the priests, but it also expresses the common American
opinion that the priests supported the war, and kept Mexico in the war when its people would have
concluded a peace with the United States.
225
William Booth Taliaferro diary, 12 October 1847, Taliaferro, William B. Papers, Virginia Historical
Society.
226
William Harrison Shover to Susan Thornton, 6 December 1846, Thornton Family Papers, Virginia
Historical Society.
224

101

mockery, it does illustrate the thoughts of the officers, and demonstrates the low esteem
in which they held these men. By ridiculing the priests, they also ridiculed the church as a
whole. Therefore, this mockery became a further expression of the anti-Catholicism of
Jacksonian America. This type of mockery was not new to the anti-Catholic movement.
American newspapers of the era, for example, filled their pages with mocking accounts
of Catholic despotism and inept priests prior to the war. Similarly, the officers further
ridiculed the church by describing the priests as fat or bloated in appearance. This also
highlighted their exploitation of the Mexican populace as these same officers often
referred to the unhealthy appearance of the Mexican people at the same time. Captain
William Austine of the 3rd U.S. Artillery described these priests as “dressed in gold
robes.”227 The dress Austine described among the priests must have been even more
evident given the humble mode of dress of most Mexicans. To these officers, this must
have seemed like the priests lived luxuriously at the expense of their poor parishioners.
Many of the officers noted the physical appearance of the priests in Mexico with
humor and disdain. Ralph W. Kirkham, for example, wrote that “the rascally priests live
well enough, for they have ‘the fat of the land’ and dress in broadcloth, but you might
dress them in rags and it would be easy enough to recognize them by their fat, well-fed
bodies. They are a grand set of rogues.”228 This again stands in contrast with Mexico’s
poor classes. In a similar vein, D.H. Hill noted that he “went down to the city at night,
witnessed the baptism by the Spanish priest of a soldier’s child and a Mexican baby. The
priest, sleek and fat, mumbled over the service and went through the mummeries as fast
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as possible.”229 On another occasion, upon viewing mass at a nearby Catholic Church,
Hill wrote that “the bloated sensual appearance of the priest was disgusting and
laughable.”230 John Sedgwick added more scorn when he wrote that “the priests that
come from the states say they could not recognize the Catholic religion in the mummeries
practiced here; and their moral character is quite on a par with their religious
degradation.”231 By noting the lack of moral character among the priests, Sedgwick’s
quote pointed a perceived connection between the priest’s moral character and their
dress. These quotes also demonstrated a view that the clergy suffered from problems of
overconsumption instead of living piously.
While the American Army heaped vast amounts of scorn on Mexican priests, the
church buildings themselves also received a great deal of attention from the American
Army. At the outbreak of war, many in the United States argued that Mexican churches
contained great amounts of material wealth in the form of gold and other such riches.
Given the nature of anti-Catholicism in the United States, these troops felt that these
churches represented fair and accessible targets to the American army, and that they were
entitled to confiscate and steal any wealth they found in Mexican churches. These ideas
mixed with the sense of manifest destiny that stated that divine providence would propel
the United States ever westward. Through manifest destiny, many in the United States
felt it was America’s God given right to expand into places such as Mexico. Therefore,
when war broke out, these sentiments combined with already present attitudes of anti-
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Catholicism. As such, many soldiers, and officers, felt they had the right to attack and
plunder Mexico’s many Catholic Churches in order to seize their storied gold and wealth.
Captain Richard A. Stewart, a Louisiana volunteer and minister, delivered a sermon to his
troops that illustrated the connection between manifest destiny and anti-Catholicism.
Thomas Bangs Thorpe, a soldier who heard the sermon, reported Stewart’s words,
commenting that:
the Reverend speaker showed most plainly and beautifully, that it was the order of
providence that the Anglo-Saxon race was not only to take possession of the
whole North American continent, but to influence and modify the character of the
world,- that such was meant by ‘the land I gave your fathers forever and ever.’ He
stated that the American people were children of destiny, and were the passive
instruments in the hands of an overruling power to carry out its great designs; and
beautifully illustrated this position by a rapid glance at the history of our nation in
times past and the present. He concluded by hoping that hostilities with Mexico
would cease,-that wiser councils would govern at her capitol,-and that peace
would again extend its wings over her distracted land; and with a truly eloquent
burst of patriotism upon the Christian of every man’s standing by his country, so
long as a single foe remained in arms against her.232
Both regulars and volunteers would have agreed with Stewart’s sermon. As a result of
this line of thought most soldiers who traveled to Mexico viewed the church as a
legitimate target. Therefore, many plundered the numerous churches along their path.
Many soldiers joined in on the plunder of wealth from Mexican Churches. While
some officers tried to stop this from happening others joined their troops in sacking the
churches along their path. William Booth Taliaferro, an officer of the 9th U.S. Infantry,
wrote home to his father of his utter powerlessness to stop the plunder of the churches,
and commented that “I have purchased a pair of earrings in which I was most egregiously
cheated and which I have since broken, which I send to Sue, together with a little cross,
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containing a piece of the wood of the Holy Cross, which was taken by one of my men
from the Sanctum Sanctorum of some lady in the sacking of Houmntle [sic].”233 One of
the responsibilities of an officer corps in occupation duty was to ensure excesses such as
these did not take place. Instead, many American officers joined the soldiers under their
command in attacking the Catholic Church.
Many officers and soldiers who fought in Mexico spoke about the material wealth
of the Catholic Church. In doing so, they usually referred to the golden Jesus’ that they
thought filled Mexico’s Cathedrals and churches. While many spoke about “golden
Jesus’” they had their eyes on much more, as this simply represented what they viewed as
the fabulous material wealth of the Mexican Church. For example, many Mexican
Churches boasted elaborate alters and other iconography. Thomas Jonathan Jackson
noted the extreme wealth in the church at Jalapa in a letter to his sister. In this letter he
reported that “on entering this magnificent structure we are struck with the gaudy
appearance on every side but most especially the opposite end which appears to be gilded
with gold at the bottom.” He continued by marveling that it “is a magnificent silver alter
and on each side are statues which cannot fail to attract the attention of the astonished
soldier.”234 The elaborate opulence of these churches must have proven striking to
American viewers. American churches at the time did not display this level wealth and
opulence. Instead, most Protestant American churches were humbly appointed buildings.
Albert Lombard, a New York volunteer, noted the expectations of plundering
Mexican churches that many soldiers carried with them to Mexico. In particular, he
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reported that “the privates too, were all promised ‘roast beef and two dollars a day, plenty
of whiskey, golden Jesuses, pretty Mexican gals, safe investments and quick returns, and
everything pictured to the fancy.”235 Stanislaus Lasalle, an officer in the 1st Indiana, noted
this view in a letter to his sister, in which he commented that “last Sunday while the
preacher was taking sacrament in a gold chalice, I saw one volunteer wink to another as
much as to say that it was not quite a little Jesus but the next thing to it. The chalice was
solid gold and must be worth at least one thousand dollars.”236 William Seaton Henry, a
Captain with the 3rd U.S. Infantry, expressed disappointment when he reached Mexico
and learned many of these rumors of the storied wealth of the church proved to be false.
In particular, he noted that “the furniture around the alter was very neat, but not as costly
as I had been led to suppose; no diamond and pearl petticoats of ‘our lady of
Guadeloupe.’”237
The officers sometimes joined their men in plundering Catholic Churches. In a
letter to his brother, Alex Brown of the 1st Pennsylvania noted that “I did wish you was
here to rummage this place through as there would be positive for you for a month. There
is a very rich chapel attached to this place, though small.”238 The regulars, as Lt.
Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana noted, also joined in on the plunder of Catholic
Churches in Vera Cruz. Much of the city, including the local church, had been destroyed
by the American siege and bombardment of that city. In a letter to his wife he reflected
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on taking part in these actions himself. In particular, he noted that “I went there [and
destroyed church in Vera Cruz] and looked all around, and would you believe it, your
sacrilegious husband stole from the very alter.”239
This anti-Catholic prejudice not only reflected the American view that the
Mexican church possessed extreme wealth, but also displayed American anti-Catholicism
within the army as well. William Preston, for example, expressed this view after visiting
the city of Puebla, and wrote that “the interior of the cathedral is richly decorated with the
gorgeous, but barbaric taste manifested in the ecclesiastical edifices throughout Mexico.”
Preston continued by pointing out that “among others an invitation to true believers to
repent, with an inflated and rhetorical account of the miraculous appearance of our lady
of Guadalupe.”240
Stealing from churches reached epidemic proportions in Mexico, particularly
when American troops entered Mexico’s larger cities such as Monterrey or Vera Cruz.
Richard Johnston, a regular officer and himself Catholic, wrote about the extensive
plunder. While stationed in the city of Tampico he noted that “the exterior walls were
broken and defaced by others; although they were too thick for shot to pass through them:
four or five silver or plated candlesticks were stolen from the alter, I understand, by the
volunteers.”241 For Johnston, American abuse of the Catholic Church caused him to
rethink his service in the army. Due to this personal crisis, Johnston contemplated his
resignation following the conclusion of the war. He noted that the abuse of the church

Ferrell, Monterrey is Ours, 197.
William Preston, Journal in Mexico (Privately Printed, Paris, 1937), 28.
241
Richard Johnson to wife, 4 April 1847, Richard Johnston Papers, Mississippi State University, Special
Collections.
239
240

107

was dreadful, but the fact that officers joined in made it even worse. Upon deciding to
resign he wrote that “the reason is, the devotion which I have for our Holy Religion
which, together with your love for me, constitutes almost the sum total of my earthly
happiness, and which renders it impossible for me to remain longer than absolutely
necessary in a position where my feelings are constantly shocked by the abuse of that
Holy Religion.”242
While physical assaults on church property took place, a much more widespread
assault occurred through officers’ prejudice against the Catholic faith on a doctrinal level.
These assaults closely resembled prewar anti-Catholic demonstrations. Much of the antiCatholic literature of the antebellum period thrived on attacking the doctrinal tenets and
theology of the Catholic faith. These assaults stressed what Protestants perceived as the
unusual nature of Catholic religious practices and ceremonies. In particular, they viewed
the Catholic mode of worship as a mixture of idolatry and barbarism. Through these
assaults, this anti-Catholic literature attempted to paint a picture of Catholicism as a false
religion. This practice carried over into the experiences of the junior officer corps in
Mexico. Once confronted with a form of religion that proved vastly different from their
own in many regards, these officers responded by launching a verbal tirade that, sought to
discredit Catholic doctrine. Samuel Ryan Curtis summed these views up nicely in a letter
written after he attended a Catholic mass. In this letter he complained after viewing mass
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that “the performance was every way shocking to my nerves. I was immediately repelled
and left the scene mortified and disgusted.”243
Other officers also expressed a general disdain for the Catholic faith and its
traditions. Lt. Chauncey Brown of the 1st Pennsylvania, for example, wrote with
incredulity regarding the fact that Catholic churches in Mexico did not have seats. In a
letter home he pointed out that “this performance [mass] lasted about an hour and a half
and as there are no seats in the church I became confounded tired of it; but I had to stick
it out. During the whole time the people of the place, particularly the females, were on
their knees.”244 Along similar lines, William Booth Taliaferro wrote of a church he
visited in Puebla. Once the fighting moved out of the vicinity, Taliaferro utilized the calm
to see the city’s sites. In a letter to his father he reported his findings and opinion of both
the church at Puebla and the Catholic faith as a whole. In particular, he disliked the fact
that the Catholic Church seemed to offer so few sermons. He argued that “there are
pulpits in all the churches but preaching is never heard in any of them. Sam says if all
they do is the foolery which he sees he don’t see the use of all of the them churches and
any going to meeting at all.” Taliaferro continued by adding that “he [Sam] is decidedly
Protestant as anybody must needs be who visits Mexico.”245 Taliaferro’s comments not
only noted the fact that many of the junior officers viewed the Catholic faith as “foolery,”
but his comment also reflects the perceived superiority of the Protestant faith. Taliaferro
referred to Catholic services as foolery because of the lack of actual preaching and

Chance, Mexico Under Fire, 84-85.
Chauncey Brown to Mother, 15 January 1848, Special Collections, University of Texas Arlington.
245
Ludwell H. Johnson, “William Booth Taliaferro Letters from Mexico, 1847-1848,” Virginia Magazine
of History and Biography, Vol. 73, No. 4 (1965), 458.
243
244

109

proselytizing, which he viewed as the most important service of a church. Anything
outside of this to Taliaferro, was simple “foolery.”
In order to discredit the Catholic faith as much as possible, many officers
attempted the age old practice of simply ridiculing Catholic services and practices, such
as mass. By ridiculing the church in this manner, the officers hoped to convey a view of
the Catholic Church as a laughable form of worship. D.H. Hill summed these views up
nicely writing, “high mass was celebrated at the church on the 6th. The mummery at the
service would have been laughable had it not been so melancholy to reflect ‘twas an
attempt at the worship of God.”246 Other officers joined Hill in his tirade against the
church. After viewing a funeral service for several babies who had recently died, Lt.
Dana wrote that the deceased babies “are always carried to the church dressed in all
ridiculous ways and there they have a great mummery over them.” He continued by
pointing out that “the Catholic priests who are with our army here say that these people
are perfect idolaters, that they just go through ceremonies and forms without
understanding the first principles of their religion.”247 There are two interesting points to
mention regarding Dana’s comments. First, he made fun of the manner in which the
priests dressed the babies. More importantly, however, this comment pointed out that
protestants where not the only ones to attack the Catholic Church in Mexico. Many
American Catholics joined in on the assaults and abuse of the Mexican faith. To them,
the form of Catholicism practiced by Mexico, proved alien from the form of Catholicism
they practiced in the United States. Historian Tyler Johnson noted that these assaults from
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Catholics were part of an attempt to prove the loyalty of American Catholics, as many
Protestants in the United States feared that American Catholics would not fight against
another Catholic nation.248 In a letter home, Lt. Theodore Laidley commented that several
officers had attended Easter mass at a local church, and further noted that many of these
American parishioners went out of curiosity instead of a sincere desire to worship. He
pointed out that “the general and a number of the officers attended the Cathedral last
Sunday, Easter Sunday, but the majority were prompted by curiosity and as I do not
admit that a proper motive for going to church, and as I could not take part in the
services, it all being Greek to me, I preferred remaining at home.”249
Apart from these general taunts and ridicule of the Catholic Church, many
officers dug deeper and argued that Catholicism represented a false religion. Most of
these taunts attempted to paint a view of the Catholic faith as idolatrous. Colonel William
B. Campbell, of the 1st Tennessee, for example, noted that “the latter [Mexicans] sell us
whatever they have of eatables-but they are a faithless race and are not to be trusted.”
Ralph W. Kirkham noted this view in a letter writing “here we are far, far away from our
native land, surrounded by these idolatrous Mexicans, who look upon every one of us as
a heretic.”250 On another occasion Kirkham proved even more outspoken writing “many
of our officers attended [mass]. Some took wax candles in their hands and followed on in
the train, but I could not do this. I believe the more I see of the Romish religion in this
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country, the more I am convinced that it is real idolatry.”251 Lastly Kirkham summed up
his final opinion of the Catholic faith by noting “you [his wife] seem to express
considerable anxiety lest I should become a Romanist. Have no fears on that subject for I
assure you I am less one now than I was before I came to this country. I have seen too
much wickedness among those who profess this faith to change my church.”252 John
Sedgwick agreed with Kirkham’s view pointing out that “the absurdities of the old
country are all they have retained except the religion, and that is so mixed up with Indian
superstition that it has lost its character of Catholicism. Our Catholics will not
acknowledge it as their religion.”253 William Shover, a Captain in the 3rd U.S. Artillery,
offered an even more condemning comment in a letter to his sister, and argued that the
pope “has millions of [unreadable] subjects here. The popes have for many years refused
to recognize the churches at Santa Fe and some other provinces of Mexico because of
their licentiousness!” He continued by writing that “certainly there is nothing in this
villainous country resembling true religion, not as we understand it in the U.S.”254
Other officers joined Kirkham in these views. Ephraim Kirby Smith, for example,
noted that “I trust a better day is about to dawn on this benighted region and that another
generation under a better government may abandon their idleness and popish idolatry.”
255
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inhabitants is a mixture of the Roman Catholic and the superstitions of paganism.”256
D.H. Hill joined Smith in his complaints by writing that “the grossness of the religious
conceptions of this people is almost beyond belief.”257 He later added that, “this religion
is eminently calculated to degrade and render childish all its devotees.”258 To these
officers, anything so different from their own practices must surely stem from idolatry.
Therefore, these attacks also portrayed the Mexican people as backward and superstitious
for supporting such practices. As a result, these actions from the Mexican church justified
the U.S. takeover of both Mexico, and the possessions of the church.
By invoking negative and prejudiced thoughts about the Catholic faith, many
officers argued that such practices were simple superstition. They argued that the many
rituals of the Catholic Church, that indeed must have seemed quite alien to the protestant
officers in the army, represented hedonistic worship and pagan superstition. Thomas
Jonathan Jackson, a young artillery officer from Virginia ,that future generations would
know as “Stonewall,” summed up these feelings nicely in a letter to his sister. In
particular, he described the church at Jalapa, located in the mountains between Vera Cruz
and Mexico City, with mixed emotions. On one hand, he described the beauty of the
church and the devotion of its inhabitants, but also ridiculed them for practices he could
not understand. On Sunday 22 April 1847 Jackson observed parishioners of the church
and reflected that “I observed a señora gradually approaching the door, on another
occasion I saw a female looking at a statue and weeping like a child. Such is the
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superstition of this race.”259 To Jackson, the image of the woman weeping before the
statue must have looked like idol worship. By April 1848 Jackson reported to his sister
that the American presence seemed to be ending many of the superstitions within
Mexico, but complained that many of the superstitions connected with religion remained.
In particular, he pointed out to her that “not withstanding the influence of our presence,
the natives still with uncovered heads drop on their knees at the approach of the
archbishop’s carriage.”260
Many American officers held a deep-seated respect for Sunday, or the Sabbath.
Many Christians in the United States held that Sunday should be kept holy and reserved
for religious worship, prayer, and reflection. When these officers arrived in Mexico they
complained bitterly about what they observed as a complete lack of respect for the
Sabbath among the Mexican population. Lt. Theodore Laidley, for example, argued that
“the Mexicans do not observe it [Sunday] as strictly as it is in the U.S. Their churches are
open and many attend and seem very devout, but they do not proclaim it a day of rest and
rejoicing by their dress, by shutting, by abstaining from all labor and etc, their dress is as
usual on other days, most of the shops are open as on other days.” Overall, Laidley
complained that life seemed to continue as usual with no respect for the fact that it was
Sunday.
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Being mostly protestant, many American officers did not understand many of the
ceremonies and practices of the Catholic Church.261 Instead of attempting to understand
these practices and learn about a different culture, many officers simply denounced such
practices as outside the norms of proper Christian beliefs and behavior. These officers
proved especially virulent in attacking the many icons that they observed within the
Catholic Church. They viewed the crucifix and images of religious figures as evidence of
idolatry and paganism. To these officers, the many icons of the Catholic faith served as
further evidence of the false practices within Catholicism. Richard Johnston, himself a
Catholic, summed up these views in a letter to his wife from Perote. In this letter, he
complained that “I must confess that I don’t like the profusion of ornament in the
churches that I have seen; because, most generally the statues and pictures are very badly
executed.”262 In particular, Johnston did not object to the presence of these icons, but the
fact that there were too many of them, and that they were not well done. Other officers
expressed confusion at what these symbols represented and thought that the Mexicans
worshiped the symbols themselves. In particular, Captain William G. Coleman of the 1st
Alabama remarked in his diary that “Sunday in camps, this day ten months I left my
home and dear wife, children and friends, tours more pleasant than common, visited the
Cathedral, it is a fine church truly, and had seven different characters to worship by these
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people Mexicans.”263 Overall, Captain Coleman summarized the view of many in that he
thought the icons he witnessed were being worshipped by the church’s parishioners.
Many officers noted the profusion of the use of the cross, or crucifix, as a symbol
within the Catholic Church. In particular, the crucifix depicted and represented the
crucifixion of Christ. These officers did not view the cross itself negatively, but feared
that Mexican parishioners worshipped the image of the cross instead of placing their
devotion in Christ where they argued it belonged. Ephraim Bonaparte Webster, for
example, noted this feeling in a letter home, and pointed out that “they [Mexicans]
merely changed their form of idolatry from their ancient mode of worship, to
worshipping the cross and the images of the Catholic Church.”264 This letter perfectly
summarized the fears of the officer corps, and their attempt to connect the proliferation of
symbols with paganism.
D.H. Hill noted further fears of icons harbored by many officers. More
specifically he argued that a church at Monterrey possessed many such symbols. In
particular, he noted that “it, like most of the large buildings in town is a quadrangle, the
sides of which are rectangular and flat on top. In the cloisters we saw a real skull, several
representations, two biers, a baptismal font, a huge cane arched and adorned with
wreaths, used as a triumphal arch, banners, wreaths, figures of waxwork, etc.” He
continued by pointing out that “the figures were in a dark room and no doubt were kept
there to inspire awe into superstitious people. In the main body of the church, there were
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several pretty good paintings and some miserable daubs. We did not see any silver at all,
they probably had hidden it on the approach of the army.”265 Not only does Hill point out
that this particular church possessed a large number of symbols and images, but he
connected these symbols to superstition. On another occasion, Hill remarked that “I
observed an image or rather a painting in front of the church [in Saltillo] which I
supposed to be a representation of Nebuchadnezzar bowed down like the hogs and
feeding on husks, but on nearing it I discovered a halo around the head and blood gushing
out from a thousand parts. He continued, commenting that “the Sacristan called the
picture ‘The Blood of Christ.’ Nothing to me could have been more revolting, and yet the
painting had evidently been executed by an eminent artist.”266 Specifically, Hill objected
to what he viewed as the grotesque and graphic nature of these images. In summing up
these paintings Hill noted that “the painted retalbo exhibits the skill of the master artist
while at the same time all the superstition of the most ignorant and degraded Catholic.”267
These views, expressed by Hill, demonstrated the hostility and misunderstanding that
many officers exhibited toward the Catholic Church at the symbols its parishioners
utilized.
In attacking the symbolism of the Catholic faith these officers connected these
symbols to superstition and something other than Christianity. Furthermore, they argued
that these symbols demonstrated the pagan nature of Catholicism, thus substantiating the
domestic fears of the anti-Catholic movement in the United States. The anti-Catholic
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literature in the United States stressed that Catholicism represented a pagan threat to
Christianity. Therefore, when American junior officers viewed the symbols of the
Catholic Church in Mexico, they connected those symbols to the pagan threats expressed
by this anti-Catholic literature.
While the vast majority of the comments regarding the church expressed by the
junior officers were negative ones, not all of the officers agreed. Several officers either
warmed to the Catholic faith over time as they received more exposure to it, or they did
not harbor as virulent a strain of anti-Catholicism to begin with. Tennant Lomax, a
Captain in the 1st Alabama, for example, pointed out in a letter that “there are any
number of churches and, oh me they are magnificent, I attended mass today I suppose I
saw a thousand people kneeling at the same time before the alter of the most high God-It
was a solemn and imposing scene.”268 Along similar lines Lt. Ralph Kirkham wrote “this
morning I went to the Cathedral and heard mass. I believe I should become a strict
Catholic should I live in a Catholic country, for I do like an everyday religion.”269
Kirkham’s wife did not appreciate her husband’s awe of the Catholic Church and
expressed fear that he might convert to Catholicism. He answered by assuring her that
this would not happen, and over time his letters began to reflect an increasing disgust
with the Catholic faith. His respect of the Catholic Church might have been fleeting, but
these comments demonstrated that anti-Catholicism could often be contradictory and
confusing.
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The Jacksonian era proved to be a tumultuous time in American history. Many
issues divided American politics and society at this time. Prior to the Mexican War antiCatholicism generated great rifts within American society. This movement not only
impacted people’s views on religion in the United States, but also their views on topics
such as immigration and manifest destiny. Many in the United States harbored ill feelings
toward the numerous Catholic immigrants who flooded into the United States during the
period from areas such as Ireland. This fueled a nativist movement that coexisted and fed
off the anti-Catholic movement. Furthermore, anti-Catholicism helped motivate manifest
destiny in the United States. By the conclusion of the Mexican War, the borders of the
United States had greatly expanded since the nation’s birth in 1776.
The 1830 and 1840s indeed was to be a battleground over the issue of religion in
the United States with riots and a flood of anti-Catholic literature and journalism during
the 1830s and 1840s. These views and anti-Catholic agitation flowed over in the junior
officer corps during the Mexican War as many of the officers in the American army
carried these social views with them to Mexico. Therefore, the war with Mexico, a
Catholic nation, exacerbated an already tense situation, and expanded the religious and
social battlefield that had already been raging in the United States for the previous two
decades. The army thus became an outlet for these anti-Catholic views. In this manner
anti-Catholicism added a since of religious and moral right to manifest destiny and by
extension the Mexican War. The officers who participated in the war clearly viewed
themselves as being supported by a divine providence and representing the moral and
religious high ground.
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Anti-Catholicism was expressed in several forms that closely copied the literature
of the period on the subject. The officers reflected these views in their letters home to
loved ones. First, they scorned the priests for the seemingly dictatorial power they held
over the Mexican people. They also attacked the priests for what they viewed as a
complete lack of moral character. The officers continued their assault on the Catholic
Churches in their path by sacking and plundering the churches of any valuable goods they
possessed. In this regard, anti-Catholicism became an extension of manifest destiny. Just
as Americans excused expansion with the fact that it came at the expense of what they
viewed as a morally bankrupt Catholic opponent, American soldiers and officers excused
their plunder of Catholic churches in a similar manner. Lastly, the junior officer corps
assaulted the doctrine of the Catholic faith. They argued that Catholicism represented a
idolatrous and blasphemous faith. Many of these officers equated Catholicism to the
idolatry they felt Mexico’s ancient inhabitants practiced.
Through these assaults, the army’s experience in the Mexican War reflected the
deep-seated emotion with which Americans across the nation viewed religion. The views
expressed by American officers in Mexico were not confined to any one group or area of
the nation, but are seen within every circle of the officer corps. In this manner, military
service became an extension of society and the issues that divided Jacksonian America.
The Mexican War became a battlefield over the issues of religion and anti-Catholicism
within the ranks of the junior officer corps.
The fact that both regulars and volunteers reacted to anti-Catholicism in similar
ways also when confronted by social issues such as anti-Catholicism and race, as the next
chapter will demonstrate, proved much harder to distinguish any difference between the
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volunteers and regulars. While these two groups responded to issues such as discipline
and motivations for fighting in different ways, they responded to social issues with the
same virulence. Due to this, the vast distinctions many historians perceive between these
two services should not be overplayed. True, differences did exist between regulars and
volunteers, but professionalism could not insulate and isolate the regulars from the social
issues of Jacksonian America. Therefore, the regulars proved just as susceptible to these
issues as the volunteers. Professionalism did not create a distinct class or group of
officers separate from the rest of society. Instead, societal rules and issues impacted and
influenced the nature of service for both volunteers and regulars throughout the Mexican
War.
The Mexican War witnessed a profusion of anti-Catholicism among the American
officer corps. Shortly after the conclusion of hostilities, Philip Berry published a work
that detailed the religious nature of the Mexican War.270 His book examined the impact
that the war had on American religious principles. In particular, he concluded that “the
conduct of the American forces in general was chequered with good and evil.”271 He
further argued that the training, and mental conditioning in violence and hatred of
Catholics possessed by many soldiers caused the violent behavior of the army in Mexico.
It is ironic to note that while Berry complained that the American army behaved poorly
and propitiated anti-Catholic tendencies, he also railed against Mexican Catholics for the
same reasons, and pointed out that the Mexican populace possessed few beneficial moral
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qualities. For example, he noted that “of the Mexican forces generally, it is a matter of
deep regret that no report of any other conspicuous moral feature has reached us from the
late seat of war, than this, that they rarely scrupled to maim and slay those who lay in
their way on the field wounded.”272
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CHAPTER IV
I NEVER SHALL BE A WHITE MAN AGAIN

When the war with Mexico began Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana had been in
the regular Army since 1842, when he graduated from the military academy at West
Point. By 1846, Dana had risen to the rank of 2nd Lieutenant in the Seventh U.S.
Infantry. Like many other officers serving in the regular army, Dana answered the call to
arms when war broke out and traveled with his regiment to Mexico. At the Battle of
Monterrey, some of his friends left Dana for dead after he received a wound they thought
was mortal. Dana survived the wound and the war, and went on to fame in the Civil War
and in the years following. During the Mexican War, he received a brevet to 1st
Lieutenant due to his exploits at the Battle of Cerro Gordo on 18 April 1847.
During his service in Mexico, Dana wrote numerous letters to his wife Susan on a
myriad of topics, from camp life to his experiences in battle. In many of these letters he
described the Mexican populace and the cities which he and his brothers in arms passed
through while in Mexico. As with other officers, the topic of race came up on many
occasions in Dana’s letters. Dana carried the racial views common to many white
Americans at the time, ones that judged Anglo-American society as superior to all others.
For Dana, and many other white Americans, the Mexican populace represented a lesser
race than themselves. To those ends, Dana and many other officers wrote letters home
that reflected their attitudes toward race. These letters attempted to dehumanize their
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Mexican foes and demonstrate the numerous ways in which Mexican society did not
equal what they viewed as a superior American society This helped excuse a war which
many, especially Whigs, increasingly viewed as an unjust war.273 Furthermore, these
officers wanted to legitimate their view that the Mexicans were not members of the white
race.
One way Dana expressed his views on race concerned the terrible condition in
which he found many of the Mexican cities he witnessed. Like other officers, Dana
commented upon the dirt and squalor of the cities he visited, noting that even the cleanest
Mexican city could not compare with an American city. While encamped on the Nueces
River, Dana wrote in his diary regarding the general conditions of the area. In particular,
he wrote that “this is the dirtiest place, I believe, I was ever in. It is almost impossible to
keep clean.” Dana continued by arguing that “I never shall be a white man again in the
world and some of us I am sure will not be permitted into the front doors whenever we
get home, even if we go through a scraping process first.”274 On another occasion Dana
put things more bluntly, commenting that “as we are all living like niggers here in this
mudhole, we had as well go through the whole hog.”275 Throughout the war, Dana noted
the inferiority of Mexico and its people when compared to the United States and white
Americans. Through these comments Dana suggested that dirt, and filthy conditions,
could literally transform one’s race. In particular, the filthy condition of Mexican cities
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and towns demonstrated what Dana and many other American officers viewed as the
racial inferiority of the Mexican people.
Dana’s view regarding the perceived inferiority of the Mexicans matched the
general sentiment of most white Americans at the time. Many people in the United States,
particularly native born citizens of European decent, viewed themselves as members of
an Anglo-Saxon race superior to non-white races such as the Mexicans, whom they
viewed as a mongrelized mix of black and Indian races. As proof of this superiority,
many Americans pointed to the successes of the United States as opposed to the failures
of Mexico as a nation. Historian Reginald Horsman, noted that white Americans further
felt that Mexico had failed due to the impurity of the Mexican people as a race.
Specifically, he commented that “the Mexicans had failed because they were a mixed,
inferior race with considerable Indian and some black blood.”276 As Horsman pointed
out, these racist thoughts went hand in hand with, and helped excuse, American
expansion, more commonly known as manifest destiny. Many argued that “to take lands
from inferior barbarians was no crime, it was simply following God’s injunctions to make
the land fruitful.”277 On another level, however, talk of an Anglo-Saxon destiny can be
confusing given that, as Horsman noted, no such race existed in reality. During the mid
nineteenth century, though, many white Americans argued that the Anglo-Saxon race not
only existed, but that it would eventually shape and guide the world. In regard to the
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United States and its policies, Horsman offers the best explanation of how this type of
racism impacted the United States. In particular, he argued that “the United States shaped
policies which reflected a belief in the racial inferiority and expendability of Indians,
Mexicans, and other inferior races, and which looked forward to a world shaped and
dominated by a superior American Anglo-Saxon race.”278 The American military
experience in Mexico reflected these thoughts. Many officers excused American
expansion and the Mexican War by pointing out the inferiority of the Mexican People.
By demonstrating their own superiority, these officers legitimated the American presence
in Mexico. To achieve this, they equated the Mexicans to Africans and Native
Americans, two groups that had long been despised and rejected by most white
Americans.
Many regular and volunteer junior officers exhibited the racism described above
regardless of their prior background or training. Historians have long noted the failures,
such as racism, of the volunteers in Mexico, but they have been much slower to criticize
the regulars. The regulars, however, exhibited the same racists views as the volunteers.
Most recently, for example, Amy S. Greenberg noted that by the end of 1847 military
victories in Mexico had failed to bring peace. Instead, she argued, “the behavior of
America’s volunteer troops had in fact done the opposite, turning the people of Mexico
against an occupying force in both northeastern and central Mexico that robbed, raped,
and murdered with seeming impunity.”279 Greenberg clearly saw the failures of the
volunteers, but did not point out that the same qualities could also be found within the
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ranks of the regulars as well. Furthermore, by the mid-nineteenth century, historian James
Brewer Stewart argued, race had been “buttressed by a system of democratic white
politics premised on the modern assumption that ‘nature’ had always divided ‘black’ and
‘white’ as inferior and superior, and always must.”280 Upon examining the letters of the
regulars and volunteers, no discernible difference in their racial views is evident. Instead,
both regulars and volunteers appeared to harbor the same racist thoughts toward their
opponent. In this regard, professionalism met its most stubborn opposition, as the
regulars position as professional soldiers proved completely unable to insulate the regular
army from the racism so rampant within the United States at time. This clearly delineates
one of the boundaries of professionalism, as West Point training and prior military
experience were clearly incapable of creating a class of officers separate from the
remainder of American society. While professionalism helped generate superior
discipline in camp and on the battlefield, it did little to isolate these officers from social
issues such as race and, as we saw in the previous chapter, religious issues such as antiCatholicism. While the goal of formal military training at academies such as West Point
was not to teach cultural equality, that training did note that war had its limitations. For
example, civilians were not to be viewed as military targets according to most traditional
military training of the day. Instead, this is exactly what happened in Mexico.
Throughout nineteenth century American military history, racism often
accompanied armies and military conquest. Through racism, officers dehumanized their
opponents, thus making it easier to prosecute the war, and excuse any action taken
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against Mexico and its people. As members of what many American soldiers viewed as a
lower race, most officers felt that they were not bound by the typical ethics of war which
made civilian targets off limits. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, these actions
included assaults on Mexican people, theft of artifacts from local churches, and general
raucous behavior. Historian John W. Dower noted that, in warfare, opposing sides often
resort to dehumanizing their opponents through virulent racist assaults. For example,
Dower pointed out that race played a pivotal role in the Pacific Theater of World War II
for both the American and Japanese forces, and argued that this racism stemmed from
deeply ingrained social values within both societies and pointed out that the war
“exposed raw prejudices and was fueled by racial pride, arrogance, and rage on many
sides.”281 The Mexican War proved no different. Throughout the war, American junior
officers expressed American racial ideals and norms, and sought to dehumanize their foes
through racist assaults. By demonstrating what they perceived as the inferiority of the
Mexican race, this racism provided many Americans with an excuse for prosecuting the
war, as few in the United States would have cared about what happened to a people that
they viewed as racially inferior in every way. Because of these views, many Americans
excused the war as an attempt to uplift Mexico by introducing American customs. Many
officers also hoped that the war would lead to the introduction of a more substantial
American society in Mexico as well. They hoped that after the war Americans would
establish farms or plantations in the region. Indeed, these officers argued that due to the
inferiority of it’s people, Mexico could never realize its full potential until Americans
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inhabited it’s land. As many have pointed out, southerners especially hoped to use
Mexican land to expand agriculture, and by extension slavery.282
Recently, historian Samuel J. Watson pointed out that during the Mexican War
“while the career professional soldiers of the officer corps shared much of the ethnic
chauvinism of other mid-nineteenth-century Americans, they can hardly be considered
articulate racialists eager to advance the cause of Anglo-Saxon civilization and progress
through Manifest Destiny.”283 Watson, like many other historians of the Mexican War,
did not recognize the intense racism which many members of the junior officer corps
exhibited towards Mexico. Furthermore, while many junior officers did not speak of
Manifest Destiny and expanding the boundaries of the United States in the patriotic terms
often associated with it, they nevertheless supported manifest destiny through their racial
ideology. In their letters they degraded and dehumanized their opponents, and some even
went so far as to argue that Mexico could never be a civilized nation unless Americans
populated it following the conclusion of the war.284 By dehumanizing their opponents,
these officers excused and confirmed manifest destiny by pointing out the inferiority and
uncivilized demeanor of their foe.
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During the years leading up to the outbreak of the Mexican War, many white
Americans harbored intense racist thoughts and ideologies. The existence of slavery
fueled much of this thought. David Roediger, for example, argued that “whiteness was a
way in which white workers responded to a fear of dependency on wage labor and to the
necessities of capitalist work discipline.”285 Roediger points out that any sense of
whiteness had to also be firmly rooted in a sense of what white was not, namely black.
Because of this, whites increasingly viewed themselves as different and separate from
African Americans, which helped fuel racist ideology in the United States. Furthermore,
the recent Indian wars, such as the Seminole Wars and the Black Hawk War ensured that
many Americans extended this racism to Native Americans as well as African
Americans. Overall then, racism represented one of the dominate social and cultural
forces of Jacksonian America. As members of this society, the junior officers in the
American army carried these thoughts with them to Mexico, and applied them to the
inhabitants of Mexico. It is ironic that the regulars, who tried so hard to distance
themselves from the volunteers, reacted to racism with the same vigor exhibited by the
volunteers.286
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Because of these sentiments, American officers in Mexico expressed a wide range
of racist thoughts, and went to great lengths to describe the Mexican people as a race
separate from themselves. For example, upon entering the city of Monterey in November
1846, Ephraim Kirby Smith wrote that “it truly might be an earthly paradise were the
inhabitants civilized. They alas, are lost in the most groveling superstition and ignorance
and are under a government that tramples them to dust.”287 Smith’s comment nicely
summarized the view held by many American officers, that Mexicans were an uncivilized
and superstitious race. In a letter to his cousin, William Austine, a Captain in the 3rd U.S.
Artillery, utilized an interesting metaphor to describe both the purpose for the war, and
the racial views of many Americans. In this letter he argued that “among the birds flying
about the forts on shore, I noticed the Mexican Eagle, a bird much smaller than our own
and apparently of less aristocratic pretensions. You will recollect that on the Mexican
coat of arms this eagle is represented as devouring a snake (their ordinary food), while
the custom of our own is to rob the humbler birds of their spoils in the old knightly
way.”288
Racial themes dominated many of the letters written by officers from Mexico
during the war. These officers used race to express a number of sentiments. While
stationed at Fort Brown early in the war, Mexican forces surrounding the fort asked Lt.
Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana and his comrades to surrender. Instead of simply
rebuking any thoughts of surrender, Dana went deeper, and scoffed at the notion of
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surrendering to what he viewed as an inferior race. In a letter home he summarized these
views by writing “our men were delighted, in the highest spirits, and highly incensed at
the idea of a surrender to those ‘niggerly rascals’”289 This quote reflected a common view
of Mexicans as black, or non-white at the least. As David Roediger pointed out, the use
of such racist language also carried a class consciousness with it as well. Therefore, this
language reflected a belief that the Mexicans were beneath these officers both racially,
and socially.290 It is interesting that so many officers took the time to demonstrate why
the Mexicans weren’t members of the white race, and its implications on Mexicans as a
people. Ralph W. Kirkham expressed a similar thought in a letter to his wife when he
wrote, “how many more of our brave officers and soldiers shall we loose before we are
conquerors of this miserable race, God only knows; but I hope and pray not many.”291
Others, such as George Meade, sought to dispel the notion that, since many were
descended from the Spanish (and thus white), the Mexicans should be considered
European. In a letter home Meade wrote “though descended from the Spaniards, they are
a very different race from the hardy mountaineers of Spain. Their mixture with the Indian
and negro race, and the effect of climate enervating them, render them a listless race,
destitute of the energy necessary for a war which is solely one of enterprise.”292 Above all
else, these officers wanted the loved ones who read their letters to understand the
depravity of the Mexican people due to their racial inferiority.
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American comments about the racial character of Mexicans ran a full gamete, as
they portrayed them as being everything from Indians to African American, or
somewhere in between. While officers might have debated what race the Mexicans
belonged to, they agreed that they were not white. William Booth Taliaferro, for
example, wrote to his sister that “the Mexicans pass our camp constantly and queerer
creatures you cannot imagine. They seem more Indians than white men and a great many
are almost pure natives.”293 Writing to Julia Dent, his future wife, Ulysses S. Grant
explained why the Mexicans were so different form Americans. In particular he
commented that “the people of Mexico are a very different race of people from ours. The
better classes are proud and tyrannize over the lower and much more numerous class as
much as a hand master does over his negroes, and they submit to it quite as humbly.” He
continued arguing “the great majority of the inhabitants are either pure or more than half
blooded Indians, and show but little signs of neatness of comfort in their miserable
dwellings than the uncivilized Indian.”294 On another occasion, Grant continued his
description about the differences between Americans and Mexicans by describing
Mexican towns. In this letter he wrote to Julia that “you would be surprised at the
difference between an American town and a Mexican one and indeed there is just as
much difference between the people. The inhabitants are generally more like Indians in
looks and habits than white men.”295
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Once again, language plays a key role in these quotes. The racially charged terms
utilized by Grant and other officers carried specific racial stereotypes in mid-nineteenth
century America. For example, David Roediger pointed out that many whites viewed
Native Americans as lazy and “came to consider themselves ‘hardworking whites’ in
counterpoint to their imagination of Indian styles of life.”296 As Roediger noted, most
racially charged terms carried an assumed stereotype with it. Tennant Lomax of the 1st
Alabama wrote along similar lines to Grant, noting that “the people generally are of the
color of mulattos-though there are some exceptions.”297 Lt. Dana wrote along similar
lines writing home that “we will make them [Mexicans] run to the tune of ‘Yankee
Doodle,’ the black rascals. The best of them are robbers and murderers, I believe.”298
Dana’s comment demonstrated the view held by many officers that most Mexicans were
black, and by implication inferior. By creating a sense of whiteness, Roediger argues,
whites also created a sense of blackness as well.299 The result was that African Americans
became heavily stereotyped, as blackness came to symbolize mental incompetence,
laziness, and other racial stereotypes. Along these lines, Dana went further and connected
the Mexicans to racially stereotyped behavior such as theft and murder. These officers
went out of their way on numerous occasions to remark upon the racial identity of their
opponents, and attempted to categorize them within a racial hierarchy.
Racism took on many forms in the Mexican War. All of these forms of racism
served to dehumanize Mexicans and support the view that they represented a racially
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inferior people. One of the more interesting and illustrative methods of racism in Mexico
concerned dirt, and the filthy conditions American officers witnessed in Mexico.
Sigmund Freud first postulated the existence of a connection between civilization and
cleanliness. In particular, Freud argued that “beauty, cleanliness, and order obviously
occupy a special position among the requirements of civilization.”300 Freud noted that
cleanliness represented one of the defining characteristics of civilization. Under these
guidelines, it is easy to understand why many Americans noted that the dirty conditions
in Mexico must have meant that the Mexicans were a lesser race of people.
More recently, Kathleen Brown noted the importance of cleanliness for
civilization in early America. Similar to Freud, Brown noted the close link between
cleanliness and civilization and the view that to many, the absence of cleanliness
demonstrated the absence of civilization.301 Furthermore, Richard Bushman argued that
in nineteenth century American culture “dirty hands, slovenly clothes, ungainly speech
marked off the coarse and rude from the refined and polite.”302 These arguments have a
profound impact on any understanding of America’s role in the Mexican War. When the
junior officers arrived in Mexico and found what they viewed as a filthy society, they
immediately argued that the reason for this must be due to the inferiority of Mexico’s
people as a race. During the mid nineteenth century, many western societies recognized
things as being dirty, whether it be the clothes that people wore, or the houses and
buildings in which they lived. Brown extensively explains the connection between middle

Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1961), 40-41.
Kathleen M. Brown, Foul Bodies: Cleanliness in Early America (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2009), 4-5.
302
Richard L. Bushman, The Refinement of America: Pesons, Houses, Cities (New York: Vintage Books,
1993), xv.
300
301

135

class societal views of cleanliness and cultural views of race. For example, Brown argues
that European explorers had certain expectations about standards of cleanliness, and were
repulsed when these standards were not met in the societies and peoples they encountered
on their journeys. The consequence of these expectations was that they assumed that
cleanliness among a people denoted a higher order of civilization or culture, while dirt
and unclean conditions denoted a lower order of civilization.303 During the Mexican War,
officers utilized the filthy conditions they viewed in Mexico to legitimize their racist
views concerning the inferiority of Mexicans. Basically, they viewed Mexicans as
members of a lesser race because they felt they were dirty.
These views of cleanliness found their way into the sentiments of the junior
officers fighting in Mexico. The letters of these officers, both regular and volunteer, are
filled with accounts of the deplorable and dirty condition of the Mexican cities they
witnessed. These officers viewed these filthy conditions with disdain and argued that
these filthy conditions demonstrated the fact that the Mexican people were members of a
lower racial order. They argued that the dirt and filthy conditions they witnessed in
Mexico were the result of the lower racial standing and lack of civilization of the
majority of Mexico’s citizens. To these officers, Mexico was a backward and uncivilized
land. The dirt they found in Mexico’s cities only served to substantiate these claims.
These officers compared Mexican cities to cities in the United States and found that the
cities south of the border failed to live up to the standards of cleanliness they held. They
utilized these observations to argue that Americans had to be a superior race compared to
the Mexicans due to the superior cleanliness of American cities.
303 Brown, Foul Bodies, 2-5.
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These views of cleanliness also supported American views of manifest destiny,
which rested on the assumption of the racial superiority of white Americans.304 Manifest
destiny reflected the view that divine providence would ultimately enable the United
States to spread to the Pacific Ocean and beyond. Race lay at the very root of these
views. To many white Americans manifest destiny helped spread American civilization
and culture to backward and uncivilized people. In this manner, manifest destiny
represented a positive force of uplift for the unenlightened masses, such as the many
Native American tribes, who lived west of the United States. For southerners, manifest
destiny represented an opportunity to extend cotton agriculture, and slavery. These views
of manifest destiny lie at the root of the Mexican War, and many officers excused and
defended the American cause through claims that they opposed an uncivilized enemy. As
proof of the inferiority of these people, American officers pointed out the filthy condition
of most Mexican cities and towns in their path.
Most American officers argued that the Mexicans were either black, Native
American, or a mixture of the two. In this light, Lt. Dana made the remarks quoted at the
beginning of this chapter, and complained about the filthy conditions in which he found
himself living while in Mexico. Lt. Richard Smith Elliot reported on the dirty conditions
while traveling through New Mexico. While in Sante Fe he reported that “the Mexicans,
as I was going to say, are, generally, a very dirty people.”305 He continued by reporting
that a woman dressed in finery at a ball one day might be seen wearing filthy dirty
clothes the next day. To Elliot, this demonstrated the inferiority of Mexicans, as they
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could not demonstrate their social standing continuously. Instead, they put on a facade of
members of a higher social station. Due to their racial inferiority, however, they could not
keep up these pretenses permanently. Furthermore, his remarks carried more weight than
simply a letter to a loved at home as Elliot regularly wrote correspondence for the St.
Louis Reveille. After relating his story he asked the papers readers “how would you like
to marry out here, reader? Do you think you could do better? Perhaps so.”306
While not commenting directly on the conditions of the Mexican populace or their
cities, Elliot’s quote does denote the connection American officers made between
cleanliness and race. Ulysses S. Grant summed up the connection between cleanliness
and race nicely in a letter to Julia Dent, his future wife written from Matamoras along the
banks of the Rio Grande. In particular, he reported on “how much I should love Julia to
walk through Matamoras once with you to let you see the difference between a Mexican
town and Mexican population and that of an American.” He continued by arguing “the
Mexican house is low with a flat or thatched roof, with a dirt or brick floor, with but little
furniture and in many cases the fire in the middle of the house as if it was a wig-womb.
The majority of the inhabitants are Indians. I believe that our present force is sufficient to
keep off any force.”307 Grant’s comments demonstrated the feeling of superiority many
American officers held in regard to the living conditions of the Mexican people compared
to those in the United States. In a similar manner, William Seaton Henry wrote that “this
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is a small, dilapidated town, of probably a thousand inhabitants, remarkable more for
their uncleanliness and rascality than any other propensities.”308
Many officers wrote vicious remarks to relatives about the conditions they faced
in Mexico. Many would have agreed with Lt. Theodore Laidley, an officer with the
ordinance department, when he wrote about the houses in Mexico. In a letter he told his
wife that “the streets [of Vera Cruz] well paved, but most abominably filthy-they seem to
be the receptacle of all the filth of the place, vultures being the only scavengers which
they know. It strikes everyone at first sight.” He continued by noting that “you can form
no idea of its extent; most offensive odors salute you where ever you go within its
walls.”309 In a similar manner, Captain John W. Dodd of the 4th Indiana told his wife
Elisa “I have been [unreadable] to all the houses, they are mostly built by planting posts
in the ground upright, close together, chinked with mud, and the roof thatched with
coarse dry grass, no floor; but the smooth hard ground, and no pretensions are made to
cleanliness or appearances.”310 Dodd’s diminutive view of the mud buildings in Mexican
cities stood out in sharp contrast to conditions in the United States. As noted by historian
Richard L. Bushman, by the middle of the nineteenth century houses in the United States
were being built in brick and stone. The importance of this distinction, he noted, was that
it provided middle class Americans a sense of belonging to the gentility, and thus a
feeling of superiority over those who did not match these qualities. As a result of this
developing middle class gentility, Bushman argued that “the vulgar masses were not

308 William Seaton Henry, Campaign Sketches of the War with Mexico (New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1847), 260-261.
309 James McCaffrey, Laidley Letters, 56.
310 John W. Dodd to Elisa Dodd, 27 July 1847, John W. Dodd Letters, Beinecke Library Special
Collections.
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merely excluded from gentry society, they were pushed to the cultural margins and
denied a claim to simple respectability.”311 In both of these quotes these officers viewed
the conditions around them with a feeling of superiority toward those they viewed. These
thoughts implied that the cleaner conditions in the United States demonstrated the
superiority of the American people as a race. As historian Bridget T. Heneghan pointed
out “only those who had fashionable white goods could have been variously styled as
racially ‘white.’”312
Other officers noted the filthy conditions of particular cities through which they
traveled during marches. Several cities seem to have struck American officers as
particularly filthy places. For example, Chauncey Brown of the 1st Pennsylvania wrote
home that “I think the town of Perote [located in the mountains on the Nation Road
between Vera Cruz and Mexico City] is a most miserable place. It is for the most part
composed of low dirty looking hovels which makes a strong contrast with the clean and
neat appearance of Jalapa.”313 The city of Tampico received the ire of William Austine, a
Captain in the 3rd U.S. Artillery, in a letter to his cousin.314 In particular he wrote that
“on the whole take the place ‘exclusively, inclusively, individually and collectively,’ it is
as wretched a specimen of a ‘settlement’ as one can well imagine.”315 Upon entering
Matamoros William Seaton Henry reported “on the whole it is one of the most indifferent
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and filthy cities I have ever seen. The greater part of the genteel population have left; in
about one house in three of the more humble cast, one of the family was diligently
searching the heads of the others. It is said they are searching for lice.”316 Captain
Stannislaus Lasalle of the 1st Indiana also complained about the conditions in Matamoros
reporting “the houses are generally made of mud in the shape of bricks but much larger
and plastered and whitewashed. The city reminds me of what I have read of other days, a
city in ruins.”317 As historian Richard Bushman pointed out, bricks carried a cultural
importance in the United States, which connected those living in brick houses with the
gentility, as “most ordinary families could never afford a brick house.”318 Mexican
houses must have stood out to many American officers. By the 1840s, as Dell Upton
pointed out, houses in the United States, especially in urban areas, increasingly utilized
bricks in their construction. Furthermore, these houses stressed uniformity in brick row
houses.319 Mexican cities, by comparison, held few brick houses. Lieutenant E. Kirby
Smith of the 7th U.S. Infantry wrote that Vera Cruz “is much like other Mexican towns,-a
large church, a few decent houses owned by the rich, the residue mean and dirty, filled
with ticks, fleas, vermin, idleness, and licentiousness.”320 Lastly, Syndenham Moore
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summed up the situation nicely when writing “the houses were in the outskirts very low,
decayed and filthy,” upon entering an unidentified Mexican city.321
The newspapers of the day even got involved in reporting the filth of Mexican
cities to American readers. After the February 1847 battle of Buena Vista in northern
Mexico many wounded Mexican soldiers were brought back to the American held city of
Saltillo to be treated by the local population. On 20 May 1847 the National Era ran an
article that expressed surprise at the fact that Saltillo “is in a most filthy condition. The
American governor of the town had to compel the alcalde to pay more attention to their
wants, and to the cleanliness of the place.”322
Even Mexico City was scorned by American officers. Many had read and heard
tales about the fabled “halls of the Montezumas,” and expected to find a glorious city
upon entering the Mexican capital. Instead, they discovered the same conditions that
prevailed in much of Mexico, namely dirt and filth. Chauncey Brown summed this view
of nicely in a letter to his wife. In particular, he reported that he had been looking forward
to entering Mexico City due to the tales he had heard of its grandeur and riches. Upon
entering, though, he wrote that “all that I have heard speak of the capitol have been
disappointed in its magnificence according to reports in beauty to Pueblo.”323
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During the 1840s agriculture dominated many areas of the United States,
especially in the south where the economy revolved around the production of cotton.
Many American officers brought a long history of farming, and plantations with them to
Mexico. Due to this, they took note of the quality of the land in Mexico and its ability to
support agriculture.324 To their surprise, they found much of Mexico’s land highly fertile,
yet uncultivated. These officers could not understand why the Mexicans failed to utilize
this valuable asset. Many settled on the opinion that this failure resulted from the fact that
Mexico was inhabited by a lesser race. Due to this, many officers, especially those from
the south, complained to loved ones at home that Mexican land could never amount to
anything unless Americans inhabited that land. Col. William B. Campbell of the 1st
Tennessee summed these sentiments up nicely. In a letter home he argued that “although
this is the finest soil and climate joined I have any knowledge of yet it never will be much
of a country while occupied by the present race. They are all semi-Indians and must in
short time give place to the civilization of North America or Europe.”325 William Seaton
Henry of the 3rd U.S. Infantry agreed, writing “it certainly never was intended this lovely
land, rich in every production, with a climate that exceeds anything the imagination can
conceive of, should remain in the hands of an ignorant and degenerate race.” He went on
by pointing out that “the finger of fate points, if not to their eventual extinction, to the
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time when they will cease to be owners, and when the anglo-American race will rule with
Republican simplicity and justice.”326 Overall, these officers realized the potential of the
land in Mexico, but argued that the land could never reach its true potential as long as it
remained in the hands of a lower race.
Many officers, as suggested by Campbell’s quote, compared the Mexican
population to Native Americans. American officers went beyond just comparing the
Mexicans to Native Americans, though. Instead, many officers argued that the Mexicans
were really members of some mongrelized race that had become mixed with both black
and Indian blood. This enabled them to create a racial hierarchy for Mexico’s citizens
which they used to rank the population. The whiter an individual, the higher they ranked
on this hierarchy, and the darker they appeared the lower they ranked. Captain Henry, for
example, expressed this view in a letter home. During the early stages of the war General
Zachary Taylor issued a call for volunteers to Texas and Louisiana. He issued this call
prior to an official call for volunteers from the federal government in order to get troops
into the ranks quickly. Upon learning of this move by Taylor, Henry wrote “the troops
sent for on Gen. Taylor’s requisition are expected to be used to carry the war into Africa.
We expect to whip the Africans back to their country before their [volunteers’]
arrival.”327 The fact that Henry called Mexico Africa is enlightening as to how he viewed
the nation and its inhabitants in relation to this racial hierarchy. Certainly, he did not refer

326 Henry, Campaign Sketches, 120.
327 Henry, Campaign Sketches, 83. Shortly after the onset of hostilities Taylor requested volunteer
regiments from the United States to help with his campaign. Specifically he called on nearby states such as
Louisiana and Mississippi for these troops. While those states answered his call, President Polk ultimately
canceled these these regiments in favor of Federally organized volunteer regiments from each state. These
volunteers are the “requisitioned” troops mentioned in Henry’s letter.

144

to Mexico in such a way out of flattery. In a slightly different vein, upon visiting one of
the many merchants stands in a Mexican city, Lt. Richard W. Johnston, also a member of
Henry’s 3rd U.S. Infantry, compared the city’s merchants to Jews writing “Mexican small
dealers, who closely resemble Jews, both in the variety of the old and curious articles
which they expose for sale, and in the exorbitant prices which they ask for them when
they find any one sufficiently green to give them their prices.”328 These comments
demonstrated that American officers created multiple racial hierarchies in Mexico. While
these hierarchies did vary from person to person, they all had one thing in common. The
whiter they viewed someone, the higher on this hierarchy they were positioned. Usually,
Americans tended to view races as either white or black. Therefore, this range of
whiteness exhibited by these officers is unique.
Other officers similarly argued that Mexico proved to be a backward and
uncivilized land. On 18 October 1847 Virginia Lt. Theodore Laidley, for example,
summed up the view of many when he wrote “we all would be delighted to get back to a
civilized land, but when are we?”329 Captain. Lucien Bonaparte Webster of Vermont,
who prior to the war had served with the American army in the Seminole War, concurred
with Laidley’s view in a letter to Henry Davies from Saltillo. In this letter he commented
that the Mexicans “are not a civilized nation, and ought not to be treated as such. Our
Indians are far superior to them as a race.” He continued by pointing out that “I should be
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ashamed to have them as American citizens.”330 This last quote demonstrated the
common view, held by many American officers, that Mexico had simply proven to be
beneath the United States in terms of civilization and development. As Laidley pointed
out, these officers did not relate this to a failure of the land or bad luck, but instead
insisted that it demonstrated a failure of race. Furthermore, Richard Stoddart Ewell, an
officer in the 1st Dragoons, noted that the lack of cultivation in Mexico demonstrated
evidence that Mexicans were members of a lesser race. In particular, he commented on
this situation in a letter home reporting “almost every city I have yet seen is in ruins and
though there is an immense population of beggars but a small part of the land is in
cultivation.”331 Syndenham Moore from Alabama proved more direct in his scorn of the
Mexican populace for not cultivating the land.332 He argued that Mexico would only be
worth something if American’s came to Mexico and took control of the land. He reported
these thoughts in his diary writing “it [Mexico] will someday be filled up by an
enterprising population from the United States. It will then smile and blossom as the
rose.” He continued pointing out that “the Mexicans live in very sorry, straw topped mud
walled houses, some instead of being built of mud have only cane or poles set upright and
straw covered over them.”333 To Moore and Ewell, and doubtless other officers as well,
Mexico could only be of value if the local population could be replaced by a better race
of American settlers who would bring the land into its full cultivation, possibly with the
330 Van. R. Baker, The Websters: Letters of and American Family in Peace and War (Kent: Kent State
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use of slavery.334 In this sense American officers desired Mexico’s land, but not its
people.
Other officers derisively commented on the lack of agricultural technology and
technological development compared to that in the United States. This lack of technology
further supported the view many Americans held of the Mexicans as a backward and
inferior people. After observing several Mexicans ploughing, Captain John W. Dodd of
the 4th Indiana wrote home to his wife that he “saw Mexicans ploughing this evening,
they use oxen and the whole apparatus would make you laugh; instead of yoking them,
they lay a beam across the back of their heads.”335 Colonel William B. Campbell of the
1st Tennessee similarly observed the lack of agricultural development among the
Mexicans, noting that “yet the mass of the population of this country are the
unadulterated race and lineal descendants of the Indians conquered by Cortez, and are
evidently to this day but little improved, their habits being much the same that they were
200 years ago.”336 In particular, Campbell remarked that Mexico’s technology had
seemingly not improved since Cortez first landed in Mexico, further demonstrating the
backward nature of Mexico. Lt. Richard Smith Elliot, a member of the Missouri
volunteers, offered a similar view during Kearny’s invasion of New Mexico. While in
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Santa Fe he reported an anecdote he heard that reflected the American view and Mexican
agriculture. In particular he wrote that “an American, some years ago, had a plough
brought from the states, with which he had a rented plot of ground, well ploughed, and
thus secured himself and abundant crop, much greater than any Mexicans had ever
raised.” He continued by pointing out that “the next year the owner of the lot refused to
rent it to him, for fear that such a mode of cultivation would exhaust the soil!”337 To these
officers, the lack of agricultural technology further demonstrated the failures of the
Mexican people as a race. In turn, these quotes compared this to the superior technology
of the United States, that to them also proved the superiority of Americans as a race.
These complaints concerning Mexico’s lack of cultivation and agricultural
technology went deeper. In particular, some argued that the land went uncultivated due to
the simple fact that Mexicans were lazy. As David Roediger mentioned, this view of
Mexicans as lazy matched white views toward non-white races in general.338 George B.
McClellan, an officer with the Engineers, for example, wrote “the Mexicans appear to
cultivate nothing whatever but a little Indian corn (maize). They are certainly the laziest
people in existence-living in a rich and fertile country (the banks of the river at least) they
are content to roll in mud, eat their horrible beef and tortillas and dance all night at their
fandangos.”339 Syndenham Moore of the 1st Alabama expressed a similar feeling to
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McClellan in a letter to his wife. In particular he argued that the Mexicans “are too lazy
to till the soil, they make no improvements whatever in the implements or mode of
culture and make but few improvements.”340 These quotes did not take into account the
intense heat and difficult conditions within Mexico that often made farming difficult at
best. Instead, they viewed this as a collective and racial failure and argued that it
exemplified the lazy nature of the Mexican people.
Apart from agriculture, these officers argued that the Mexican government and
army held out against what they should have already perceived as a superior people,
which further demonstrated the racial inferiority of their opponents. Other officers
lamented the fact that the war seemed to continue with little chance of a cessation of
hostilities. These officers connected the continuing will of the Mexican people to resist
with race, arguing that a sensible race would sue for peace and end the war. Ulysses S.
Grant, for example, wrote that “if these Mexicans were any kind of people they would
have given us a chance to whip them enough some time ago and now the difficulty would
be over.”341 Lt. Ralph W. Kirkham expressed similar thoughts after a rumor spread
through camp that stated that the Mexican Congress had sued for peace. In a letter home
he wrote that “Oh, how glad I shall be for I am tired of fighting! We can whip these
Mexicans in any numbers, but they are not worth whipping at such an expense. The brave
fellows that we have lost are worth more than the whole Mexican nation.”342 These
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officers resented the fact that the Mexican Army, and the Mexican people, continued to
prosecute the war instead of resigning themselves to their inevitable fate. They felt the
American army had demonstrated its superiority after winning the first few battles of the
war. After witnessing the continued will to resist exhibited by the Mexican Army despite
its many setbacks, Lt. Edmund Kirby Smith, a member of the 7th U.S. Infantry, argued
that “the Mexicans appear determined never to give up even if we should take every town
and fortress in the nation. What a stupid people they are! They can do nothing and their
continued defeats should convince them of it.”343 Smith’s comment went beyond just a
desire to see the war brought to a conclusion. His comments demonstrated the view of
many officers that American battlefield victories had proven the superiority, not just of
the American Army, but of the American race as a whole, and that the Mexicans should
accept their inferiority and give up. This comment demonstrated the influence manifest
destiny had on many American officers. In particular, manifest destiny argued that
America could, and should, expand, and that the superiority of the Anglo-American race
gave them to right to do so.344
The war brought out a flurry of racial emotions in American officers. American
officers attempted to degrade or dehumanize their opponents by venting racialized
emotions about their foes to their friends and loved ones. Following the successful siege
of Vera Cruz in March 1847, for example, ordinance officer Theodore Laidley argued
that the Mexican army acted cowardly in giving up such an easily defensible position so
easily. It is ironic that Laidley, as a member of the victorious army, argued that the
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American Army should not have been able to take the city of Vera Cruz as easily as it
ultimately did. In his eyes, the only variable that ensured an American victory was the
fact that the Mexicans defending the city were cowardly. In a letter to his wife he
expressed these thoughts, writing “it is a pretty strong place and if it had been defended
with any vigor, it would have cost us dearly to have taken it, but they are a great set of
cowards as all of the battles have sufficiently proved.”345 Others, such as Lt. Kirkham
argued that the Mexicans had simply proven to be too slow. In a letter to his wife he
expressed this view commenting that “peace stock remains about the same, but the
Mexicans are such a slow people, they take so much time.”346 Kirkham argued that the
Mexicans were slow compared to the United States, which Kirkham felt handled issues in
a quick and efficient manner. Overall, these officers utilized their letters to debase and
vilify Mexico, its people, and its army.
While criticizing their Mexican opponent for being uncivilized and critiquing
their lack of development, many American officers found time to debase the Mexican
populace in a far simpler way by commenting on what they perceived as the Mexican’s
stupidity. It became a common theme throughout the war for American officers to
derisively refer to the Mexicans they witnessed on their journeys as dumb or stupid since
they did not follow American customs. Possibly, this derision was due to the fact that
many Americans simply did not understand Mexican customs, which demonstrated the
existence of a large cultural gap between the United States and Mexico. Furthermore, the
language barrier probably prevented American observers from understanding much of
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what went on from day to day in Mexican society. Lt. Johnston noted this in a letter to his
wife complaining that “opposite me, and at the same little fire where I obtained my coffee
were two very pretty young Mexican girls, with their light dresses and rebosas, sipping
their chocolate. These are indeed a queer people to me.”347
The comments of many other officers went much deeper than the simple
complaint of Lt. Johnston, and noted the common stupidity many observed in the
Mexican populace. These comments, served to further dehumanize their opponents. After
viewing the inhabitants of Mexico during his service, Captain Chesley S. Coffee of the
2nd Mississippi, wrote to his brothers and sisters that “the people here are not intelligent
by any means, they will do for sirvents [sic], some of them, others are fit for nothing.”348
Captain Syndenham Moore, ridiculed the Mexican council after he heard a rumor that the
council had tried to sign a peace agreement with the United States, and wrote to his wife
that “they are so changeable and folly abounds with them and their public view.”349
The most common task of the American army in Mexico proved to be occupation
and garrison duty due to the fact that the shear size of Mexico meant that long supply
lines would need to be protected by garrisons of troops. Many officers, especially among
the volunteers, found themselves relegated to these menial roles for the majority, if not
all, of the war.350 Dr. Thomas Eugene Massie, who traveled as a surgeon with American
troops in New Mexico, made many observations about the people he witnessed along his
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journey. The American occupation of conquered areas such as New Mexico did not
always go smoothly, though. For example, on 19 January 1847 local residents began an
unsuccessful revolt against American rule in Taos, New Mexico. Colonel Sterling Price
quickly put down the revolt with a small command of 300 troops in the weeks that
followed. Several months after the Taos revolt, Massie wrote that “the Mexicans
hereabouts are a miserably poor, and ignorant race of beings, and my first wonder was
how they managed to prevent an instant separation of soul and body. Five hundred good
soldiers could keep this province in complete subjection.”351 Whenever things did not go
according to plan, as happened at Taos, many officers reverted to Massie’s tactic of
referencing the inferiority of the Mexican people to explain why American plans and
strategies broke down. Basically, American officers utilized the Mexicans as scapegoats
to explain any failures.
In attempting to convince their loved ones of Mexican stupidity, these officers
sought to dehumanize and debase their enemy in such a way that it excused and
explained the necessity for the war in the first place. These officers needed to explain to
American readers, and their families at home, why manifest destiny and American
expansion was a positive force. By elaborating on what they perceived as the mental
inferiority of the entire Mexican populace, these officers implied that introducing
American advancements in education and learning could only be a positive force for
Mexico. Lt. Richard Stoddert Ewell, sent a revealing letter to his mother. Shortly after
being stung by a scorpion, Ewell noted with amusement that a Mexican told him the sting
would get worse before it got better. Due to the advice of this person, who he viewed as
351 Thomas Eugene Massie to Uncle, 11 October 1847, Massie Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society.
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foolish, he condemned the entire Mexican population. In his letter he explained that “I
have been almost equally disappointed in everything I have seen from this to the city.”
He continued noting “a more stupid, begotted race cannot easily be imagined.”352
American officers, as Ewell’s comment illustrates, proved quick to describe the entire
Mexican population as mentally inferior to themselves. Through these comments,
American officers objectified and dehumanized their opponents.
Many officers joined Ewell in his critique of the people living in Mexico. In a
letter home Lt. John Sedgwick of the 1st Artillery offered his critique of the Mexican
people that perfectly illuminated the the American racial view of Mexico. In particular,
he reported that:
We [the United States] are the greatest go-ahead people in the world, and we beat
the Jews in getting drunk. It is so with the English and Irish. The real Indians, the cross of
the Castilian [Spanish] and Indian, are the meanest people living; they have all the
cunning, treachery, and the vices of the Indian without any of the virtues of the Spaniard.
I think it is the greatest misfortune in the world that Cortez was not annihilated here, and
the country would then have fallen into the hands of the Anglo-Saxon. As it is, these
people are no better than the aborigines, except in their idolatry, and I doubt if their
religion is much better.353
Sedgwick not only pointed out what he viewed as the failures of the Mexican
people as a race, but went a step further and compared those failures to the success of the
United States, or the “Anglo-Saxon” race. Captain William Shover, a member of the 3rd
U.S. Artillery, agreed with Sedgwick. In a letter to his sister, Susan Thornton, he argued
that “but a few years ago the haughty Spaniard strutted in his majesty here! Then follows
the imbecile Mexican, and now struts the yankee, the ‘barbarian of the north!!’ Here too
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is at this day vast herds of that miserable race of beings that Cortez and his followers trod
in the dust and made hewers of wood. Yea slaves indeed!”354 While Shover certainly
seemed critical of the “imbecile” Mexicans, he also criticized the United States as the
“barbarian of the north.” While Shover obviously did not view the Mexicans as an equal
race to Americans, this quote demonstrated his contempt for the war by 1848.
Even when American officers attempted to compliment the citizens of a Mexican
town they passed through, they often unwittingly slighted the remainder of the Mexican
population. Upon passing through Jalapa in April 1847, Captain Syndenham Moore of
the 1st Alabama, for example, reported to his wife Amanda that “the inhabitants are far
superior to any we have ever before met with in this republic. Although their appearance
is better and they are said to be far superior in intelligence, I noticed here more handsome
women than I have ever before seen in Mexico.”355 While Moore might have
complimented the inhabitants of Jalapa, he criticized the rest of the nation in doing it by
pointing out the surprise he felt at actually finding intelligent people in Mexico.
The racial views of American officers extended to the entire Mexican population,
but perhaps no single group received more attention from these officers than women.
Most American officers commented about the women they witnessed in Mexico.
Examining the comments these men made about these women reveals a great deal about
American views on both gender and race at the time. In describing Mexican women these
officers often combined race and gender. They expected to find gender roles similar to
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those found in the United States, but when they didn’t, many of these officers assumed
that the problem must lie with Mexican women in particular. The comments of these
officers ranged from a critique of the color of these women to a critique of their social
actions. For example, many officers found the dark complexion of Mexican women
unattractive, while others criticized the practices and customs of Mexican women.
Several American officers found the customs of Mexican women completely alien
to what they viewed as normal and proper behavior for women. Syndenham Moore
described a common complaint among American officer when he observed several
Mexican women bathing in a river. He wrote to his wife that “the women I observed are
all neatly clothed though in different style from the American ladies. They are fond of
bathing and go in without hesitation before anybody and often in company with the
men.”356 This scene of public bathing appeared especially alien to American officers who
were accustomed to bathing being a very private matter. By the mid-nineteenth century,
according to Kathleen Brown, “renewed interest in bathing in the nineteenth century
sparked a growing desire for privacy.”357 Moore, and other American officers like him,
found the custom of Mexican women bathing alongside, and in full of, men repulsive. As
Moore noted to his wife, he found the trait to be a common defect among all Mexican
women. In particular, Moore found this lack of modesty demonstrable of Mexican
women’s position as members of an inferior race. To him, they did not know any better
than to display their bodies in front of men. This is also ironic considering so many
American officers complained about the filthy and unsanitary conditions in Mexico, yet,
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when they found people trying to clean themselves, they found fault in this practice as
well.
Stanislaus Lasalle proved equally repulsed when he visited a fandango in a
Mexican city. Many American officers looked forward to the many fandangos in Mexico,
that were simply parties held by local land holders and the wealthy elite. American
officers were often invited to these events.358 Some officers went to these gatherings out
of a sense of curiosity, while others went in the hope of meeting local women. Lasalle
went to his first fandango for both reasons, but decided not to remain long upon arriving.
In particular, he looked on aghast when he arrived at the party only to find the women all
dressing in the backyard in view of everyone around. He described this event in a letter to
his sister writing “I believe I must tell you the joke. Lieutenant Brown was with me and
like myself I presume was anxious to see a fandango but the idea of girls dressing in the
backyard was too much to bare. We both broke to our lodgings perfectly satisfied with
fandangos.”359 This comment highlighted the fact that American officers found the habits
of Mexican women to be both foreign and alien. However, these comments also
demonstrated the fact that many American officers felt that Mexican women possessed
these faulty traits while most middle class and genteel American women obviously did
not.360 Syndenham Moore, for example, described the women bathing in the river with
mortification, and clearly would not expect American women to behave in this manner.
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In a similar manner, Lasalle was likewise repulsed by the idea of white women baring
their flesh in front of men.
Apart from the customs of Mexican women, American officers further
commented on the outward appearance of these women. Many of these officers argued
that Mexican women did not compare with American women in regard to beauty. These
comments went further than just derisively calling Mexican women ugly, however.
Instead, they linked these comments with race and whiteness. Colonel Samuel Ryan
Curtis of the 3rd Ohio, for example, equated darkness with ugliness. Along these lines he
wrote that a Mexican woman he saw was “a dark Indian looking woman, black eyes,
black hair, and dark skin. This is the character of the lower order of females as far as I
have seen.”361 On another occasion, Curtis pointed out that “the women were generally
dark and none of them pretty.”362 As Curtis’ comments demonstrated, these officers
closely linked appearance and beauty to race, with beauty denoting a higher level of
whiteness. As historian Kathleen Brown noted, by the 1840s the status of women in the
United States had clearly changed. Brown explains that whereas women had been viewed
as possessing the dirtiest bodies, this had clearly changed by the mid-nineteenth century.
According to Brown, by the 1840s cleanliness “became more clearly a female
responsibility.”363 Given these developments, American officers in Mexico viewed
American women as the cleanest members of society. When Mexican women failed to
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meet this same standard, American officers viewed them as inferior to American women
both socially and racially.
Like Curtis, many officers argued that qualities such as darker skin and outward
appearance demonstrated the fact that Mexicans represented a lower race compared to
Americans. Instead of just calling Mexican women ugly, these officers went deeper and
noted that their lack of beauty stemmed from their darker skin and lack of what these
officers thought were white traits. Instead, these officers described Mexican women as
black or Indian. Lt. Ralph W. Kirkham, an officer in the 6th U.S. Infantry, wrote along
these lines to his wife by remarking that “you know I threatened when I got among the
Mexican girls to play the gallant. I have not found time yet, and besides I have only seen
one girl here who had even a pretty face.”364 On another occasion, Kirkham argued that
“the Mexican women are very graceful, more so than ours; but as far as being handsome,
or even pretty, it is all a mistake. Nine-tenths of the people resemble the Cherokee
Indians as much as possible.”365 Comments about Mexican women resembling the
Indians illuminates the American racial ideology of the period. The Mexican War came at
a time when the United States relentlessly pushed westward, with much of this westward
expansion coming at the expense of the numerous Native American tribes who inhabited
this land. Many Americans excused this aggression with the argument that expansion
benefited these Native tribes since it brought them civilization and American culture. The
numerous wars with Indians, and President Andrew Jackson’s Indian removal policy,
helped breed a situation in which many Americans felt that the Indians represented a
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lesser race.366 Given this, American officers, such as Kirkham, did not refer to Mexican
women as Indian as an attempt at flattery.
Not all Mexican women incurred the scorn of American officers. Instead, some
officers noted that a few of the women possessed all of the charm and beauty of the finest
American women. They quickly pointed out, however, that the Spanish ancestry of these
women caused this, not their Mexican heritage. When these officers noted the beauty of
Mexican women, they often described their light complexion, or the fact that these
women possessed a Spanish, not Mexican heritage and ancestry. Captain William Seaton
Henry in the 3rd U.S. Infantry summed these views up nicely. In a letter home he wrote
that “the service [mass] had not commenced when we arrived. There were about a dozen
females collected, the majority of them Mexicans. I cannot say much for their beauty.
There was one, the Señora Leonora, a Mexican widow, who looked quite sweetly.” He
continued by pointing out that “to delicate features, good figure, and blood-like Castilian
carriage were added to the softest, deepest-fringed black eyes I ever saw.”367In a similar
manner, Captain William Harrison Shover wrote home that “ I had a very pleasant ride
with Major [Roger] Dix this afternoon about the city and alameda in looking at the
flowers and the pretty Mexican girls, some of whom are almost white.”368 These quotes
are interesting for several reasons. First Henry noted the general lack of beauty among
Mexican women. He went further than this, though, by noting the beauty of one woman
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in particular. The interesting part of this is that he noted her beauty stemmed from he
Castilian, or Spanish, heritage, and not from traits she possessed as a Mexican.369 Shover
further demonstrated the common practice of associating beauty with whiteness. These
views denoted the importance these officers placed on skin color and whiteness as a
racial determinate. To them, someone’s standing in society depended on their color and
cultural background.
In a similar manner, while traveling through Mexico City, Lt. William Booth
Taliaferro of the 9th U.S. Infantry pointed out in a letter to his sister that “the women are
first seen here with white skins and absence of Indian blood.”370 Lt. Rankin Dilworth of
the 1st U.S. Infantry took these thoughts even further by connecting color and
intelligence. While in Reynosa he wrote that “the inhabitants present all shades from pure
Indian to white person. Their intelligence is in the same scale. They are perfectly
indolent.”371 Lt. Kirkham agreed, commenting that “the lower classes, which embrace at
least nineteen-twentieths of the whole population, are poor, miserable beings who are so
ignorant and superstitious as it is possible to be.”372
As with gender, many American officers associated their views on class with race.
Historian Bridget T. Heneghan pointed out that “whiteness, like other categories, is
leaky; that is, race can only be seen in relation to other categories, such as class, gender,
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sexuality, and so on, that render any category problematic.”373 While in Mexico they
witnessed a society sharply divided between the classes. They connected these class and
social divisions to race, arguing that the better class of people not only had more wealth,
but represented a higher racial order as well. To these officers, race explained the wealth
of prosperous Mexicans. Many officers argued that the higher class of Mexicans
appeared lighter, or whiter, in physical appearance. Some of the officers noticed that the
people of one town appeared to be of a higher class, and thus a higher racial order than
the inhabitants of other Mexican towns. Usually, these officers pointed out to loved ones
that the higher standing of such Mexicans resulted from their European ancestry. They
argued that, due to their closer ties with Europeans, these people stood apart from the rest
of Mexican society. Colonel William B. Campbell of the 1st Tennessee, for example,
noted this phenomena while in Jalapa. In particular he wrote that “the population is more
of the European than in any town I have seen and look respectable and intelligent. These
Mexicans are nothing but herdsmen having large droves of cattle and sheep and goats and
horses and on the Rio Grande cultivate little or nothing and are a miserable, ignorant,
filthy race, but seem to be healthy and stout.” Lt. Theodore Laidley had a similar
experience while in Jalapa, and argued that “for the first time I have seen some
respectable decent looking people, since I have been in Mexico. Here you may see as
well dressed people as anywhere.” He continued by noting that “they are particularly
noticeable for the extreme whiteness and neatness of their linen and the good taste of
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their dress.”374 While Laidley noted “decent looking people” in the city of Jalapa, the
understanding in this comment is that everyone else he had see must have displayed
exactly the opposite traits. By noting the “whiteness” of these people’s linen Laidley
equated them to a more American, and thus white, vision instead of the rest of Mexican
society he had witnessed thus far. Campbell, like other officers noted the class and racial
stratification of Mexican society, but went further by pointing out that the European
heritage of the higher classes generated these differences. Therefore, they viewed the
higher class as better than the rest of society because of their whiteness. Furthermore,
they possessed the social graces that made them more closely identifiable to Americans
in the eyes of these officers. To most American officers, as demonstrated by Lt. Laidley’s
letter, higher class became synonymous with race and whiteness.
Many American officers belittled their opponents. The course of the war
progressed remarkably well for the American Army on the battlefield, as the American
forces never lost a single major battle and gained a complete victory over Mexico within
two years of the outbreak of war. Instead of just boasting about the quality and skill of
their own army, many American officers criticized the fighting ability of their opponents.
These officers felt these views had been substantiated by the long string of victories
gained by American arms starting with the war’s first two battles of Palo Alto and Resaca
de la Palma. In an ironic twist, these officers criticized the Mexicans because they had so
easily been defeated by the American Army, and pointed out that the American Army
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should not have been able to so easily defeat them.375 For these officers, this lack of
fighting ability confirmed the racial inferiority of the Mexican people. Syndenham
Moore, for example, noted that “I could not help feeling pity for a race who would submit
with no more resistance than they have shown to such indignity. If the Mexicans had any
of that national pride which accumulated on the bosoms of Americans they might have
made it difficult for our army to have penetrated so far into the interior as they have
already gone.”376
After several engagements these officers wondered aloud at why the American
Army had so easily defeated their foes. Several officers noted this phenomena after the
Battle of Vera Cruz, in which the Mexican army surrendered the city without a fight
following a short bombardment.377 Despite the fact that Winfield Scott won a relatively
cheap victory after a short siege, many officers reflected on the reason. To many, Vera
Cruz appeared to be almost impregnable. A ring of coastal forts protected the seaward
approaches to the city, and a strong line of entrenchments protected the landward
approaches to the city. Despite this, the Mexican army defending the city surrendered to
Winfield Scott on March 29, 1848 after only a four day American bombardment. Several
officers who participated in the siege noted that, given the highly defensible nature of the
city, only the racial inferiority of the Mexicans could have enabled an American victory.
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After the battle Captain William Richard Caswell of the Tennessee Mounted Infantry
wrote that “since I have seen the Mexican Army here, and since they have been defeated
by our arm, they having against us every advantage of position and numbers, I feel
compassion for the poor abject [unreadable] and slaves, which constitute the rank and file
of their armies, and a contempt for them as enemies of our country.”378 Basically,
Caswell noted that the only reason Vera Cruz was surrendered so easily was due to the
racial inferiority of its defenders. Lieutenant Ralph W. Kirkham took this further by
arguing that “the walls surrounding the city ought to have protected it if the [Mexican]
troops had any skill; with five thousand men we could have held it against ten times the
number.”379 Both of these quotes point out the fact that the Americans viewed the
Mexican Army with contempt. As Caswell pointed out, these officers felt that the
Mexicans did not represent a worthy opponent, referring to them as racially inferior and
“slaves.” Quote literally, he is arguing that the Mexicans don’t even deserve to be on the
same battlefield as an American Army.380
While these officers complained about the lack of fighting ability exhibited by the
Mexican Army, other officers went in the opposite direction by arguing that only the
stupidity and ineptitude of the Mexicans as a people prevented their government from
signing a peace. They pointed out that the ineptitude of the Mexicans prevented them
from realizing that they had been beaten and should give up the fight. Captain John W.
Dodd of the 4th Indiana Infantry commented to his wife that “if the better class of
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citizens in Mexico can rule, they will make peace, and thus secure the aid of our
government in perpetuating their rule.” He continued by arguing that “if they do not
make peace, it will be because the mass, the rabble, the slaves, will not let them, the
consequences will be that the better class will leave the country.”381 Ephraim Kirby Smith
summed things up more bluntly in a letter to his wife arguing “what fools the Mexicans
are that they don’t make peace.”382 Arguments such as those listed here furthered the
view, held by many American officers, of Mexicans as an inept people not worthy of
being an opponent of the United States.
The racism exhibited by American junior officers also utilized stereotypes
concerning the perceived intelligence of various races, and not simply ridiculing their
opponents. These officers usually found an area such as intelligence or lack of bravery on
the battlefield, and argued that all Mexicans had proven severely lacking in these areas as
a race. These arguments went beyond simply talking about an individual that these
officers might have met. Instead, they argued that all Mexicans exhibited these negative
traits. For example, Captain William Austine, a member of the 3rd U.S. Artillery, argued
that all Mexicans were alcoholics. In a letter to his cousin Austine reported that “every
house was a grog shop and I believe every man, woman, and child I saw was drunk: the
‘blue ruin’ was most abundant and could be had at most reasonable prices.”383 Captain
Chesley Coffee, a company commander in the 2nd Mississippi Infantry, also made broad
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judgements about the people of Mexico arguing “I will say something about my opinion
of the Mexican race. I think that they are entirely destitute of any principal of honesty.
Any of them would kill you for two dollars.”384 These judgements extended to officers’
view of the poor performance of Mexico’s army as well. Ralph W. Kirkham, for
example, wrote that “if the Mexicans had any bravery, we certainly should have had to
fight pretty hard for it. They are principally shooting down stragglers on the road.”385
Captain Stanislaus Lasalle also condemned the behavior of the Mexican Army in a letter
he wrote from Matamoros to his sister. He pointed out that “they [Mexicans] feared their
own people much more than they did us, as it is customary with Mexican soldiers to rob
and plunder everything that should fall in their way, whether it belongs to their own
people or not.” He continued noting that “it is tolerated by the government, and is often
the case that it is the only remuneration they receive for their services.”386 Lastly, John
Sedgwick argued that Mexicans imbibed in many vices pointing out that “their national
vices are lying and stealing. They will steal everything they can lay their hands on, and
lie when the truth will answer better. These vices they almost all have; there are very few
exceptions.”387 Sedgwick’s comment summed up the view many American officers held
concerning the Mexican people. Like Sedgwick, these officers condemned the entire
population in a racialized manner instead of noting that the complaints they proffered,
such as theft, were individual, and not racial, problems. Instead, they argued that these
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problems occurred due to the inferiority of the Mexican people as a race, that generated
broad stereotypes concerning the people of Mexico.
Race played a major role throughout the Mexican War. The junior officers of the
American army, both regular and volunteer, demonstrated this racist ideology. By doing
so, they helped expand and promote manifest destiny by dehumanizing their enemy.
These officers reported what they viewed as the uncivilized and barbaric nature of the
Mexican race in letters to their loved ones at home. Some of these officers expressed the
opinion that Mexico would never amount to anything without the permanent presence
and relocation of Americans in Mexico. These views also highlight the fact that
professionalism did little to insulate the regular army from the social issues that divided
many Americans at the time. Far from being members of a separate caste or group within
American society, the regulars responded to racism in the same manner as the volunteers.
Chapter 1 demonstrated that the regulars viewed themselves as being better than the
volunteers in every way. When confronted with an enemy of another race, however, both
regulars and volunteers reacted in the same manner and exhibited the same racist
ideology toward their opponents.
As John Dower pointed out with World War II, racism can infiltrate the ranks of
armies at war through such means as propaganda by creating an image of the enemy as
racially inferior. The American Army in Mexico experienced the same issues and
problems Dower pointed out with soldiers in the Pacific theater of World War II. Dower
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noted that racism helped armies fight by dehumanizing their foes and pointing out their
barbaric habits. The American army in Mexico experienced a similar phenomena.388
While the war was popular in some circles within the United States, especially the
South, it was much less popular in places such as New England. By 1848 many
periodicals and groups such as abolitionists had begun to speak out against the war as an
attempt by the southern states to expand the institution of slavery. Racism in Mexico
helped promote the necessity of the war, and helped excuse the war by pointing out the
racial inferiority of the Mexican people. Basically, since they belonged to an inferior
race, Mexico did not have to be treated with the same respect as European nations. In the
eyes of many officers and Americans, an enemy seen as inferior is much easier to fight
and kill psychologically than an enemy viewed as an equal. The act of dehumanizing the
Mexican population and pointing out their “uncivilized” habits helped increase support
for the war. If Mexico had been portrayed as a civilized and upstanding member of the
international community, more people would undoubtedly have spoken out against the
war. Instead, fewer people supported an enemy they viewed as racially similar to the
Native Americans they had fought for years, and the African Americans they had
enslaved for generations. Furthermore, many of these people would not speak up in
support of a nation many viewed as being populated by a black and Indian race. 389
The racism exhibited in the Mexican War further demonstrated the fact
that racism and war often go hand in hand. Since warfare is predicated and based on one
side killing the other, many soldiers have to demonize and vilify their opponents in order
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to help cope with the fact that they must kill their fellow man. American junior officers in
the 1840s faced this situation and responded in the same manner by pointing out the
racial inferiority of their enemy. Once established, these racial stereotypes can be quite
difficult to turn off, however. Therefore, many officers returned from Mexico with an
intense hatred for Mexico and its people, which further promoted racism toward Mexico
in the United States. Prior to the war, the United States and Mexico had a fairly good
relationship. Similarly, many Americans admired the Mexicans and the young republic
they had created. During the Mexico War any residue of these thoughts vanished in the
racist ideology propagated by the war. As ideologies are often passed down from
generation to generation, it is possible that these thoughts did not die with the conclusion
of hostilities but continued to be handed down to future generations of Americans.
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CHAPTER V
THE NAKED DISAGREEABLE TRUTH

The Mexican War proved to be a transformative event for the image of the regular
army in the eyes of many Americans. When the war broke out in 1846, as we saw in
Chapter 1, the regular army and West Point held a somewhat precarious position. By the
conclusion of hostilities, though, many people across the nation had a new understanding
of the regular army due to the performance of the regulars and the remarkable success
American arms met with on the battlefields of Mexico. Because of this change of heart,
the position of the regular army and West Point stabilized and improved following the
conclusion of hostilities. While the war did not eradicate all of the army’s detractors by
any means, it strengthened the army’s general position.
Franklin Pierce perhaps best embodies the general shift in attitudes many
Americans experienced during the Mexican War. The Democrat Pierce served as the
fourteenth President of the United States from March 1853 to March 1857. During the
1830s he also served in Congress as a Representative for New Hampshire. During this
period, he participated in the Congressional assaults on West Point, particularly in 1835
and 1836. On 30 June 1836, as reported by historian James L. Morrison, Jr. he delivered
a speech on the subject in which he “resurrected Thomas Jefferson’s old charge that the
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academy was unconstitutional.”390 In the years leading up to the outbreak of the Mexican
War Pierce actively sought the closure of West Point. Pierce, like many within the
Democratic Party, viewed both West Point and the regular army as a threat to republican
government in the United States.
The outbreak of the Mexican War brought many changes for Pierce, however.
Pierce had often wished to serve in the military, and the outbreak of hostilities in 1846
seemingly offered him the opportunity. Therefore, he quickly volunteered, and received a
commission as Colonel of the 9th Infantry Regiment in February 1847.391 He eventually
rose to the rank of Brigadier General in command of a brigade of volunteers in Scott’s
campaign against Mexico City. At the battle of Contreras he received a wound in his leg,
but retained his command in the battle of Churubusco. After the war he returned to New
Hampshire, but faced unfounded accusations of cowardice from his opponents for years
following the war. Specifically, at the Battle of Contreras on 19 August 1847, his horse
fell, crushing Pierce’s leg, and Pierce soon passed out from pain. Following the war, his
political opponents accused him of cowardice on the battlefield and referred to him as
“Fainting Frank.”392 During the war Pierce apparently realized a newfound respect for the
regular army and West Point. To these ends, when he became president, he was
supportive of the regular army and allowed his Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, “carte
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blanche to carry out his reforms.”393 The reforms Davis proposed consisted of increasing
the size of, and funding for, the regular army. Due to this, during his presidency the size
of the regular army slowly began to increase.
Pierce was not alone in supporting the regular army and West Point. Following
the war with Mexico, members of Congress, especially Whigs, slowly began to come
around in support of the army. Many did not support the army enthusiastically, but
grudgingly acknowledged the necessity of the regular army following hostilities.
Furthermore, many recognized that the increased size of the United States as a result of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalogo required a larger army for garrison purposes.
Furthermore, by 1848 journalists and newspapers also began to recognize the need for the
regular army by this point as well.
When war broke out between the United States and Mexico in 1846 American
newspapers frantically scrambled to cover the war. Prior to the Mexican War, military
journalism had yet to take hold as a major force. As Tom Reilly pointed out, while many
claimed that the Crimean War witnessed the first military journalists, in actuality, the first
military journalists and correspondents actually served during the Mexican War.394
George Wilkins Kendall, who wrote for the New Orleans Picayune, was one of the first
correspondents in Mexico, and traveled extensively with the American army throughout
the conflict. While the Picayune might have been the first to send a correspondent to
Mexico, they certainly were not the only American newspapers to do so as papers across
the country sent correspondents to join the armies. America’s newspaper coverage did
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not end with correspondents, though. Instead, many newspapers published soldiers’
letters from the front. Reilly noted that the vast majority of these letter writers were
themselves officers within the army, with most belonging to volunteer regiments.
Naturally, many of these writers portrayed their service, and the volunteers, in a favorable
light. These men sent regular letters and correspondence home from the front. In turn, the
home papers of these officers printed their letters in order to keep the public informed on
the war’s progress. In this manner, the United States newspaper industry covered and
reported the Mexican War.395
From the earliest stages of the conflict, these papers focused on the moves and
actions of the volunteer regiments sent to fight the war. Many extensively covered these
regiments from their first muster until the time they returned home to be released from
service. To these papers, these volunteer regiments embodied the Republican citizen
soldier ideal.396 As noted in Chapter 1, dating back to the colonial period, many in the
United States argued that the volunteers embodied the virtues of the republic since they
only temporarily became soldiers, and returned to civilian life once hostilities ended.
Most Americans, building on long-standing English traditions, feared a standing regular
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army, and argued that a standing army represented tyranny and despotism. In the war’s
early stages especially, the volunteers received much more attention from the nation’s
papers, whose writers largely ignored the regular army. Another reason for the glut of
coverage of the volunteers probably had something to do with the fact that the majority of
the letter writers served with volunteer regiments.
As the war progressed, this coverage slowly changed as the regular army received
more positive press than had been the case at the inception of hostilities. Several reasons
accounted for this change in coverage. First, many papers simply could not ignore the
impact that the regular army had on the battlefield, as regular regiments played a
dominant role in every battle except Buena Vista. Also, over time many papers witnessed
the depravations committed during the war, for which the volunteers received the most
blame.397 To an extent, it is only natural that the volunteers received more blame for these
actions since the volunteers provided most of the garrison and occupation force during
the war, whereas the regulars participated in action on the front lines more commonly.
Overall, the newspaper coverage of the war, along with the actions of the regulars and
volunteers, served to influence the public’s opinion concerning the regular army, and
West Point by extension. While the regular army might not have been welcomed with
open arms following the cessation of hostilities, most people, even if grudgingly, proved
willing to give the regular army a chance. Furthermore, many realized that a regular army
would be needed following the war to garrison the newly expanded frontier. As such, the
congressional debate to close West Point and possibly eradicate the regular army, one
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that had raged prior to the Mexican War, subsided and slowed following the signing of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848.
Richard Smith Elliot, a Lieutenant in the Battalion of Missouri volunteers, was a
prolific letter writer for the St. Louis based Reveille, and covered many of the events that
transpired during Kearny’s invasion of New Mexico. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities,
Elliot had extensive practice with journalism. In December 1839 he covered the national
convention for the Whig Party. In 1843 he took a position with the Indian Department
that brought him to St. Louis. From there he traveled extensively to areas such as Council
Bluffs. In 1844 he began writing for the Washington, D.C. based National Intelligencer,
but soon switched to the Reveille in St. Louis. When the Mexican War broke out Elliot
and his friend Thomas Hudson began raising a company of mounted riflemen. The
company elected Elliot a Lieutenant and soon joined the Missouri volunteer Infantry
regiment for an enlistment of twelve months. In June 1847 Elliot received a discharge
upon completion of his enlistment period and returned to St. Louis to resume his legal
practice. Despite the fact that he served with a volunteer regiment, he often did not offer a
flattering view of the volunteers to the readers of the Reveille. One would assume that, as
a member of a volunteer regiment, he would write very sympathetically of the volunteer
service, but this was not the case. Instead, he was quite hostile to the volunteers on
numerous occasions.398
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When war broke out with Mexico, Elliot had been writing for the St. Louis based
Reveille under the pen name John Brown since 1844.399 After Polk issued his call for
volunteers, Elliot enlisted in a Missouri regiment, and took part in Stephen W. Kearny’s
expedition to New Mexico. While in the field, Elliot continued to send correspondence to
the Reveille, updating the paper on the progress of the campaign and the condition of the
troops. Among a myriad of topics, Elliot covered the performance of the troops while on
campaign. During the early stages of his enlistment, Elliot noted the condition of the
volunteers with pride. For example, on 12 June 1846, he reported from Ft. Leavenworth
that “the volunteers, about five hundred in number, are drilled twice a day on the parade
ground, and look formidable enough.” He continued by pointing out that “they are, in
truth, learning very well, and will make good soldiers.”400
It did not take long for Elliot’s opinion of the volunteer service to sour. By June
1846 he complained that the quartermaster department had not issued necessary supplies,
such as tents. He also lamented the lack of organization displayed within the ranks of
volunteer regiments. Along these lines, he noted that “the organization and discipline of
the volunteer regiment will necessarily be imperfect for some time.” Apparently he had
more respect for the abilities of the regular army; however, he continued by arguing that
“Col Doniphan has appointed Lieut. Wills, of Cole county, commissary of the regiment,
and it is not probable that all their issues will be made with the same promptness and
regularity that they are in the regular army, as Mr. Wells is a young man, entirely without
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experience.”401 By April 1847 Elliot had become completely disgruntled with the
volunteers. In a remark that at first seemed like a cut on the Mexican people, Elliot
bemoaned the filth in which many volunteers lived, and wrote that:
As to cleanliness, generally, there is great room for improvement among the
Mexicans; but perhaps I had better say nothing on this subject, for fear some of
the volunteers might think it was reflecting on them also. In truth, the most
wretchedly dirty and filthy men I have ever seen are among some of the Missouri
‘free and independent’ volunteers! Their quarters are but little better than pig
sties, and their officer of the day, visited the quarters of a company, and found the
rooms so filthy that he could scarcely endure the noisome smell and sights of
untold dirtiness.402
Over the course of his service in New Mexico, as these comments demonstrate, Elliot
came to view the volunteer service with disgust instead of pride. By the time he mustered
out of service he proved only too willing to leave the squalor of the army behind. This is
interesting considering Elliot was himself an officer among the regiment he described.
Perhaps by pointing out the regiment sobriquet, the “free and independent” volunteers,
Elliot offered a parallel commentary about the volunteer system in general. Volunteer
regiments considered their freedom from control and arbitrary authority, even in military
service, to be vital. The results of this free-spirited nature, as Elliot demonstrated by
noting the miserable living conditions among the Missouri volunteers, could be
disastrous.
In a similar manner, Elliot often expressed interest in the volunteers, and their
reaction to military service. On 29 April 1847, for example, Elliot reported to the editor
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of the Reveille that “I am heartily disgusted with volunteer service. It has not the regular
and spirited performance of duty to be found in the regular army. You cannot depend on
the officers either for the possession of military knowledge, or for prompt and efficient
action. The general rule is against these things.”403 Later in the same letter, Elliot
described the general performance of the volunteers, and noted that they drank heavily
and engaged in general debauchery of every kind. He closed the letter by informing his
readers to “not think this picture too highly colored. It is true in every feature. By the
disorders, by the unrestricted license allowed to everybody, not only have Americans
contracted disease and suffered death, but we have actually, as to morals and manners,
become contemptible in the eyes of this most contemptible of all people, the Mexicans!”
He continued by noting that “this is a degradation that I never thought the incompetence
of our commanders would bring to us to; but it is the naked, disagreeable truth.”404 As
chapter three demonstrated, Elliot’s readers likely held a very low opinion of the Mexican
populace due to the highly racialized nature of the Mexican War. By suggesting that the
volunteers occupied a lower social standing than the Mexicans, Elliot offered perhaps one
of the greatest criticisms of the volunteers possible by connecting these volunteers to
what he viewed as an inferior and savage race. This, and other reports, also bolstered the
professional character of the regulars. Furthermore, these articles assumed that the
regulars did not behave in such a manner since Elliot’s only comments concerning the
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regular army proved much more flattering than the manner in which he covered the
Missouri volunteers.
Elliot was not the only correspondent who criticized the performance of the
volunteers in Mexico. Many other correspondents felt the volunteers did not react to
service in Mexico with the virtue expected of them. A correspondent with the Charleston
Mercury, for example, described South Carolina’s Palmetto regiment as “ragamuffinism”
due to their appearance.405 Papers from Cincinnati and Louisville joined in, criticizing the
volunteers for “their lawless propensities.”406 When noting this lawlessness, the papers
referred to the outright criminal behavior that many soldiers engaged in while in Mexico.
The Niles Register offered a similar critique. Pointing out that new volunteer regiments
had recently arrived in camp, the writer continued by arguing that “the sooner they are
removed the better. A state of things has existed at the camp for the last few days which
is highly disgraceful to all concerned.” The article continued by pointing out that “we are
sorry to note a riotous and rowdy disposition manifested by the citizen soldiery
volunteered into service.”407 The Louisville Journal also joined in on this railing against
the volunteers, noting on 29 June 1846 that “there was another disgraceful row between
some of the volunteers and citizens about dusk last evening. We learn that a man named
Davis was so seriously beaten by the volunteers that his life is despaired of.”408
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While Elliot and the other correspondents might have been more than willing to
express their opinions to the newspapers and have their letters published for everyone to
read, not all officers shared this sentiment. Lieutenant George Gordon Meade, for
example, argued that the constant flood of letters written from Mexico actually had a
detrimental effect on the American war effort. In particular, he argued that “I cannot
express to you how thankful I am you refused John Cadwalader’s request to publish my
letter, and I have mentioned your good sense and prudence with great pride throughout
the camp.”409 He continued by arguing that “it is the more appreciated, as many good
people similarly situated have not exercised the same discretion, and many letters have
been published which their authors would have given a great deal to have revised before
meeting the eyes of their brother officers.” He finished his rant about newspapers by
arguing “if there is anything I do dislike, it is newspaper notoriety. I think it is the curse
of our country, and fear it is seriously injuring our little army, whose tone once was
utterly opposed to making use of the public press to sustain their cause.”410 On another
occasion, Meade warned his wife to “be on your guard against newspaper reports, as a
general rule false. Even in the army, in the rear division, they had us of the advance all
cut to pieces, and were quite glad to see us alive when they came up.”411
In a similar, manner, Ephraim Kirby Smith warned his wife about publishing any
of his letters. In particular, shortly after the siege of Vera Cruz Smith related the
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happenings of the army, including the successes the army had gained and the failures it
suffered. Suddenly aware that the personal information he enclosed in his letter might
make it into a newspaper, Smith warned his wife that “not a word I write must get into
the papers.”412 Both Meade and Smith proved typical of the regular army officers who
tended to distrust the newspapers and their coverage of the war. Overall, these officers
felt that the newspapers did not cover the war fairly and accurately, and that they unfairly
criticized the army and its efforts in Mexico. Furthermore, these officers considered it
unprofessional to air the army’s dirty laundry to the general public. Basically, they felt
that it was not their place to openly criticize the army and its actions in the media. This
does not mean that many did not disagree with many actions within the army. Instead,
officers like Meade simply felt that the public sphere was not the proper place for such
complaints.
Throughout the Mexican War American officers expressed a desire to stay
updated on events in other theaters of the war and events at home in the United States. To
satisfy these needs, officers often read and exchanged newspapers from the United States
during the war. They often followed these papers’ coverage of the army’s campaigns and
compared the information presented by the newspapers to their own knowledge of having
participated in the actual events. To this end, many officers registered a myriad of
complaints against the newspapers. Lieutenant Theodore Laidley, a regular office with
the Ordinance Deparment, complained that the newspapers divulged information that
should have been kept secret. In particular, he reported to that “papers have scattered the
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plan of operations all over the country and of course to the enemy also, when its success
depended in so great a measure on the secrecy with which it was kept.” He continued by
pointing out that this had proven to be “a fault, by the way, that will cost us much in all
warlike operations, at all times, and most probably defeat some or many of them.”413
Lieutenant Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana of the 7th U.S. Infantry also noted
the large number of rumors that spread throughout the army’s camp. Many of these
rumors, he complained, had been caused by the tendency of the newspapers to report
erroneous information. Before the war had even begun, he reported this phenomena to his
wife writing “it is late at night, but I make haste to finish this letter and dispatch it to you
in order that you may have a correct account of a terrible accident which has occurred
here this afternoon, for should newspaper remorse reach you before you hear from me,
they will be so exaggerated that you might feel uneasy about some of your friends.”414 On
another occasion, he argued that “one thing let me again charge you, that is, to believe
none of this idle, foolish rumors which are continually going the rounds of the
newspapers. Some of them are the excess of absurdity and many of them without any
foundation.”415 Basically, in making this argument, Dana felt that the newspapers were
reporting rumors and falsehoods, and thus could not be trusted.
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Many officers concurred with the opinion that little could be trusted in the
newspapers. Robert Anderson, a captain with the 3rd U.S. artillery, implored his wife to
“not be over-anxious at not hearing from me; believe no newspaper stories from the
army.”416 He continued by writing that “I cannot resist giving you here one or two
instances of misstatements to show you how much we who are in the army are deceived
by false statements. Genl. Shields and Lt. Dana have both been reported dead,
information positive, the last news is that they are both at Jalapa and with favorable
chances of recovery.”417 Anderson further expressed his relief that he had not written to
Lt. Dana’s mother in condolence. Ephraim Kirby Smith also displayed his lack of faith in
the investigative abilities of the newspaper media in a letter to his wife. In particular, he
reported “a ridiculous story is in the Matamoras Flag of today that Santa Anna and Arista
have had a quarrel in which Santa was killed. I mention it as it will be quoted in the
newspapers.”418 This story later proved false, as Santa Anna had not been killed.419
Furthermore, George Gordon Meade advised his wife to “be on your guard against
newspaper reports, as a general rule false. Even in the army, in the rear divisions, they
had us of the advance all cut to pieces, and were quite glad to see us alive when they
came up.”420
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As the Mexican War progressed, many correspondents and papers began to view
the volunteers negatively. These newspapers came to view the many deprivations and
atrocities committed by American troops in Mexico as largely the fault of the volunteers.
Along these lines, these papers proved much more willing to report atrocities committed
by volunteers. Early in the war, these papers had not printed stories about violence
committed by American soldiers. As the war progressed, though, these papers began to
inform their readers about the behavior of the volunteers in Mexico. Christopher Mason
Haile, a correspondent for the New Orleans based Picayune, argued that newspapers had
neglected the poor behavior of the volunteers for too long. He argued that the volunteers
had committed “outrages against Mexican citizens,” commenting that those guilty of
such acts should be “exposed and dismissed from the service and our national honor will
not be tarnished by such gross and horrible violations.”421 After printing an article in
which he railed against the behavior of the 1st New York while in Mexico, Horace
Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, had his image publicly burned in effigy by
members of the regiment upon their return.422
At least some newspapers pointed out that the regulars did not experience these
problems. Historian Tom Reilly commented that “U.S. Army regulars did not have as
severe a problem, [John H.] Peoples reported, because they were confined to camp at
night. Volunteers did not face such restrictions, and their officers seldom attempted to
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curtail their activities.”423 One of the more scathing commentaries on the behavior of the
volunteers came from George Kendall, a correspondent for the New Orleans Picayune,
and probably the war’s single most famous correspondent. As Tom Reilly argued, years
after the war Kendall argued that “our volunteer system will not do for a long contest.”424
During the course of covering the Mexican War, Kendall grew to lament the volunteer
system. Due to this, Kendall wrote the previous quote on the eve of the Civil War after
growing to dislike the volunteer system.
Throughout the war, American newspapers kept track of the progress of the
American army, by covering the actions of the various regiments sent to Mexico. These
papers quickly became aware of the rivalry that existed between the regulars and
volunteers, with many taking the side of the volunteers in this inter-service dispute. For
example, the Missouri based Boon’s Lick Times reported Taylor’s movement to
Monterrey with interest and trepidation over the fact that Taylor appeared to be preparing
to leave his volunteer regiments behind to garrison Matamoros instead of taking them
with him to the front. Many volunteer’s greatest fear was being left behind and not
allowed to fight and gain glory in battle. The papers reported this news to its readers
commenting that “Gen. Taylor is not only inclined to look with disfavor upon the
volunteers, but that he is determined to concentrate all the regulars in a body at
Monterrey…while he will garrison the volunteers at the different little Mexican towns
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which have surrendered.” The paper summarized its misgivings for the lack of respect
shown the volunteers by noting that “it is to be regretted that at so early a day in the
history of this war, such a state of feelings should spring up between these different
interests in our army.”425 These papers viewed these moves as evidence that generals,
such as Taylor, exhibited favoritism toward the regular army by assigning it front line
positions while keeping the volunteers in the rear, where the papers argued they had little
chance at gaining glory or fame. The primary reason these newspapers feared this, was
that it allowed the regular army to reap the laurels of victory without the volunteers
participating. In reality, Taylor, and later Winfield Scott, assigned their regular regiments
to the front lines because they were more reliable as soldiers. Furthermore, the regulars
could not leave Mexico until the conclusion of hostilities, while most volunteer regiments
only signed for a twelve month enlistment. Therefore, these generals kept them in the rear
since they would otherwise have to be replaced at the end of their enlistment. To them, it
was safer to assign these volunteer regiments to garrison duty where they could more
easily be replaced.
Many papers lauded the performance of the volunteers with each passing battle.
Often this boiled down to regional preference with papers rooting for the volunteer
regiments from their states and towns. These papers often relied on letters written by
participants in these battles to relate events to their readers. As the first major
engagement in which large numbers of volunteers participated, the Battle of Monterrey in
September 1846 received a great deal of attention from American papers. For example,
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the Pennsylvania based Somerset Herald and Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Register
informed its readers about the performance of the volunteers during the battle by printing
a letter written by Colonel Balie Peyton of the 5th Louisiana. This letter pointed out that
“the volunteers from the different states behaved in the most handsome manner. They
have won for the citizen soldier the admiration and applause of the officers and soldiers
of the regular army, who speak of their conduct in the highest terms of approbation and
eulogy.”426 The article summed up its coverage of the Battle of Monterey by noting that
“the courage and consistency of this corps is the theme of admiration in the army.”427
While the fact that the paper lauded the performance of the volunteers during the battle is
not unusual, the article is different for what is missing. In particular, while the article
mentioned numerous specific volunteer regiments, it says virtually nothing about the
regular regiments under General Worth who turned the Mexican left flank, a maneuver
that led directly to the resounding victory at Monterrey. These papers, like many
Americans at the time, disliked the regular army, as they thought it represented an affront
tot Republican virtue. Furthermore, many Democratic papers, just like the Democratic
Party as a whole, did not support either the regular army or West Point.428
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Other papers decried the disbanding of volunteer regiments early in the war. With
the onset of hostilities, many states rushed to raise six month volunteers to hurry to the
front without official federal approval. Congress, however, passed the War Bill on 13
may 1846, which authorized President Polk to call out fifty thousand volunteers.429 Once
President Polk issued his call for twelve month volunteers, many six month volunteers
were sent home. The Alabama based Jacksonville Republican reported these
developments with disappointment, noting that “of some six thousand volunteers
disbanded under the recent order from the war department, there will not remain in the
service enough to form a single regiment under the new terms proposed.” They continued
by arguing that sending these regiments home could spell disaster for General Taylor and
leave him unsupported.” The paper excitedly pointed out that if this happened “the
consequence would be a great embarrassment to the army, and probably its defeat. The
paper further reported its disapproval at the fact that many volunteer regiments did not
have adequate barracks, pointing out that “they [volunteers] are now, we believe,
quartered at a miserable flea-ridden cotton shed.”430
On 29 December 1846 President James Polk addressed the combined Senate and
House of Representatives to offer several recommendations for the prosecution of the
war. Several of these recommendations revolved around the army and its balance
between regular and volunteer regiments. In particular, Polk suggested creating additional
Furthermore, this letter is dwarfed by the much larger and longer letter mentioned above. For more
information on the Battle of Monterrey refer to K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (Lincoln:
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regular regiments to help prosecute the war with Mexico, as it had already become
obvious by this point that the regular army would do a majority of the heavy lifting in the
coming campaigns. Furthermore, he recommended appointing someone to the rank of
Lieutenant General. Had it passed, this would have been the first time someone held the
rank of Lt. General since George Washington. Polk also suggested that the states raise
more volunteer regiments, but he scolded these states that they had not already raised
enough soldiers to fill the quotas they had been given. The Vermont Phoenix reported
Polk’s address to its readers, but also offered editorial comments on the address that
reflected their disgust at Polk’s recommendations. In particular, they disapproved of his
suggestions to increase the size of the regular army and to reopen the position of
Lieutenant General. In an article entitled “What Next!” the paper argued that “if any
judgement may be safely pronounced upon the incidents of the last three days, the
Executive of the United States has entirely lost the confidence of the popular branch of
Congress; not that of the party opposed to the administration, which it could hardly be
supposed to have possessed, but of the party to which itself belongs.” The article closed
by asking “what next! Who can Tell!”431 As this quote demonstrated, many members of
Congress obviously did not approve of Polk’s attempts to add additional regiments to the
regular army. In particular, many of these members, especially the Democrats, did not
support the regular and were among the the groups attacking it in the years preceding the
Mexican War.
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Other papers covered this speech from Polk as well; as many papers were
interested in what Polk had to say concerning both the war effort and the army. The
Missouri based Democratic Banner, for example, reported Polk as arguing that “it is our
settled policy to maintain in time of peace as small a regular army as the exigencies of the
public service will permit.” The article continued by pointing out that “in a state of war
notwithstanding the great advantage with which our volunteer citizen soldiers can be
brought into the field the small regular army must be increased in its numbers in order to
render the whole force more efficient.” This paper, like the Vermont Phoenix, also
pointed out President Polk’s discontent at several states not doing their part in raising
enough volunteers. In particular Polk complained that “of the additional regiments of
volunteers which have been called for from several of the states, some have been
promptly raised but this has not been the case in regard to all.”432 The low enlistment
numbers in many volunteer regiments reflected the fact that the Mexican War was not
popular in some circles, especially New England. On the other hand, regiments filled
quickly in many southern states such as Mississippi. While he worried about probable
size of the army, Polk was also concerned about the quality of that army, and felt that
more regulars would better serve the war effort that volunteers.
Newspapers across the nation listened attentively whenever President Polk gave
an address, particularly as the war wound down. With the conclusion of peace in 1848,
Polk’s attention, and the attention of the nation, once again returned to debates
concerning the regular army and what function it would play in the war’s aftermath.
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Along these lines, Polk issued a message to Congress on 6 July 1848 to announce the
conclusion of the war and his plans for the future. In this address he turned his attention
to regular army and, as the paper reported, rehashed the old notion of the republican
citizen soldier. Polk, the Edgefield Advisor noted, argued that “while the people of other
countries, who live under forms of government less free than our own, have been for ages
oppressed by taxation to support large standing armies in periods of peace, our
experience has shown that such establishments are unnecessary in a republic.” Polk
continued by pointing out that “our standing army is to be found in the bosom of society.
It is composed of free citizens, who are ever ready to take up arms.” Interestingly, Polk
added that “our experience in the war just closed, fully confirms the opinion that such an
army may be raised upon a few weeks’ notice.”433 Polk’s praise of the regular army in
this quote pointed out several interesting arguments, and addressed many of the
traditional fears people had of a standing army. First, he pointed out that instead of being
a tool for tyranny, the regular army’s ranks were comprised of free citizens and members
of society. Furthermore, the regular army could quickly be expanded in a time of
emergency, much like the militia system. Polk, then, argued that the regular army held
many of the same qualities people admired among the volunteers, which in turn made the
regular army appear less like the tool of tyranny many feared. The regular army, like the
volunteers, was built on citizen soldiers, a point Polk highlighted in this passage.

Unsigned, “The President’s Message Announcing to Congress the End of the War with Mexico,” The
Edgefield Advertiser, 19 July 1848. These comments are indeed curious considering earlier in the war Polk
had been upset over the fact that volunteer enlistments were down and the fact that many states had not
filled the quotas they had bee given. Perhaps with the war successfully over Polk wanted to create as rosey
a picture as possible. It is also possible that Polk wanted to appeal to as many Democrats as possible since
the Whigs had gained a lot of momentum heading into the elections of 1848.
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While some papers and journalists appeared quick to defend the volunteer system
from what they viewed as an undemocratic regular army, other papers proved more
willing to support the regular army, especially following the early victories the regular
army achieved in 1846. The Vermont based Burlington Free Press, for example, pointed
out some of the achievements and gains West Point and the regular army had achieved by
1847. Following the successful actions of the regular army in the resounding victories at
Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, the paper cited the importance of West
Point in such victories. Furthermore, the paper reported that the performance of the
regular army and West Point graduates in these actions should dispel any criticism
toward these institutions. The paper opened with an article pointing out that “the attacks
have been made year after year against the military institution at West Point, and the
attempts which have been repeatedly made to suppress it, on the grounds that it was
useless or that it was expensive, have been triumphantly met by the conduct of its
graduates in regard to the existing war.” The article continued by commenting that “they
[West Point graduates] have not only formed the life of our regular army, but they have
inspired the volunteer corps with the energy and power their military education enabled
them to bring to their country’s service. This fact has been exhibited by every action in
which our forces have been engaged.”434 Furthermore, the article provided an account of
the West Point graduates’ service in the war, and described the benefits their service
provided the nation. This article pointed out that the war’s quick success could largely be
attributed to the actions of the regular army. To this point, the anonymous author
summarized this argument by asking “will the most violent opponent of the military
434
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academy say that the contest will not be shortened a single month in consequence of the
instruction obtained by our officers of regulars and volunteers who have been educated
there [at West Point].” The article concluded by asserting “let every battlefield from Palo
Alto to Cerro Gordo, reddened with the blood of the officers of our army-old and youngspeak in thunder tones in reply to the foul calumny of this unprincipled defamer of their
virtue, patriotism, fortitude, and valor, which will be ever honored.”435 Apart from
pointing out that the war’s success was largely due to the regular army, the article noted
that the congressional and media attack which the regular army had sustained were
unfounded, and that the regular army should “be ever honored.”
While the Burlington Free Press defended the regular army, other papers proved
just as quick to defend the volunteers. The Indiana State Sentinel, for example, cried foul
when a Judge W.W. Wick sought to give the regulars a pay raise, but not the volunteers.
The paper reported that Wick, whom they quoted as claiming to be a “brother of one of
the volunteers,” had “turned traitor to Old Hickory and his principles.” The article further
argued that “if he is really ‘a brother of one of the volunteers,’ as he pretends, he is an
illegitimate and not a legitimate one.” Furthermore, the article continued by noting that
“if he should show himself in his true character, it would be that of a consummate
hypocrite and demagogue.”436 The Federal government did have a specific reason for
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wanting to raise the pay of the regulars, as the volunteers received more money per
month than the regulars, which made it almost impossible for the regular army to fill out
its ranks with recruits. Therefore, the increased pay would allow regular army recruiters
to successfully compete with the volunteer regiments for recruits. The paper, however,
did not sympathize, and felt that the volunteers had been slighted by these developments.
Throughout the Jacksonian period, and until the outbreak of the Mexican War in
1846, Congress assaulted West point. One of the primary problems that plagued West
Point was its funding, as the military academy relied on approval from a hostile Congress
for its budget each year. Often, this relatively simple matter turned into an intense debate
with opponents of the academy attempting to defeat the proposed funding packages for
West Point in an attempt to destroy the academy as a whole. These opponents of West
Point felt that by defunding the academy they could force its closure. Shortly following
the outbreak of hostilities with Mexico, Congress once again attempted to defund West
Point and force its closure. As such, the House of Representatives hoped to defeat a bill
providing funding for the academy. The New York Daily Tribune noted this debate in a
report of recent activity in Congress. The paper was quick to decipher the real purpose
behind the debate regarding West Point, however, writing that “the house then went into
committee of the whole and took up the bill for the support of the Military Academy. Mr
Sawyer of Ohio, moved to strike out the first section of the bill, that provided funding for
West Point, with a view of defeating the whole bill, and with the avowed object of
abolishing the institution.”437 Ultimately the bill was defeated as the paper reported
noting “the motion failed by tellers-Yeas 55, Nays 101.” However, Sawyer did not give
437
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up on his goal of seeing West Point closed and reported, “Mr. Sawyer then introduced an
amendment, looking to the prospective abolition of the Academy, and as soon as the
Cadets now there should have finished their terms of service.”438 Ultimately, this bill was
also defeated, but it highlights the intense debate regarding West Point, and by extension
the regular army, that continued through the outbreak of the Mexican War.
Not every paper reported on the actions of the volunteers in a favorable light.
Some papers, such as the New York Daily Tribune reported that the volunteers often
experienced serious troubles and lack of discipline. In particular, the paper printed a letter
from an unnamed officer at Reynosa, Mexico dated 2 November 1846. In this letter, the
officer noted that:
the volunteers when sick are the most helpless, miserable beings that can well be
conceived; to be sure they are not much better when they are well, yet a volunteer
hospital, as one of our officers very cogently expressed it, is a perfect h-l [Hell]
upon the earth. There are two men in one of the hospitals now who are dying by
inches, victims of Nostalgia, or homesickness. Medicine can do nothing for them;
they seem determined to die, and I do not know what will save them. Many of the
regiments have suffered from this cause alone (a disease unknown among the
regulars) and several, and it tends to produce serious consequences as it
complicates other diseases.439
This letter laid out a very dim view of the volunteers and reported this view to the readers
of the paper. Furthermore, this quote argued that since they suffered from such mundane
afflictions as homesickness, volunteers obviously were not the best choice to prosecute a
foreign war. Regulars, the paper argued did not suffer from these afflictions, and were
thus better prepared to fight a foreign war. The officer continued by noting that “I
suppose that you have been perfectly overwhelmed with accounts of the battles at
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Monterey, and every volunteer will be writing a glorification of himself and corps. I
understand that many of their officers assert that the city was taken by volunteers.” The
letter further pointed out numerous instances of cowardice exhibited by the volunteers
during the battle and summed up by noting that “to pretend to say that Monterey was
taken by the volunteers is perfectly preposterous.”440 As mentioned in earlier chapters,
many papers printed letters from officers stationed in Mexico for their readers. Many of
these letters, such as the one above, offered insights into the realities and conditions on
the ground in Mexico that the paper’s readers otherwise would not have gotten.
Other papers and correspondents joined in by reporting outrages committed by the
volunteers during the war.441 Correspondent John H. Peoples, for example, reported on
the condition of the army once he reached the city of Monterey, and found that the army
had become disorganized and disorderly in its occupation of the city. As Tom Reilly
noted, Peoples observed that “the Kentucky volunteers and Mexicans ‘are having a war’
over the death of some Kentucky troops.” Peoples continued by pointing out that the
Kentucky soldiers had killed at least 50 Mexicans in five days in retaliation for the deaths
within their regiment. Overall, each event such as this further cast a shadow on the
volunteers and their reputation among people in the United States who were reading these
papers. While the regulars certainly participated in some of these events, papers rarely
mentioned this participation. Instead, the volunteers bore the brunt of these
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recriminations.442 In particular, many in the United States viewed the volunteers as the
shining example of republican virtue, and actions like these contradicted those views.
Furthermore, while the regulars certainly participated in this violence, the volunteers do
appear to have carried out assaults on Mexican civilians and property with more vigor.
This might be due to the fact that while many regular regiments committed violence as
they passed through an area on their way to the front, they usually did not remain long
enough to create a lasting image of violence. The volunteers on the other hand were often
used to garrison captured cities, and thus remained for weeks and months on end. This
meant that they had plenty of time to take out their agitation over their assignment on the
local populace.
While many papers might not have wholly supported the regular army, after
viewing their performance in Mexico compared to that of the volunteers some grudgingly
acknowledged that the regulars might be more well suited for the realities of a foreign
war. While these acknowledgments did not amount to whole-hearted support for the
regular army, they did show that at least some recognized the need for the regular army
and that they apparently possessed some abilities that the volunteers did not. The
Pennsylvania based Jeffersonian Republican, for example, ran an article at the end of
Reilly, War with Mexico!, 80-82. The history of the Mexican War is full of events like this. Mexican
Guerrilla units operated throughout the war and would often kill isolated American soldiers. The comrades
of these victims, though, often blamed the local population and exacted their revenge by killing anyone
even remotely suspected of being involved in the act with little evidence. Many officers reported these
events in their letters home. Many of these accounts have been published. For examples of these works see:
Lawrence R. Clayton and Joseph E. Chance, The March to Monterrey: the Diary of Lt. Rankin Dilworth;
Nathaniel Cheairs Hughs Jr. and Timothy D. Johnson, A Fighter from Way Back: The Mexican War Diary
of Lt. Daniel Harvey Hill, 4th Artillery USA; Robert H. Ferrell, Monterrey is Ours!: The Mexican War
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1846 summarizing the war effort up to that point. This article reported that “the regular
army created under the law of the last session, when filled up, will amount to 16,998
officers and men.” The article continued by arguing that “the volunteers called out who
have encountered the enemy, have more than justified the high expectations formed of
this description of troops, but it is no disparagement of them to say that a regular force
would be preferred in a war to be prosecuted in a foreign country.”443 While the paper
attempted to reserve as much credit for the volunteers as it possibly could, the article still
recognized that regular troops might be better in a foreign war than volunteers. This
grudging support demonstrated that, some at least, were willing to recognize the necessity
of the regular army.
As the war progressed, many papers began to change their tune in regard to the
volunteers. While papers proudly covered the departure of the volunteers and reported
their exploits on the battlefield, this coverage cooled as the war progressed. By the end of
the war, the regulars received much more attention, while the attention received by the
volunteers proved much less flattering than it had earlier in the war. An article in the
Brooklyn Daily Eagle that covered the return of the New York regiment summed up this
occurrence nicely. In particular, the paper drew the reader’s attention to the differences
between the condition of the volunteers upon their departure and their return noting that
“the volunteers presented a most interesting sight and exhibited the difference between
Unsigned, “Synopsis of the War,” The Jeffersonian Republican, 24 December 1846. Many at the time
argued that a foreign war was indeed the realm of the regular army, and not a volunteer force. It was
considered illegal for the militia to be used outside the country. This is why President Polk issued a call for
volunteers to serve under the control of the Federal government in 1846 instead of calling out the militia.
During the invasion of Canada in the war of 1812 many militia units had refused to cross the boundary into
foreign soil because of this. Furthermore, in A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair historian Paul Foos argued that
the militia system had become almost useless as a military force by 1846. Instead, most militias were
simply social clubs used by officers for prestige instead of an actual military force.
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going and returning in the strongest light.” The article continued by noting that “many of
them looked extremely pale and haggard, and their clothing and uniform was torn, worn,
defaced and looking like every thing else but a uniform.”444 Truly the paper did not
intend to paint a picture of the worn out, but glorious, veterans returning from the
battlefield. Instead, the paper hoped to degrade these volunteers by pointing out the
terrible shape in which they returned. As historian Paul Foos noted, by 1848 many within
New York had turned against this regiment, and viewed the war as an attempt to grab
new land on which to expand cotton, and thus slavery. Foos pointed out that this led
directly to the rapid rise of the Free Soil Party.445
Others papers followed suit with the Daily Eagle, and printed articles noting
problems that had begun to arise form within the ranks of the volunteers. For example, a
journalist for the St. Louis Missouri Republican wrote on the conditions within Colonel
Sterling Price’s Missouri regiment on campaign in New Mexico. Specifically, the paper
reported that “it was a common occurrence, not restricted by any order of the Colonel, to
see officers of his regiment dealing Monte at the gambling hells of Santa Fe, and the
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privates of their companies betting their money on the turn of the card.”446 On another
occasion the paper reported from Santa Fe that:
Lewdness in both sexes exhibits itself in the most glaring and shameless forms,
and walks abroad at midday, as if the human family had dwindled down to
nothing more than brute intellect and to less than savage refinement. True, there
are many of the officers and privates of Col. Price’s regiment who are gentlemen,
and hold themselves aloof from the vices and dissipation that are so contagious,
and of which the very atmosphere seems composed, but alas! for the large
majority, they have expended more than the amount of their wages and are,
indeed, a reckless ragamuffin band, a disgrace to the name of American soldiers,
and will return to Missouri a miserable, ragged set, with morals corrupted, and
will, ere long, be a great accession to our state penitentiary.447
Overall, these accounts surely influenced the opinion that many people in the United
States held for the volunteers. At the very least, it made the volunteer system a little
harder to defend.
As the Mexican War drew to a close, many papers began to voice their fears that
the experience and realities of the volunteers service had corrupted the morals of the
individuals who participated in the excesses during the war. One writer, for example,
contended that “this war has introduced crime and vice among us.” The writer continued
by explaining that “no one can know, until he has witnessed it, the hardening influence of
war upon the characters of those who are engaged in it. He, who under the name of glory
can coolly blow out the brains of his fellow man, or urge a bayonet into his bosom, has
taken a lesson in blood, the effects of which he has rarely the ability or disposition to
George Winston Smith and Charles Judah, Chronicles of the Gringos: The U.S. Army in the Mexican
War, 1846-1848, Accounts of Eyewitnesses and Combatants (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico
Press, 1968), 133. Many within antebellum society considered gambling a particularly nasty evil. For
example, it is commonly written that soldiers during the Civil War would throw out their playing cards on
the eve of a battle so that they would not be found in their possession in the event they were killed in the
battle.
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shake off.”448 Many within the United States feared that the returning volunteers would
arrive with a different moral, and more savage, bearing than they possessed upon leaving
due to their participation in the plunder and pillage of Mexico. In particular, they feared
that the rigors and realities of combat had corrupted their republican virtue, and that they
would be useless as citizens when they returned. Furthermore, their participation in the
violence against Mexican citizens further infected their ideals of what a republican citizen
should be.
Other papers noted the fact that renewed support for the regular army, and West
Point, could be found in places other than the papers. In particular, the Indiana State
Sentinel pointed out that the first session of the thirteenth Congress witnessed additional
appropriations passed for the military academy at West Point. These appropriations
included “additional pay for officers, instructors, cadets, and musicians.”449 This
resolution further allowed officers’ allowances for subsistence, housing, clothing for
servants, and repairs. The military academy itself also received funding for more
barracks, a sign that the number of cadets might soon be increasing. Overall, as this
article testified, 1848 saw several advancements for the regular army and West Point
from a congress that only a few years prior had contemplated dissolving both institutions
permanently. Following the conclusion of hostilities, though, much of this sentiment
changed.
By March 1848, the United States’ war against Mexico had come to a conclusion
following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in February of that year. The war had gone
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quite well for the United States, with the American army winning every major battle of
the war leading up to Winfield Scott’s capture of Mexico City in September 1847.
Following the cessation of hostilities many newspapers and correspondents across the
nation reflected on the war’s course, and attempted to interpret what the war meant for
the future of the United States. At least some of these papers reflected on what the superb
performance of the regular army meant for its future. In March 1848 the Vermont
Watchman and State Journal printed a speech delivered by Representative George P.
Marsh of Vermont. In this speech, Marsh described the course of the war and the battles
that had been fought since 1846, and bemoaned the habit that prevailed across the nation
of not giving the regular army the credit it deserved for its share of the victory. To
counter this trend, the paper took care to note the role of the regular army in the many
battles that had been fought since the beginning of the war. Moreover, the article referred
“to the injustice with which the officers of the regular army have been treated.” The
article continued by arguing that:
not only have they been denied the promotion to which experience and faithful
service had entitled them, but it has been the studied effort of the administration, and the
party that sustains it, to deprive them of the credit which justly belongs to them for the
brilliant successes that have crowned our military operations in Mexico, by ascribing to
the mere animal courage of the volunteers and new raised regiments, results which were
in a far greater degree due to the skill and intelligence of the educated gentlemen of the
regular army, by whom the most important movements were directed or advised.450
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Marsh continued by arguing that the lack of recognition shown the regulars stemmed
from the pre-war Congressional assaults on both the regular army and West Point, and
noted that “creditable as are our recent victories to the bravery of our troops, they are far
more important to our national safety and renown, as furnishing to the world evidence
that the highest order of strategical talent exists among us, and our system of military
education is able to produce as accomplished a corps of officers as the best educated
European professional schools.”451 Lastly, Marsh summarized his arguments by pointing
out that “the disposition to withhold from the regular officers the praise and the rewards
to which they are justly entitled is not an accident, not a mere matter of personal feeling
with the members of the present cabinet, but it is one among the many evidences of a
design, which has been long entertained by a certain party, to demoralize the army, break
down its esprit de corps, abolish the military academy, and convert the military
establishment into an engine of political corruption.” Marsh concluded by warning that
“among other ‘reforms’ which will signalize the triumph of radicalism, will be the
suppression of the school at West Point, rotation of office in the military service, and the
establishment of the principle that political subserviency is the only route to military
preferment.”452
Once the war ended, the newspapers began to report and cover the return of the
volunteers to their home states. The South Carolina based Sumter Banner for example,
reported in 1848 that the South Carolina regiment would be returning home shortly. The
papers noted that “preparations are commencing throughout the state to receive, with all
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the honors due to them, the volunteers, who form a remnant of the Palmetto Regiment.”
The paper concluded by urging “our citizens to ready to hail them with appropriate
honors, and prove their appreciation of the gallantry and bravery of the Sumter
volunteers, as a part of the Palmetto Regiment and the army of Mexico.”453 This article
demonstrated the zeal and fervor many states expressed for their volunteers. Furthermore,
another article noted that the regiment would receive a silver star from the Governor of
South Carolina for their service on the battlefields of Mexico.454 These papers usually did
not mention the return of the regulars or talk about the glory or distinction they might
have won on the battlefield. When they did mention the regulars, they simply mentioned
that the war had ended and the regulars would be returning home even though many went
straight into garrison duty on the frontier. For example, on the same day the grand article
outlining the return of the Palmetto regiment appeared in the the Sumter Banner, another
article, which reported the general ending of the war, cooly noted that the several regular
regiments had been ordered back to the United States. This article did not approach the
glorification the Palmetto regiment received.455 Overall, most papers reserved their
applause for the volunteers. That said, by 1848, as we shall see, a lot of the public fervor
in support of the volunteers had cooled.
Coverage of the issues relating to the future of the regular army continued well
after the conclusion of the Mexican War in many papers. As late as 1850, for example,
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the New York Tribune reported developments along these lines to its readers, thus
demonstrating the fact that these readers were still concerned about such issues. As late
as 3 December 1850 the paper reported an address by Secretary of War C.M. Conrad. In
particular, the article quoted Conrad as arguing that “the Military Academy continues, by
its excellent discipline and admirable course of instruction, to afford ample guarantees
that it will realize the expectations of the country and sustain the high reputation it has
hitherto enjoyed.”456 On another occasion, under a headline that read “Professional pay at
West Point” the paper exalted to its readers that the Senate raised the pay for professors
at West Point from $1,500 to $2,000 per year. The article noted that the bill did have its
detractors, but also pointed out that in the end the measure passed and West Point’s
professors received their pay raise.457
While some papers were willing to acknowledge the abilities of the regular army,
or detract from the volunteers, this did not apply to all papers. Many papers, and their
readers, still exhibited a distrust of the regular army. Postwar the regular army had its
defenders as well as detractors. In particular, at least some Whig politicians supported the
regular army as evidenced by a debate covered in the Pennsylvania Mountain Sentinel.
The paper reported a debate that had ensued regarding remarks proffered by William F.
Johnston, the Governor of Pennsylvania. Along these lines, the paper recorded Johnston
as stating:
It is believed that other states have taken honorable notice of their officers in the
regular army, who risked their lives and nobly maintained the national honor in
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the recent contest with Mexico, and their example should remind us that
something is due the brave and heroic officers yet living, who, in the sanguinary
battles of the late war, signalized themselves by meritorious conduct, and proudly
sustained the just renown of our beloved commonwealth.458
Furthermore, Johnston called for the state to recognize its natives who served as officers
within the regular army. Johnston’s comments certainly reflected a belief that the regular
army had performed admirably in Mexico, and that this service should not go unnoticed
by the state. In response to these comments, the paper noted that “we are not disposed to
say ought against the officers of the Regular Army, but on the contrary, are willing to
bear testimony in favor of their gallantry and bravery.”459 Furthermore, northern papers
appear to have been more supportive of the regular army than southern papers. Perhaps
this is due to the large number of volunteer regiments from the south, or perhaps the
strong presence of the Democratic party impacted the southern view of the regular army.
While the paper claimed to support the regular army and its endeavors, they did
not like the fact that Governor Johnston omitted the volunteers from his praise regarding
Pennsylvania natives in the Mexican War. The article offered a long critique of
Johnston’s message that illuminated their feelings regarding the regular army. Many of
the fears of The Mountain Sentinel, a thoroughly Democratic paper, boiled down to
political allegiances as the paper remarked “officers of the regular army! They are nearly
all Whigs!” The paper further developed a general critique of the disparity between the
treatment received by the regulars and that received by the volunteers. Along these lines
the paper pointed out that “‘the officers of the regular army’ are well enough cared for.
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They were occupied with their business when engaged in Mexico, they received heavy
pay and enjoy high consideration.”460 The article continued by arguing that “if, as
between the regular officers and the volunteers, either is deserving of special praise and
consideration at the hands of the people, the Executive, and the Legislature, it is
unquestionably the latter.”461 In general, the Democratic Party proved less supportive of
the regular army, so it is not surprising that Democratic newspapers were less supportive
of them as well. The article argued that the volunteers deserved this credit as the more
virtuous between themselves and the regulars as they had left their homes and professions
to take on the duties of a soldier, whereas the regulars simply acted in the manner
expected of them. By enlisting, the volunteers had displayed their republican virtue, and
would soon return to a civilian life. The regulars, on the other hand, went to Mexico
because it was their job and they were paid to do it. Therefore, the paper felt they were
driven less by any sense of patriotism or duty, and more by a mercenary desire for pay
and money. Because of this, they were viewed as less virtuous than men who had
willingly volunteered their service to the army. This article certainly demonstrated that
the regular army still had its share of critics to deal with following the Mexican War, but
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it also acknowledges that, as evidenced by Governor Johnston’s remarks, some people
did defend the regular army. Also, the article itself noted that they did not want to detract
from the regular army. Instead, they simply disliked the omission of the volunteers from
Johnston’s address.
This coverage of the soldiers who went to fight in the Mexican War illuminated
several things. First, while many papers began the war by giving almost all of their
attention to the volunteers, by the end of the war, some papers, although grudgingly, were
willing to admit that the regulars had performed well during the Mexican War. Also, this
coverage suggests that the debates to close West Point and eliminate the Regular Army,
that swirled around Congress prior to the war, had not conclusively been ended prior to
the war. By 1848, however, Congress seemed ready to conclude these debates. From
1848 through 1850 these debates proved increasingly more congenial to the regular army
and West Point as attacks on these two institutions slowly ceased in the aftermath of the
Mexican War. The primary reasons for this shift in opinion were two-fold. First, the
regular army had proven its capabilities during the Mexican. Furthermore, the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo brought a large amount of new territory into the United States.
Congress realized that the regular army would be required to garrison this new territory.
As with the newspaper coverage, even the regular army’s opponents had to acknowledge
that it had performed a necessary service during the Mexican War, and that they had
proven their worth in that regard. Also, from 1848 onward, the Whig Party increased in
strength on the nation stage. This increase in the power of the Whigs, who had proven
more willing to support the regular army, also explains the increased support for the
regular army and West Point.
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As described in Chapter 1, Congress argued about reductions to the army
throughout the period leading up to the outbreak of the Mexican War. The first half of the
1840s witnessed a series of reductions to the army. In 1843, for example, Congress
moved to reduce both the size of the army and the amount of funding it received. In this
year, Edward Stanly, the chairman of the Military Committee in the House of
Representatives, reported this reduction to the army. This report argued that in order to
further reduce the size of the army and thus cut military expenses, the number of
commissioned officers should be reduced to a proportion “corresponding with the
reduction of privates.” Stanly further hoped that “after the decision of that body
[Congress] as to the extent and manner of the reduction, the subject would not again be
agitated, at least until some experience had enabled us to judge of the operation of the
measures then adopted.” Overall, Stanly feared that Congress would not stop with the
reductions it had just undertaken, but would continue to further reduce the size of the
army. To this end, Stanly’s report argued that the subject of reductions for the army had
been thoroughly researched, and that the army then operated on the minimum numbers
possible, and that any further reductions would be disastrous to its future. To support this
argument, Stanly pointed out that in 1808 Congress had reduced the size of the army.
This move almost had disastrous results in the War of 1812. Following this war, Stanly
reported that the size of the army had once again been reduced in 1821, but that “the
reduction of the army in 1821 was excessive,” that “would seem to have been proved by
an experience too dearly bought to be soon forgotten.”462 Given how desperate
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Congressional reductions on the army had been, it is understandable that Stanly feared
any further reductions.
The big problem, or disastrous experience, that Stanly referred to in his speech
was the Black Hawk War and other troubles the army faced concerning Native American
rebellions and wars. Stanly argued that these troubles could have easily been avoided if
the size of the army had not been so drastically reduced. Furthermore, by this point
rumblings from Mexico were already starting to be felt. This situation became even more
desperate in the next few years as a dispute between the United States and Britain broke
out over control of the Oregon territory. While this dispute was ultimately settled
peacefully, many feared that the United States might soon face a war with Britain over
Oregon, and Mexico over Texas at the same time. Therefore, it is understandable why
Stanly and other supporters of the army were so worried over these proposals for more
reductions for the army. Once war broke out with Mexico, the United States quickly
moved to reverse decades of reductions to the army by creating several new regular
regiments. While numerous volunteer regiments were also raised, Congress and President
Polk felt the nation should raise several new regular regiments to increase the size of the
standing regular army. To this end, President Polk reported to Congress that “in order to
prosecute the war against Mexico with vigor and success, it is necessary that authority
should be promptly given by Congress to increase the regular army, and to remedy its
existing defects in its organization.”463
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Once the Mexican War ended, Congress once again got back to business as usual.
Despite its wildly successful outcome, by 1848, the war had become very unpopular
within many circles of the United States. New England, particularly, had come to
denounce the war as an attempt by the southern states to expand the institution of slavery.
To counter these accusations, David Wilmot introduced his proviso banning the
introduction of slavery into any territory gained from the Mexican War. While the
proviso ultimately failed to pass the Senate, it illustrated the divided nature in which
many had come to view the Mexican War. With the war, and thus the military, fresh on
everyone’s minds, Congress once again turned to the pre-war debate over the future of
West Point and the regular army, a debate the war had interrupted before its conclusion.
Few could deny the battle record of the regular army during the Mexican War, as regular
regiments had shouldered the heaviest burden on the battlefield.464 Following the
cessation of hostilities the Georgia legislature offered its support to Congress for the
regular army and West Point. On 24 February they recorded that:
with pride and exultation it recurs to the battlefields of the Rio Grande and of
Mexico, in the war now waging, as evidence of the patriotism and gallantry of our
people; but more especially to mark, by some deliberate expression, the sense it
entertains of the value of the military institution of the United States at West
Point, as illustrated by the science, the skill, the courage, and noble bearing of her
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cadets, and to whom is justly to be ascribed a large share of the lustre and glory
achieved by our arms.465
The comment above demonstrated that circles across the United States had begun to
realize the importance of the regular army. Furthermore, this realization came as a direct
result of the actions of the regular army during the recent Mexican War. It is even more
interesting considering the support came from Georgia, a state firmly supportive of the
Democratic Party, as most Democratic supporters championed the value and virtue of the
volunteers as opposed to the regular army.
Another indication of the strengthened support the regular army and West Point
enjoyed following the Mexican War came from the amount of funding and appropriations
given to these institutions. Throughout the 1830s and 1840s funding for the regular army
and West Point had remained consistently low. In 1842, for example, Congress allotted
only $16,200,837.18 to support the armed forces, including the army, navy, and military
academy at West Point.466 The Mexican War changed much of this however. During the
fiscal year of 1848 Congress allotted a total of $47,434,824.70 toward supporting the
army in Mexico.467 Naturally, fighting a war is expensive, and it is natural for military
funding to increase during the period of active hostilities in Mexico. While funding
naturally decreased in the years following the conclusion of the Mexican War, it
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remained significantly higher than it had been prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In 1849
alone Congress allotted $24,153,102.92 to support the armed forces.468 Furthermore,
after the initial funding for 1850 proved insufficient to maintain the increased size and
role of the army, Congress passed additional funding to supplement operational costs for
the year. In particular, on 5 July 1850 Congress approved an additional $1,076,901.00 to
help the army make it through the remainder of the fiscal year.469 This came in addition
to the $33,697,152.15 Congress had already allotted for the armed forces in 1850.470
The conclusion of the Mexican War presented Congress with an interesting
problem in the form of new territory in California, New Mexico, and Arizona among
other places. These gains meant Congress and the army now had a vastly expanded
frontier to protect and defend. As such, peace meant that the regular army received little
reprieve as it would immediately be sent to garrison and patrol this new territory. These
developments meant expanded support for the regular army as Congress now needed to
increase the size of the regular army in order to adequately garrison the new frontier.
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In his 1851 State of the Union Address, President Millard Fillmore spoke
concerning the nation’s new needs and a need to increase the size of the regular army. In
particular, Fillmore argued that “to the difficulties of defending our own territory, as
above mentioned, are superadded, in defending that of Mexico, those that arise from its
remoteness, from the fact that we have no right to station our troops within her limits, and
that there is no efficient military force on the Mexican side to cooperate with our own.”
He continued by adding that “so long as this shall continue to be the case, the number and
activity of our troops will rather increase than diminish.” Furthermore he added that
“these troops are necessary.” On speaking of the American presence in these areas,
Fillmore added that the American presence “cannot be increased, however, without an
increase of the army; and I again recommend that measure as indispensable to the
protection of the frontier.”471 Fillmore’s speech demonstrated an increased level of
support for the regular army following the Mexican War. While many still might not
have liked the regular army, they had at least begun to admit that the regular army had
proved useful and would be necessary for the continued safety of the American frontier.
Overall, Fillmore noted that without increasing the size of the regular army, the American
presence on the western frontier must decrease.
By the 1850s the national debate concerning the future of West Point and the
regular army had evolved due to the experience of the Mexican War. During the war,

Millard Fillmore, “Message from the President of the United States, to the two Houses of Congress, at
the commencement of the first session of the Thirty-second Congress,” 2 December 1851, House and
Senate Documents, 634 H.exdoc.2/1. One of the problems which Fillmore is talking about concerns the
stipulations the United States agreed upon in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In particular, the United
States would not only be responsible for garrisoning and protecting their newly won territory, but also
agreed to utilize American troops to protect Mexico from Indian raids until Mexico could rebuild its armed
forces.
471

215

regular army junior officers leading the regular army met with resounding success on the
battlefield, and bore the brunt of active combat duty. Their success led Congress to
reluctantly concede the usefulness of both West Point and the regular army. Due to this,
the prewar debates concerning these institutions began to take on a different shape.
Instead of debating whether to close West Point and destroy the regular army, by 1848
Congress proved willing to concede the existence of these institutions, especially
considering the massive amount of new territory the army had to garrison and patrol. As a
result, the size of the regular army began to slowly increase throughout the 1850s.
Furthermore, Congress provided increased funding to the armed forces throughout the
1850s as well.
When the war with Mexico had began, many in the Congress and across the
United States held high hopes for the volunteers. These volunteers, they felt, represented
the ideal citizen soldier, driven to service by republican virtue. To these people, the
regular army represented tyranny and greed, as they went to war because it was their job
and they were paid to do it. By the war’s conclusion, however, this view had changed.
While some still disliked the regular army and West Point, many others came to view
them in a new light. The regulars had fought well and been instrumental in the battlefield
victories that brought the war to a swift and successful conclusion. Furthermore, the
regular army would be needed to garrison the newly expanded frontier. West Point had
also proven itself during the war, providing almost all of the junior officers who helped
lead the regular army. Due to these developments, support and funding for the regular
army increased following the Mexican War. Also, calls to close West Point and destroy
the regular army subsided following the conclusion of the Mexican War.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo signaled the ending of more than just the
Mexican War. While the treaty brought the conflict to a successful finish for the United
States, the war’s end also signaled a conclusion to debates that had threatened the
existence of both the regular army and the military academy at West Point. These
debates, that had raged in Congress prior to the outbreak of war, drew to a conclusion in
1848 due to both the resounding success of the war. During the war, the regular army
proved instrumental to the American victory in Mexico. Throughout the war, the regular
army bore the brunt of the fighting. Furthermore, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
greatly expanded the western frontier of the United States. Congress realized that whether
or not they liked the regular army, they would need it to garrison and patrol this new
territory. As a result of these developments, calls to close West Point and destroy the
regular army slowly subsided following the conclusion of the Mexican War.
Historians have often used the Mexican War as a starting point from which to
begin discussion of the origins of the Civil War. While the question of what to do with
the territory gained during the Mexican War did inaugurate an intense debate regarding
the westward expansion of slavery, an understanding of the war with Mexico serves a
more important purpose than just providing a starting point for the Civil War. Instead, as
evidenced by the actions of regular and volunteer junior officers throughout the war, the
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Mexican War became a social battlefield over issues such as anti-Catholicism and racism.
In this manner, the Mexican War is just as closely connected to Jacksonian America as it
is to the Civil War. For example, the long-standing fear of a regular army reached in peak
during the 1830s and 1840s with Congressional attempts to dismantle the regular army
and close West Point. The Mexican War experience of the army, both regular and
volunteer, answered many of these fears. Therefore, the Mexican War can teach us about
more than just the Civil War, and represents many unique debates itself. Instead of just
serving as a starting point for discussions about the Civil War, the Mexican War is
important as a catalyst for the social issues that divided Jacksonian America.
This dissertation explores many of the social issues of the day such as
professionalism, the existence of a standing army, anti-Catholicism, and racism. Apart
from these issues, sectionalism and American views on land reform in Mexico also
divided the American army, and impacted its service in Mexico. Many American
officers, as illustrated briefly in chapter 3, felt that Mexican land could only be useful if
inhabited by white American farmers. These views, usually demonstrated by southern
officers, denote earlier Jeffersonian views concerning the importance of land and
agriculture for the future of an American Republic. To many serving in the war, Mexico
represented available land for the extension of American agriculture. It is interesting that
these debates regarding the possibilities for Mexican lands usually failed to mention the
institution of slavery, but it may be assumed that southern officers felt slavery would
naturally follow American expansion into Mexico. This debate over what would happen
to Mexican lands following the war’s conclusion was also inextricably tied to race. The
reason for crop failure in Mexico, American officers argued, did not lie with the quality
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of the land. Instead, the Mexican people were to blame for these problems. They argued
that the Mexicans were a lesser race, and felt they would never be able to utilize their
land to its full potential. The land, they argued, held great promise, but this promise could
only be fully realized if white Americans inhabited this land. This view also
demonstrated their views regarding manifest destiny. In many ways, manifest destiny was
closely tied to race, and these officers felt that it was America’s destiny to expand into
these areas. They excused this expansion by arguing that only a white presence in Mexico
could help its land reach its full potential. In this manner, expansion could be excused as
a positive force for all parties involved.
Another issue which had already begun to divide the nation, and which would
greatly intensify in the decade following the end of the Mexico War, was sectionalism.
During the next decade sectionalism became the most divisive issue in the United States.
While sectionalism was an issue during the Mexican War, it had not yet become as
virulent as it would in the years following the war. Due to this, many officers simply did
not mention, and were not concerned about sectionalism. Instead, these officers were
much more vocal about issues of race and anti-Catholicism. Because of this, I argue that
racism and anti-Catholicism offer more insight into how social and cultural issues
impacted the junior officer corps. American officers utilized these two issues to
demonstrate their own superiority over their opponents.
Sectionalism manifested itself most intensely within the ranks of the volunteers.
This sectionalism was mostly demonstrated by an intense regional and sectional rivalry
between different volunteer regiments. Northern regiments complained about the actions
of southern regiments, and southern regiments complained about northern regiments. For
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example, Colonel Samuel Ryan Curtis of the 3rd Ohio complained about southern habits
after he came into contact with several southern regiments in Mexico. In particular, he
wrote that “duelling is obnoxious to our morals and our laws, but southern men must in
some way be informed that we scorn their code of honor but do not fear their threats.”472
On another occasion, after viewing a mob in action, Curtis singled out a southern
regiment as the primary cause of the trouble. Specifically he reported that “several
officers of the Tennessee regiment of horse were mixed up in the crowd and one captain
was exceedingly boisterous being under the influence of liquor.”473
Sectionalism also manifested itself in the form of rivalries between regiments of
the same region. For example, following the Battle of Monterrey, Captain Robert C.
Foster of the 1st Tennessee complained bitterly that several officers from Jefferson
Davis’ Mississippi regiment took credit for the victory, when in fact Foster argued that
the Tennessee regiment had been responsible for the victory. Foster reported that “it had
been ingloriously attempted by some, and with but little regard to truth, at least in some
instances, to steal from our gallant regiment the laurels that they have so dearly
purchased at the cost of so much blood.”474 To add fuel to these rivalries, newspapers
often exalted in the accomplishments of local regiments while vilifying the actions of
regiments from other sections of the nation. The regulars, on the other hand, usually did
not participate in these sectional rivalries. Instead, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, they
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usually simply complained about the volunteer system and volunteer regiments as a
whole without regard to regional or sectional affiliation.
The regular army relied on a professional ethos in its officers. This
professionalism, which was instilled by their education at West Point, provided the
regular officers with knowledge about setting up camps, and how to conduct themselves
on the battlefield. Their training provided them with a professional mentality that helped
them view themselves as separate from the rest of the army. For example, regular officers
viewed themselves as superior to volunteer officers. As chapter 2 and 3 point out, though,
this professionalism clearly had its limitations. Both regular and volunteer officers
engaged in assaults on the Catholic Church and faith in Mexico, and both demonstrated
racist attitudes toward their opponents. Since both the regulars and volunteers reacted to
these issues in the same manner, they had more in common with each other than either
dared admit. Because of these similarities, many in Congress and across the nation slowly
began to accept the regular army and West Point. Whereas the volunteers were supposed
to represent republican virtue, their actions called this view into question. Furthermore,
the fact that the regular army and volunteers reacted similarly to these social issues also
proved that, despite fears to the contrary, the regular army could work within a republican
framework, and was not the tyrannical force that many feared.
By 1848 the position of the regular army and West Point had proved much more
stable than it was prior to the outbreak of the Mexican War. Congressional attempts that
sought the destruction of the regular army and closure of West Point ceased. During the
decade following the Mexican War, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the regular army’s
position solidified within Congress and the United States. Because of this, the regular
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army slowly began to enlarge throughout the 1850s. By 1861, the regular army numbered
just over sixteen thousand. While this might seem like a trivial number by today’s
standards, it represented a huge growth considering the size of the regular army in 1846
had only been around 7,000. Also, while both sides in the Civil War once again relied on
volunteer armies, both sides drew on West Point graduates to lead those armies. In this
manner, the regular army remained a crucial component of both armies throughout the
Civil War. Furthermore, the Civil War simply proved too large for the regular army to
handle. Because of this, volunteers comprised the large majority of both armies. Thus,
following the Mexican War the condition of both West Point and the regular army were
greatly improved.
While the Mexican War positively altered the public’s opinion of the regular
army, it did not greatly alter perceptions about the volunteer system. Following the war,
many in Congress and across the nation continued to rely on volunteers as an effective
force in a time of emergency. For example, when the Civil War broke out in 1861 both
the Union and Confederate governments quickly began to raise large volunteer armies.
Despite their questionable record during the Mexican War, few if any called for the
eradication of the volunteer system.
While few called for the destruction of the volunteer system, this does not mean
that the volunteers’ record in Mexico did not raise questions. Prior to the Mexican War
many viewed the volunteer system as the bulwark of a republican society, and felt that
the volunteers embodied the virtuous spirit required by a republic. The actual service of
the volunteers called these perceptions into question, though. The intense antiCatholicism and racism exhibited by the volunteers contradicted many of the thoughts
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regarding the virtues of the volunteers. When American journalists learned of these
developments, they began to print articles denouncing many volunteers’ actions. Prior to
the Mexican War many in the United States also argued that, unlike the regulars, the
volunteers fought out of a sense of duty and patriotism for the nation. This was not the
case in Mexico, though. Many volunteers, such as Syndenham Moore who hoped to use
the war to gain a higher judicial seat, enlisted in the hope of winning fame on Mexican
battlefields which could be translated into a higher social standing following the
conclusion of hostilities. Lastly, the volunteers simply did not perform as well on the
battlefield as the regular army. Throughout the Mexican War regulars and volunteers had
largely fought segregated from one another. Following the Mexican War, this slowly
began to change. During the Civil War, for example, regular officers often were placed in
command of volunteers.
Throughout the antebellum period the United States modeled its army after the
armed forces of the its European counterparts. As such, West Point taught a similar
curriculum to European service academies, which heavily focused on engineering. This
proved instrumental in the process of professionalization of the army. While these
officers learned how to develop strategies and how to act on campaigns, the engineering
background of the army played just as crucial a role to the development of the regular
army and its intended purpose. As stated in the introduction, by 1846 the United States
had become an expanding empire. The territorial gains of the Mexican War expanded this
young empire to the Pacific Ocean. While many in Congress and the United States
championed what they viewed as the virtuous volunteers, they realized that this system
was not conducive to empire building. A volunteer force could be raised to defend
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territory, but volunteers were not an effective force for building or maintaining an
empire. The excesses of the volunteer during the Mexican War proved that volunteers
were not well suited to garrison duty. Instead, a regular army was needed to build and
maintain the American empire. To fulfill this role, though, a professional force would be
needed. West Point thus played the role of creating a force with the proper background
and education to fulfill this role. Through their engineering background, regular officers
would be well suited to build the forts, roads, and infrastructure needed to build and
maintain America’s western empire. Furthermore, the greater discipline of the regular
army made them much more well suited to garrisoning the western frontier. In this
manner, professionalism, provided by their education at West Point, proved the deciding
factor in the success of the regular army following the Mexican war. While the regulars
and volunteers both displayed racism and anti-Catholicism, only the regulars could fill
the role the United States needed to secure its expanding empire. Due to this, the position
of the regular army solidified following the Mexican War, and calls for its destruction
ceased. Calls to close the military academy at West Point also concluded due to this
development. In this manner, professionalism during the Mexican War influenced and
altered the antebellum debate regarding the closure of West Point and the destruction of
the regular army.
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